Note: In this trial, I am using a style of legal citation wherein the name of the case (plaintiff v defendant) is followed by the bracketed year in which the request was made, and a number denoting the ordinal number of that case in the sequence of other cases made in that year of that name. Please contact me for clarification if necessary. This case may be referred to under this system as SpicyBoy v Godomasta (2019)1.

Introduction

1 SpicyBoy ( u/Stampedechive ) was the plaintiff, representing themself, bringing a case against the defendant, Godomasta ( u/Godomasta ), also representing themself. The request for trial was made here on the 1st of February 2019 (GMT), and I presided over the trial, from the 19th of February 2019 (GMT) to the 5th of March 2019 (GMT), here. I, Judge AllenY, took the case, presided over the trial, and am hereby issuing judgment.

2 The plaintiff brought a charge of 100.01 First-Degree Intentional Griefing, a charge of 100.02 Second-Degree Intentional Griefing, and a charge of 100.03 Third Degree Intentional Griefing, each claimed to be amplified by the sentencing consideration of 100.04 Severe Griefing, which is to say all of the charges each with all of the sentencing escalations under the Mount Augusta Criminal Code 100. The defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges, and thus the verdict must find the defendant guilty or not guilty on these three charges.

Ownership of property

3 In order to have standing to bring a case, one must have suffered “direct harm”, as per the Constitution of Mount Augusta Article III. C. v. The plaintiff contended that they owned the property on which action took place, and thus suffered direct harm, whereas the defendant contended that the plaintiff did not own the property. It was not argued that the plaintiff might have suffered direct harm even if not owner of the properties, nor was it argued that the defendant was not the person who had done the actions which were alleged to be an offence. Therefore, the case was considered primarily on the question of whether the plaintiff was the owner, or not.

Argument from Godomasta v Figasaur (2019)1

4 I will first deal with the argument, primarily presented by the defence in their presentation of evidence and closing statement, that ownership of the property in question had already been transferred by the verdict of the trial Godomasta v Figasaur (2019)1, because this argument was made early in the trial, and because I did not find it convincing, and can thus eliminate its line of reasoning from the rest of the trial.

5 While this court does not have the scope to change any of the rulings laid down by the court in Godomasta v Figasaur (2019)1, I do not consider that that court in fact laid down a ruling that Figasaur owned the property in question.

6 The defendant quoted the verdict of Godomasta v Figasaur (2019)1:

Per the request of the plaintiff, the court exercises its right under the Treason statute found in MACC§500.1.5 to declare the defendant's properties immediately derelict without the ability to contest or deny. As evidenced in this trial, the defense claims to be the owner of all properties in the JQ, and therefore this applies to all said properties.

The court took action “to declare the defendant’s properties immediately derelict”, and then described the properties it understood to be the defendant’s in saying “this applies to all said properties”. By “this”, the court meant the declaration of the defendant’s properties as derelict. It makes sense to say that the court declared the defendant’s properties derelict, and took this action only. The alternative interpretation is that the court first declared property as the defendant’s, then declared the property of the defendant derelict. This would be a curious procedure, one it is odd to interpret the court to have taken, given that the wording of the Mount Augusta Criminal Code 500.01 5. says that:

a. The sentencing judge may recommend that some or all of the property owned (within the borders of Mount Augusta) by the individual convicted of treason may be declared derelict, effective immediately and without appeal.

It makes reference to the property owned by the individual, without specifying anything about a court procedure to declare the property to be owned by the individual, or anything else that would clarify ownership with regards to the individual and third parties. If in a judgment about an offence X a court opined that the defendant was guilty of offence Y, neither that trial nor another trial about the defendant committing offence Y could use this as a legally binding ruling, unless the first court made clear that it intended to behave in an irregular manner and specifically rule on offence Y; even in this situation, the other court’s ruling’s validity would be in question.

7 Not only does this reading make textual sense, but promotes justice, as it would be unreasonable for a trial in which third parties did not even participate to deprive them of their property, and so I have taken this interpretation. To be clear: it is the opinion of this court that if the property in question was owned by Figasaur, Godomasta v Figasaur (2019)1 declared it derelict. However, if the property was not owned by Figasaur, then no change in the ownership of the property occurred because of the verdict of that case.

Argument against Godomasta v Figasaur (2019)1

8 On the other hand, the plaintiff argued, primarily in their cross-examination and calling of witnesses, that the verdict of Godomasta v Figasaur (2019)1 was illegal, in that the declaration of property as derelict immediately by the courts would violate the Constitution of Mount Augusta Mount Augusta Bill of Rights XII. This court, as before, will not rule differently on the same matters decided in another case, which can be overturned with mistrial proceedings; the proper procedure for overturning other courts’ decisions is through the Constitution of Mount Augusta Article III. D. ii. The court in Godomasta v Figasaur (2019)1 declared derelict Figasaur’s property. Thus, this line of reasoning is also extinguished.

