Ever since the end of the Reconquista Spain has begun to reintegrate itself within the affairs of European warfare. Starting with the military reforms of Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba, Gonzalo de Ayora, and others in the late 1400’s Spain has attempted to recreate various European styles of combat while maintaining the various strengths of the Spanish Army.

The wars of the early 1500’s and more importantly for Spanish military thinkers in this period the recent wars in Naples have allowed us to further develop and see what areas must be addressed and expanded upon in order to further improve the quality and fighting prowess of Spanish armies.

The State of the Guardias de Castilla and Heavy Cavalry:

It has become apparent that the performance of the Spanish Heavy Cavalry, which consists of our Men-at-Arms and heavily armored mounted knights, has been far from satisfactory. Indeed, our horsemen have fallen short when compared to the prowess of their Italian and French counterparts. Although the role of Cavalry in the Spanish military system assigns them a supporting role to our formidable Infantry, regrettably, they have often failed to accomplish this vital task, leaving our infantry vulnerable to enemy attacks.

In the recent memory of the year 1503 and more prominently in the conflict of Naples, the Spanish horsemen were unable to effectively deter the advances of the formidable French Knights, who thus claimed victory and a freedom of movement we so desperately sought. This inadequacy has forced us to hold men in reserve to counter these mounted threats, inevitably weakening our infantry core and hindering their ability to concentrate against the enemy infantry.

It is, therefore, of utmost importance that we address the pressing issue of the Spanish heavy cavalry. While we must acknowledge that even with substantial investments, our Men-at-Arms will not be able to rival the forces of the Roi overnight, diligent efforts must be made to improve their capabilities. To this end, we have employed esteemed Italian teachers and seasoned veterans of the Italian wars to establish schools dedicated to training our Spanish Knights, thereby imparting upon them the skills necessary to better fulfill their duties of protecting our infantry from enemy horsemen.

Furthermore, we shall construct new stables with the intent of increasing the quantity of finely bred warhorses that will be made available to our forces. This, in conjunction with the aforementioned schools of training, shall not only augment the quantity and quality of our Heavy Horsemen but also serve to reduce the costs associated with maintaining such a force.

To ensure the swift and effective execution of these initiatives, the Crowns of Spain allocates the sum of 150,000 florins.

Spanish Light Cavalry:

The valiant Jinetes, the very essence of our Spanish light Cavalry, have demonstrated their unparalleled prowess and adaptability in the ongoing Wars of Christendom. Mounted upon their noble Andalusian steeds and well-versed in the art of Moorish tactics, these skilled horsemen have proven indispensable in various aspects of the grand campaign, including scouting, raiding, and other essential tasks. Their presence on the battlefield is, without doubt, a force to be reckoned with.

Although the Jinetes may not possess the strength to confront the formidable Heavy Knights or Pikemen directly, their value in the theater of war cannot be overstated. By skillfully diverting the attention of the enemy's Men-at-Arms away from our infantry, the Jinetes can effectively disrupt the opposing forces' battle plans. Furthermore, their adeptness at wielding javelins and executing well-timed charges can render Pikemen vulnerable to their assaults. In the grim calculus of war, we must also consider the cost efficiency of the Jinetes; their sacrifices on the battlefield are well worth the strategic advantages they provide, especially when compared to the more expensive Men-at-Arms.

In light of their remarkable success and the necessity to further develop our distinct Spanish style of warfare, the Crowns of Spain hereby commit to investing in the expansion and improvement of stables, ensuring a constant supply of high-quality horses for our esteemed Jinetes. Additionally, we shall establish new training fields to increase the number of these dedicated men who stand ready to serve the Catholic Monarchs.

The generous sum of 200,000 florins shall be allocated for these investments, which we anticipate will have the dual effect of bolstering the ranks of our Jinetes while simultaneously reducing the costs required to maintain them.

The Spanish Infantry:

The bedrock of our Spanish military, the steadfast infantrymen, have held the line against countless foes since the 1490s military reforms that established them as the primary fighting force. With all other branches of the military designated as auxiliary, our infantry has proven itself to be a capable foe to all that oppose it, the ranks of Swiss, French, Italians, and others that lay fallen as proof.

Our conscription-based military system has permitted us to field a sizable and formidable force at a lower cost than many other European powers. However, the financial burden of maintaining an effective army remains a significant concern, necessitating the implementation of cost-reduction measures and the enhancement of both efficiency and quality.

