The Fall of Raqqa

January – February, 1506

Winter in Erzincan has always been cold. Sultan Bayezid II and his army 36,000 men strong wintered in the city until temperatures would rise above zero. Meanwhile, Ismail Safavi Shah prepared, with most of his own army wintering in Bingöl. As the site of his most significant victory, it held a special significance. However, not everyone had such reverence for winter.

Co-King Giorgi of Georgia-Armenia led an army over 12,000 strong down from Kars to Ardabil. The winter march was tough on the men, but they were inspired to exact revenge for Tbilisi. While they were too weak to help, their traditional capital was sacked and destroyed. Now, they marched for Ismail’s ancestral home: Ardabil. When they arrived at the city, its walls remembered King Tamar the Great of Georgia, who had sacked the city and killed over 12,000 of its inhabitants 300 years ago. With this historical parallel, the rumour that the Georgians came to take revenge for Tbilisi spread rapidly throughout the city and its citizens prepared for a long siege. From this moment onwards, they assumed – and thereby knew the truth – that if they were to surrender, they would all die.

Emir Hakeem al-Dumyat did not have to worry about winter. He had been marching since November and it did not get that cold in Syria. They kept marching, leaving Homs in early January. Their goal was al-Raqqa to use it as a springboard for another invasion of Iraq. With him was the Emir of Matrouh, “Al-Ghuri” Abdul Alif Farid, who had been in Iraq with the armies of his namesakes. The local rulers had no real sympathy for the Safavids and received the Egyptian army with open arms. Then, al-Dumyat began gathering support from the local Bedouin tribes. However, a Mamluk title no longer commanded the respect it once did, and with Bayezid II still inside Erzincan, he would need months to build a coalition of tribes that could guard his rear and ensure the success of a march down the Euphrates.

The Road to Harput

March-April, 1506

On March 10th, Sultan Bayezid II left Erzincan. He marched for Diyar Bakr by way of the western road. Every path from Erzincan to Diyar Bakr led through the mountains, but this was the fastest path, and also avoided Bingöl. While he was prepared for Ismail to block his passage, he hoped for nothing more. This decisive battle would surely be won by the Ottomans, even if the terrain favoured the Safavids. However, the akinji scouts only reported – and clashed with – small units of Qizilbash cavalry, who used the hills as shield.

Ismail Shah evacuated towns on the road to Diyar Bakr and used his sappers and foot soldiers to cut down trees on the road, dig trenches, and even bomb hillsides to cause landslides. They did this far in advance of the Ottoman army, but also far in their rear. This left the Ottoman light cavalry stretched thin as well, and the centre open to raids. These began coming nightly, usually small, and not always successful. However, they put pressure on the Ottoman soldiers and forced them to always remain vigilant. Then came the first battle.

At Tenceli, just before dawn, hundreds of Qizilbash streamed down from hillsides and small side-passes to attack the Ottoman column. Bayezid II smiled, because he hoped that this was the battle he had been waiting for. However, just as soon as the Qizilbash had begun their attack, they ended it and retreated. Seven more attacks followed throughout the day. The fighting was fierce, but always brief, and the Ottomans were usually worse off. Furthermore, they found their supplies dwindling, not even a month away from Erzincan.

Nevertheless, their slow progress was still progress. On April 11th, the Ottomans arrived at the critical fortress of Harput and took it by assault the next day, despite Safavid reinforcements. There, Bayezid II and his Kurdish retainer Idris Bitlisi invited a number of Kurdish leaders. Many would come to the Ottoman Sultan and pledge their support, and their resistance to Ismail’s army did improve the situation for the Ottomans significantly. However, the Kurds only hindered the Safavids; they did not fight them. They were rightly afraid that Ismail would come after them, as eazy targets, while Bayezid II’s promises had yet to materialise. However, a tribal rebellion fomented, waiting for the moment that the Ottomans would decisively defeat Ismail on the field of battle.

This moment would not be in Spring, however. The Ottomans pressed forward to Diyar Bakr, and at the pass of Maden again suffered an embarrassing ambush by the Safavids. As they emerged from the mountains of Anatolia, it became clear that the supply issues were terminal and something had to be done about them.

Diyar Bakr!