Argument about validity of transfer

9 The defence also suggested that the manner in which the transfer occurred was invalid, primarily in their closing statement, drawing on the Mount Augusta Criminal Code 600.02 2. However, these arguments were generally invalid because that section specifies the requirements for a contract to be prosecuted under the Mount Augusta Criminal Code 600.02, not the requirements for property to have been validly transferred. There are no regulations on the transfer of property, and thus any property owner may transfer any property to any legal person, even without consideration, formalities, etc. The parts of the defence argument which argued the transfer was done without owning the property in question are not necessarily relevant to specifically contract law. This is to say that this notice (henceforth Exhibit B) would be valid if its poster were indeed the owner of the properties.

Evidence of ownership

10 The question of the ownership of the property then comes down to the evidence provided. Whereas the plaintiff claimed that they were majority shareholder of the JQPA, a body several members holding ownership of property in question, with Figasaur being a former majority shareholder, the defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to sustain this, given lack of records or documents.

11 There were three pieces of historical evidence given as to ownership; Exhibit A, specifically the relevant comment of Figasaur claiming ownership from the 30th of December 2018 (GMT), Exhibit B, posted on the 30th of January 2019 (GMT), and Exhibit C, posted on the 31st of January 2019 (GMT). The verdict of Godomasta v Figasaur (2019)1 was handed down on the 23rd of January, 2019 (GMT), after the first piece of evidence here but before the second and third.

12 From this evidence, ownership cannot clearly be determined. While Figasaur claimed to be an owner on the 30th of December 2018, it is not clear whether this meant under the framework of the JQPA, and as majority or minority holder. Similarly, it is not clear whether on the 30th of January, Cr0c was the sole, majority, minority or even an owner of the property in consideration (given that it is certainly possible the properties were all declared derelict earlier). It is also said that Cr0c, “not Fig” owns the property; whether this means Figasaur is not a majority, minority, or owner at all is also up for debate, though the last interpretation seems most likely.

13 The most important thing is that the witness called by the plaintiff said that “[the JQPA’s] finances are not available to the public, largely bc they are done over vc.” What this introduces is uncertainty at any one time who owns the property in question, within the framework of the JQPA. Even though the testimony of Figasaur, Cr0c and SpicyBoy assert that SpicyBoy is the majority owner in the present, the precise ownership at the moment of declaration of dereliction is not known to the court, and no evidence was provided as to it; there was certainly much time for trading in the time between the two earlier Reddit threads, and it was during this time that the declaration of dereliction occurred. Perhaps it is likely and sensible that property was transferred away from Figasaur to prevent its dereliction by court order, but this is merely conjecture.

14 Thus, it satisfies the court to find that it is uncertain that the property in question was not owned by Figasaur to the extent that it could be declared derelict at the time of the verdict of Godomasta v Figasaur (2019)1; it is at least likely that Figasaur was a minority holder, and whether a minority stake can be derelicted independently of other stakeholders is also an unknown, depending on the internal structure of the JQPA.

Conclusion

15 The Mount Augusta Criminal Code 100.01 defines First-Degree Intentional Griefing as “the willful destruction of property with the intent to cause destruction [or] death”, or “coercion by force, threat of force, fraud, payment or contracting by promise of payment or reimbursement any party” to achieve the above, or “materially assisting” the achievement of the above. This must be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt”. Implicit in finding someone guilty of a charge is that the bringer of the charge has the right to do so. There is a reasonable doubt over whether this is the case. Thus, I find the defendant Godomasta not guilty of one charge of 100.01 First-Degree Intentional Griefing. This also means that without an offence to escalate, the “degree of sentencing” escalation resulting from 100.04 does not apply.

16 Second-Degree Intentional Griefing is defined at the Mount Augusta Criminal Code 100.02 as:

the willful destruction of property with the intent to gain entry … [t]he coercion by force, threat of force, fraud, payment or contracting by promise of payment or reimbursement any party with the goal of causing the above … [m]aterially assisting anyone via donation of goods, materials, or other aid (snitch network access, etc.) with the goal of causing the above

Its burden of proof is set at a standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt”. As previously stated, there is a reasonable doubt over the eligibility of the plaintiff’s standing to bring charges dependent on their ownership of property, and thus I find the defendant Godomasta not guilty of one charge of 100.02 Second-Degree Intentional Griefing. This also means that without an offence to escalate, the “degree of sentencing” escalation resulting from 100.04 does not apply.

17 The Mount Augusta Criminal Code 100.03 provides Third-Degree Intentional Griefing as:

the willful destruction of property with the intent to cause disruption [or to] cause mischief … [or t]he coercion by force, threat of force, fraud, payment or contracting by promise of payment or reimbursement any party with the goal of causing the above [or m]aterially assisting anyone via donation of goods, materials, or other aid (snitch network access, etc.) with the goal of causing the above

Again, the standard of its burden of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt”; this burden has not been fulfilled by the plaintiff who has failed to prove their standing as owner and thus victim of direct harm beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, I find the defendant Godomasta not guilty of one charge of 100.03 Third-Degree Intentional Griefing. This also means that without an offence to escalate, the “degree of sentencing” escalation resulting from 100.04 does not apply.

18 In conclusion, I have found the defendant, Godomasta, not guilty, on all three charges. Here ends the verdict. Lex paciferat.