Co-King Giorgio Bagrationi maintained the siege of Ardabil throughout the dead of winter, but it would not fall on time. Ismail Safavi Shah sent his cavalry on a rapid winter march to scout out the area. The infantry was slow to follow, plowing through frozen valleys, but the relief of the city would not have to wait for them. At the first reports of the Safavid cavalry force, which was the majority of their army, the Georgians cut their losses. Wary of being cut off or just generally a fair battle, Giorgi ordered a retreat from Ardabil. Just weeks after he had made a big show of a grand speech promising mountains of loot, as well as after months upon months of the siege, he retreated based on scouting reports. It was not a popular move.

With mixed feelings, the Georgian-Armenian army began to pull back to Armenia. Ardabil was free, and the gates opened to let whatever food could be mustered pour in. The city was saved from a brutal sack, but many people had starved, and many more collapsed in the winter cold, which took a heavy toll on the malnourished citizens suffering from a shortage of firewood. However, when at the start of Spring, Ismail returned, the mood was jubilant. The city had withstood the invader heroically.

The Georgians, meanwhile, had retreated safely. Ismail went after them looking for a victory. Not willing to lose another city like Tbilisi without a fight, King Giorgi started working on a plan for the battle. It was ambitious and it was cunning, just like his father’s plan had been at Psithi. Giorgi wanted to replicate that success, but not in a pass where Ismail would suspect it. He would need a river crossing. However, his plan suffered from a fatal, hubristic flaw typically found among novice tacticians: he drew a scheme based on specific terrain, without knowing whether it existed. Then, he sent scouts out to look for the perfect terrain. All reports came back negative, or if the terrain did fit his specifications, it was far from any of the main roads and nowhere near anywhere Ismail would go. A flawed location would have to do, but still convinced in the superiority of his scheme, Giorgi walked right into a defeat of his own making…

The plan was to allow Ismail to cross the river, in this case the Hakari, and approach a decoy camp. Then, from a hidding position, Giorgi would strike with the real army. Meanwhile, the most powerful component of the Georgian army, its heavy cavalry, would cross the river and strike the Safavids in the rear. King Aleksander, Giorgi’s father, counseled against the plan. Why let Ismail cross the river for free? Why send the knights to cross the river only after Ismail is already across? Furthermore, the hiding spots Giorgi had thought up were not up to par. Ismail went into the confrontation extremely cautiously, as he had no intention to ever tempt fate again like at Psithi. As such, he only crossed after he had received scouting reports, which offered detailed descriptions of the Georgian (decoy) camp, but also of a second camp, poorly hidden. The trap was obvious.

Ismail crossed the river playing the part of the fool well. While he loudly and boisterously paraded towards the decoy camp, the most veteran and reliable Qizilbash were secretly placed in the rear, under the command of Şahkulu. When Giorgi launched his “surprise” attack, it was he who was caught off-guard by a powerful cavalry charge. The forces in the decoy camp, that were supposed to flank Ismail, were destroyed as quickly as Giorgi’s main force. Only with a great sense of battle (or pure luck) did Giorgi manage to escape unharmed himself. And Aleksander? His knights had gotten stuck crossing the river and sat out the battle. They also escaped unharmed. However, it was a quick and total victory for Ismail’s troops, who were in all ways superior, and had completely seen through Giorgi’s ruse.

What followed was a guerilla campaign, but not a powerful one that had been directed from the top. Armenians evacuated the path ahead of Ismail, while Caucasian tribal fighters raided his convoys and supplies. However, they were too disparate and too few to stop Ismail’s momentum. He reached Yerevan, and took the city after a six-week siege. After that, the Safavids consolidated. They realised that the majority of the locals, including most of the elites, still held faith in the Georgians, and Ismail wisely did not want to overextend with his lands still occupied by Ottomans. Now was the time for peace to be made.

Results:

• Safavids beat the Georgian Army at Hakari.
• Safavids occupy Yerevan and the road from Tabriz to Yerevan.

Georgian Losses:

• Levy Pikemen: 2225
• Levy Archers: 1050
• Levy Crossbowmen: 1350
• Mounted Skirmishers: 140
• Levy Cavalry: 240
• Feudal Knights: 450
• Sappers: 20
• Caucasian Light Infantry: 3850
• Siege Artillery: 5
• Field Artillery: 15

Safavid Losses:

• Horse Archers: 600
• Qizilbash Infantry: 350
• Qizilbash Cavalry: 1500
• Siege Artillery: 4 lost, 2 gained (net 2 loss)
• Field Artillery: 5 gained
• Gholams: 40

Occupation Map