The 1496 military reforms played a crucial role in achieving this, mandating that individuals of certain income levels furnish their own weapons, thereby reducing costs. These reforms mandated that “an income of 5,000 maravedis. Anyone who has a fortune equivalent to this sum must be able to present a shield, a spear and a sword and a helmet of arms. From 10,000 maravedis, " a shield, a cuirass, a spear and a sword " or " a cuirass and a helmet and a sword and a dagger and a dart and a crossbow and a quiver of arrows ". Those who would be at the head of a fortune of 20,000 maravedis will have to be in possession of all the said weapons. A fifth of these people, instead of the crossbow, will provide themselves " with an arquebus and one hundred and fifty balls and twenty pounds of powder ".

This has allowed many of our men to bring their own weapons further reducing the costs. Nevertheless, the art of war has evolved since the conception of these laws, and the needs of the Spanish Crowns have likewise transformed. To address these shifts, we must standardize the weaponry of our soldiers and adapt our infantry divisions according to the military innovations of El Gran Capitán:

1. Pikemen: These men will be armed with a standard 10 ft long pike made with either ash, oak, or fir. While the golden standard for Pikes should be those made with ash, due to the strength and flexibility of the wood, the less durable woods of fir and oak can be used to reduce costs. In addition these men must carry some sort of side weapon such as a sword or dagger in order to allow them to defend themselves should they either lose their pike or come close to the enemy.
2. Swordsmen: These men will be armed with the standard weapons of the traditional Spanish Rodeleros. Carrying buckler shields and one-handed swords these men have proven invaluable in the campaigns of Italy being able to break the deadlock of Pike warfare and inflicting massive casualties on our foes. Moreover, these men also carry a small number of javelins in order to further increase their killing power.
3. Gunmen: The arquebus, though in its infancy during the drafting of the aforementioned laws, has since become a mainstay in our armies as the principal ranged weapon of the infantry replacing the crossbow in its entirety. Gunmen must also carry a sidearm, such as a sword or dagger, for self-defense in close combat situations.

To support these standardization efforts, Spain must establish manufacturing centers dedicated to the mass production of these weapons, ensuring their availability for purchase by individuals who meet the income requirements or for distribution to conscripts who lack the necessary equipment. Furthermore, we must expand and construct new muster and training centers to facilitate the efficient training of larger numbers of soldiers. Our seasoned veteran captains, forged in the crucible of Spain's numerous conflicts, shall serve as invaluable instructors for the next generation of Spanish soldiers.

By adopting these reforms, we aim to reduce the financial burden on our citizens when arming themselves in accordance with the 1496 military reforms, and consequently, the Spanish Crown shall extend the program to include individuals from lower income brackets as well. To fund the arming of these lower income conscripts, an allocation of 50,000 florins per annum shall be dedicated to this cause to help subsidize these efforts.

With an investment of 500,000 florins, we are confident that our efforts to standardize weaponry, increase the production of equipment, expand training facilities and resources, and most importantly reduce the cost of our infantry core, will lead to a stronger and more cost-effective Spanish military, capable of defending our nation and achieving victory on the battlefield.

The New Infantry Weapon:

In recent conflicts on Italian soil, a lingering concern has emerged amongst Spanish military strategists. The arquebus, as it stands, is unable to penetrate the armor of the formidable French knights or halt a determined pike charge before it reaches our ranks. Until now, no weapon has been able to address this deficiency in firepower. However, Commandante Navarro has introduced a new weapon, the "Musket," which holds great promise. Measuring six feet in length and firing two-ounce balls, this heavy weapon has the potential to fell two armored cavalrymen with a single shot.

Navarro has employed the musket in his carts, but this tactic carries its own drawbacks. The use of carts restricts the number of deployable weapons, and though limited availability currently renders widespread deployment unfeasible, this constraint will diminish as more muskets are produced. Additionally, the carts impede the mobility of our forces; the army must deploy based on the carts' positions, and their slower movement dictates the pace of any advance. Nevertheless, the carts have demonstrated the musket's lethal efficacy against both knights and foot soldiers.

The primary challenge lies in deploying the musket effectively. While the weapon's destructive power is undeniable, its weight and unwieldiness hinder its use by the common soldier. To address this issue, Fernando d'Ávalos, the 5th Marquess of Pescara, who is currently recovering from injuries sustained in the 1512 Battle of Naples, has devised a solution. He has designed a "fork-shaped rest" that enables soldiers to use the musket effectively on foot, thus preserving their mobility and capitalizing on the weapon's deadly force. This rest supports the weapon during aiming and firing, allowing the soldier to lift it and move to the rear of the formation to reload. The preliminary trials of this device have yielded promising results, marking it as the preferred method for the musket's deployment moving forward.