May-June, 1506

In May, Sultan Bayezid II arrived at Diyar Bakr, the first real goal of his campaign. The Safavids were less active on this open plain, though recently settled Qizilbash tribes – the ones not alread with Ismail’s host – proved difficult to conquer as well. Diyar Bakr was a tough city to crack that had been held by the Aq Qoyunlu, the Mamluks, and then Ismail, without falling. The Ottomans began their terrifying siege works, and invested the city. On June 14th, the city would fall to Ottoman assault.

However, they were not sitting still. The Ottoman cavalry, or rather, most of it, rode down west to Urfa and the Ottoman border. The supply line to Erzincan had been severed completely, and Harput had become isolated in the hands of Kurdish allies. The Ottomans could not only rely on living off the land, especially if the land was full of Qizilbash, and so they tried to go west and build a new supply artery. In June, the Ottomans also took Urfa, but found the surrounding lands extremely hostile with Qizilbash activity. Units remained to occupy and guard the new supply lines, but the rest were recalled for the march to Mardin.

Mardin was a powerful city and also rich in Safavid symbolism. Its location on top of lone hills made it hard to target with artillery and almost impossible to undermine. Sultan Bayezid II quickly realised that the city would take months to conquer, but was now more confident that he should not waste all that time here. Leaving behind an army that outnumbered the small but capable garrison, he ordered them to starve the city and accept their surrender when it was granted. He assumed that the supply lines from Urfa would get going soon, and that he could march east to Lake Van, where the sulphur mines were his next objective.

A Dark Turn

July-August, 1506

As Sultan Bayezid II made his way to Bitlis, the gateway to the Lake Van region, his campaign took a dark turn. Already low on supplies due to Erzincan being cut off, he received news that the small garrison in Urfa had fallen to a force of Qizilbash, and that he was now without any supplies from the Ottoman Empire. Living off the land was now necessary, but it put his army on a timer, as he still had no control over the countryside. For now, his army relied on Kurdish support to remain in fighting shape. The Safavids tried to evacuate people away from the Ottomans, but Kurdish towns often hid their food from the Qizilbash, only to eagerly sell it to the Ottomans.

Ismail Shah launched his third major attack on the Ottomans at Sarikona in July. From then on, he resumed the earlier strategy of slowing down the Ottomans, raiding their supplies, and cutting off communications. That was how Bayezid II lost contact with Diyar Bakr and the forces outside Mardin. Then, a diversionary force attacked the isolated Ottomans besieging Mardin, lifting the siege and further isolating Diyar Bakr and Bayezid II himself. More and more, the Ottomans were only able to truly secure the territory they were standing on top of.

Bayezid II arrived in Bitlis in August. While the former governor would have happily handed over the city, Ismail had realised months earlier that the Kurds were working against him, and the man had been generously provided a garrison of loyal Qizilbash to man the gates. As such, Bitlis held and had to be taken by force.

Meanwhile, the Egyptians returned to Iraq. After securing Bedouin alliances, al-Dumyat travelled down to Euphrates starting in June. However, with such a long way to go, he only arrived in August. The city was again retaken by Mamluks on August 16th. However, with no sign of the Ottomans to the north, the Mamluks looked south.

The Mamluk Return

September-October, 1506

On September 15th, Bitlis fell to the Ottomans. Not long after, however, news reached Bayezid II that Diyar Bakr had been retaken by the Safavids. He would only learn of this later, but the same had taken place in Harput. It was a bitter pill to swallow, but when the Sultan looked at his maps, the only option he saw going forward was a return to Erzincan. He set out for Muş, which surrendered straight away as Bayezid II had threatened to otherwise wipe them out. However, on the way there, his army’s numbers kept dwindling, especially after another major Safavid attack at Umurca in September.

The Egyptians in Iraq consulted the diaries of their predecessors and began anew with their work to establish a Mamluk government in the region. However, they found it difficult to dislodge the current administration, which was a combination of Qizilbash and Arab rule under the provincial governor Şahkulu. As Ismail’s right-hand man, Şahkulu was currently with the Shah. Nevertheless, the Mamluks were not confident their army could survive a full-scale revolt, numbering only around 6,000, and the Qizilbash were not happy to move without knowing what Ismail’s situation was. As such, a tenuous status quo was reached in the region, where the Mamluks mainly acted as an occupying force, leaving the new administrative structure as well as Qizilbash settlements in place.

