The Rising Phoenix

As a direct companion to Neo-Joseon thought's view on society, the role of the State, and gender relations, Neo-Joseon thought also has a broader national identity aspect to it: how Koreans should view themselves in the framework of both the modern world, and in history. As with Neo-Joseon thought as a whole, this comprises a substantial part of Premier Yi Kwon's cultural, societal, and national change plan.

The Neo-Joseon national identity can be summarized in one phrase: the Rising Phoenix.

The Rising Phoenix has reference to the Phoenix Throne of Joseon monarchs, a fact that is not missed by the monarchists promoting Neo-Joseon thought. But, more metaphorically, it refers to both a) the "victim mentality" that the school of thought has towards history, and b) the insurgent/vengeful aspect to modern Korean existence.

The victim mentality will center around the fact that, from 1892 to 1945, Korea was de facto ruled by foreign powers. First, from 1892 to 1895, as a tributary state to the Chinese, then from then onwards as a protectorate/vassal of Japan. The historical accuracy of this perception of Korean history is irrelevant - as with the former-PRC's victimhood strategy, the promotion of the victimhood narrative in Korean history serves one purpose: to instill a sense of bitterness, vengefulness, and "underdog" status to the Korean people.

In history and social studies classes across the country, ranging from basic history in the early years to detailed history in university years, this narrative will be implemented and enforced. A new generation of Koreans will grow up on the narrative that the Korean goodwill was exploited for half a century by Korea's two closest neighbors for their own gain. Focus will be put on certain real atrocities - forced labor by the Japanese and the existence of [comfort women](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comfort_women, for example - as well as imagined atrocities under the Chinese regime. Education will dive in depth into the utter destruction of Korean national thought and identity throughout these fifty years, and - perhaps most importantly - foreign influence in Korea will be blamed for the split between North and South. The Chinese and the Soviets in the North, and the Americans and the Japanese in the South. Again, the accuracy of this view on history is irrelevant.

As a sequel to what will be portrayed as the Korean equivalent to the Chinese "century of humiliation", the events from 1945 to 2020 will be portrayed as a direct continuation of foreign influence and meddling getting in the way of a unified Korea. Everything bad associated with the period - the Korean war, Northern and Southern atrocities and war crimes, the split - will not be blamed on Koreans, but on external factors.

All of this builds up to the central aspect of the Rising Phoenix national identity: the triumphant resurgence of Korea. The events of 2021 - the collapse of the US, the unification of Korea, and all of the good that has come since (with the bad being washed away) - will be cast as a direct contrast to the period from 1892 to 2020. Koreans taking back Koreans, despite external pressures, will be the narrative cast.

The most important part of the Rising Phoenix identity is not the view of the past or the present, but the impact that such a narrative has on the national psyche. It is the intent of the Rising Phoenix identity to cultivate an isolationist, militaristic, and wholly loyal populace. Isolationist, because of the lessons taught about the disaster of foreign intervention in Korea. Militaristic, because of the urge to never let such a travesty happen again without a fight, and because of the need for a national defense. And finally, loyal because of the fact that it was this renewed sense of a unified Korea that brought Korea out of it's own "century of humiliation."

The mindset will not take hold immediately, but over several years, and then several decades, it surely will.