Nevertheless, the scarcity of these weapons, currently numbering a mere 100 in the entire Spanish military, constitutes a significant hindrance. To address this shortfall, new musket manufacturing centers must be established to expedite production and facilitate the weapon's deployment. While the musket may not play a decisive role in the present conflict, we must prepare for its widespread use in future engagements by arming every gunman with such a weapon.

Spain has thus initiated the conversion of arquebus manufacturing facilities to musket production, ensuring that our ongoing military efforts are not adversely affected. Additionally, Spain recognizes the need to further alleviate the constraints on the deployment of these weapons in terms of both quantity and cost. We must produce more guns to increase the number of gunmen deployable in future campaigns and reduce the costs associated with arming, training, and maintaining them.

To realize these goals, Spain will allocate a sum of 400,000 florins to the endeavor.

The Question of Artillery:

During the Italian Wars, which began in the 1490s, the role of artillery has evolved from a minor aspect to a central component of military campaigns. The French have been at the forefront of refining artillery tactics, and while Spain has adopted many of these strategies, there remains room for improvement.

One significant shortcoming is the quantity of cannons available rather than the quality. While Spanish cannons are comparable in quality to their French counterparts, the French are able to field far greater numbers allowing them total dominance in nearly every battle. To address this deficiency, Spain must invest in new cannon foundries to increase the number of cannons available and reduce manufacturing costs. Additionally, Italian gunsmiths, particularly from Ferrara, will be brought in to oversee the manufacturing process, enhancing the quality of the cannons and introducing new methods to be implemented across Spain to further improve cannon quality.

Another area of discussion is the debate surrounding artillery tactics, specifically the debates on the deployment of siege artillery in a campaign and the debate between light artillery or field artillery for battle.

Beginning with the usage of siege artillery, throughout the campaigns in Italy a point of major note has arisen. That being the limitations of siege artillery in both a general campaign on the march as well as their lack of any use in a pitched field battle. While in Spain the ratio of siege to field gun is around 1/4th, a ratio that is still sufficient for the campaigns of Spain, these guns due to their immense size and weight highly limit the mobility of an army. Siege guns must be moved on large and well made roads restricting the paths which an army can maneuver. The quality of roads itself has been a continuous issue in campaigns across Italy, with weather, road damage, or other factors limiting the speed at which siege artillery can be moved and positioned. Moreover, the speed at which an army can move is very much determined by the pace of the siege artillery itself, which often results in the army marching far slower than it could if it were free of these limitations. This lack of mobility and the inherent limitations of siege guns in anything outside their specific role, specifically pitched battles, necessitates a change in the deployment of these weapons.

However, at the same time as the questions regarding siege artillery have arisen another topic of debate has begun, this being if the dominance of artillery in a pitched battle and what type it will be. The two types of cannon, light and field, both have advantages over one another. Field artillery has the advantage of being powerful, able to smash apart enemy formations and deal devastating losses. However, field artillery also lacks maneuverability and must be set up before a battle takes place with no chance of maneuvering it during the fighting. Light artillery is far less powerful but has the advantage of greater mobility both on march and during a battle.

With these two debates ongoing the questions of how Spain will adapt to these changing times. Firstly, regarding the questions on siege artillery Spain will begin the process of separating these cannons from its regular cannon trains. These guns will then be placed into dedicated siege artillery trains which will follow behind the main army, guarded by a small force and moving along the major roads. By doing this change it will allow for the mobility of the major force to be maintained, reduce the logistical consumption, and also open up alternate paths which would be unavailable. The general tactic should be that the mobility of the main army be maintained, allowing it to move ahead of the siege trains, fight battles in necessary, and construct the siege camp around the fortress in question, allowing the siege guns to arrive when it’s completed, wasting no time while maintaining all the advantages.

In addition, the mobility of Spanish armies are of the utmost importance. While the firepower of field artillery must be utilized in some capacity, the advantages of light artillery can assist us in overcoming the numerical deficiencies we face in the number of guns against the French. The ability to reposition mid barrage allows us to have a portion of our guns engaged in the ongoing barrage while others reposition to gain advantageous points of fire inflicting far greater losses. As a result, the supporters of light artillery have begun to have a greater influence on the thinking of Spanish military thinkers. Therefore, a reorganization of Spanish artillery must be done to increase the numbers of light artillery. The current number of 2 field artillery per Coronelía should be maintained in order to keep the devastating power of the field artillery both in a pitched battle and a siege but the number of light artillery, currently at 2 per Coronelía as well, must be increased. While Spain will aim to increase this to 4 per Coronelía it has yet to be seen if the investments in new foundry’s will prove enough to facilitate such an expansion.

To implement these changes and establish new cannon foundries, Spain will allocate 600,000 florins to the effort.

[M: All these reforms, technological developments, and investments have been approved by Blog]