Al-Dumyat managed to secure most of Iraq between Baghdad and Basra and his army saw no fighting as it spread out to occupy the major towns and cities. Who did saw fighting in the region were the Arab allies of the Mamluks, who clashed with the new Qizilbash settlers. With this fighting going on, but the Egyptians with no real desire to commit, since it was slowly becoming apparent that the Ottomans were not coming south just yet, the region remained tumultuous.

The Long Road Home

November-December, 1506

Sultan Bayezid II returned to Erzincan on November 15th. On the final stretch of the road, the Safavid attacks intensified, and there were three major battles, none of them decisive, at Dinarbey, Kabayal and then Baglar. Only a few days were between each encounter, and the Ottoman host was thoroughly battered and demoralised. Having set out with 36,000 men and over one hundred pieces of artillery, Bayezid II now returned with only 20,000 men and 65 guns.

It had not been easy for Ismail Safavi Shah either. He had exerted himself enormously to keep his Qizilbash in check and avoid – at all costs – that decisive battle he was sure would be disastrous. Much like the Georgians had learned at Psithi, irregular warfare was effective but anything but glorious, and the Qizilbash hungered for glory. They had learned one or two things about the Ottomans, gaining a healthy respect for especially the janissaries and the akinji, but while Ismail was happy he had lost no land, the Qizilbash were unhappy that Erzincan was still in enemy lands.

Co-King Giorgi still encamped outside of Ardabil’s walls. The siege held and the city had begun to starve. First the rats, then the cats and the birds were eaten, soon people would begin thinking about eating corpses. However, raids kept the Georgians constantly vigilant, and their position was anything but secure. They would have to winter around the city and brave the cold, hopefully forcing its surrender in Spring.

January 1507, Suleiman (12 years old) in the Topkapi Palace reads the reports from his grandfather’s campaign:

“Hoca Bey, why did my grandfather raise his army as one large force? To avoid the mistake that my father made. Şehzades Selim and Ahmed split their armies and Selim was defeated at Hasankale. However, I think grandfather looked upon the military situation from too far away. Erzincan to Diyar Bakr makes sense if you look on a map, but if you want to defeat the Shah of Tabriz, I would have attacked Tabriz. He would not have run away from that fight.”

“Magnificent, Suleiman. But how would you have conquered Iraq from Tabriz?”

“I would have entrusted it to the governor of Syria or Dulkadir, Hoca Bey. Or if we had to, I would have gone from Gaziantep to Urfa, and from there to Diyar Bakr and Mosul. But can you truly defeat a foe who does not want to fight? I think it will be difficult without control over the land. I would have secured control of the Kurds first.”

“Perhaps Sultan Bayezid should have put you in charge, Şehzade. But it is easy to avoid mistakes from inside a palace.”

“Yes, Hoca Bey. I have much to learn.”

Map of Sultan Bayezid II’s Journey

Results

• Ottomans failed to defeat the Safavids and, due to supply issues and lack of control over the area, were forced to retreat to Erzincan, with a return to the territorial status quo of 1505.
• Egyptian Ottoman forces take Raqqa, Baghdad, Basra and most of lower Iraq unopposed.
• Georgians march to Ardabil, but the city holds and may last another few months.
• Everyone is getting really exhausted of war.

Occupation Map

Losses:

Egypt:

• 50 Gholams
• 200 Bedouin Cavalry
• 50 Bedouin Infantry
• 20 Mercenary Crossbowmen

Georgia:

• 140 Levy Pikemen
• 160 Levy Archers
• 20 Crossbowmen
• 100 Mounted Skirmishers
• 60 Levy Cavalry
• 50 Feudal Knights
• 60 Sappers
• 500 Caucasian Light Infantry

Ottomans:

• 120 Sappers
• 200 War Wagons
• 1,000 Janissaries
• 10,000 Azabs
• 20 Silahdars
• 1,200 Akinji
• 300 Kapikuli Sipahis
• 1,000 Rumelian Timarli Sipahis
• 1,400 Anatolian Timarli Sipahis
• 600 Delis
• 12 Sahi Guns
• 8 Zarbuzans
• 30 Baceloskas
• 400 Horse Archers

Safavids:

• 400 Horse Archers
• 10 Sappers
• 600 Qizilbash Infantry
• 3,000 Qizilbash Cavalry
• 800 Gholams