Extra Credits (EC) did in 2016 a series on the Gracchi brothers:

1. D(aniel Floyd) Ep 1
2. D Ep 2
3. D Ep 3
4. D Ep 4
5. D Ep 5
6. M(ike Duncan) Ti Gracchus major (see comment below)
7. J(ames Portnow) "Lies"

Because it is five entire videos with two supplementary videos, I have instead organised this thematically. I will write a (much shorter) piece on M's video on Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (cos 177; father of the Gracchi brothers) later.

I abbreviate Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and his brother Gaius to TiSG and CSG respectively because the names are really too long (the praenomens alone are insufficiently unambiguous). I also abbreviate video titles by author; also, eg for timestamp references, D 4-2:06 here means D(aniel Floyd) Ep 4 at 2:06.

Sources

EC has been criticised before, specifically their videos on the first world war, the Sengoku Jidai, and the first Opium war (see AskHistorians (AH) and especially their terrible practice of never publishing sources or citations) among others. BadHistory has a list of EC videos here; thus this post cOnTRibUtEs tO tHe LiTerATurE. One comment on AH noted EC's general reliance on a very limited number of sources – largely from local public libraries "with no particular regard to quality" – and how they plagiarise by (very) closely paraphrasing without attribution. Many of the same issues are present here.

EC purports in their "Lies" episode to correct errors and add context. AH commenters have also criticised how those episodes are useless due to their unknown unknowns and how they spend their time discussing trivialities. J's "Lies" video is similarly useless. J gives two corrections (J 0:48 and 2:53) before spending almost half the video discussing how he sees parallels between Rome and modern democratic decay and then relating two anecdotes (J 11:38 and 12:37), both of which mishandle the material, before one anecdote (J 14:00) that is a fantasy.

In this case, however, J 4:02 in "Lies" helps recover at least one of their sources: Plutarch's Lives of TiSG and CSG. It becomes very clear that they followed Plutarch very closely, which tracks with AH comments about EC's research process. That J then spends two minutes talking about how he does not care about inaccuracies in Plutarch, even though he knows about them, also tracks.

Onto to Plutarch. His biographies of TiSG and CSG were "clearly influenced by pro-Gracchan sources", chief among which was CSG personally. Santangelo Topoi 15 (2007) p 469. One of the other difficulties here is that Plutarch was oversimplifying in his time: he to tell a clear moral story and so paints the Gracchi as demagogues and "reduces the complexity of Roman politics to a clash between demos and boule". Ibid p 486.

It also injects possibly fictitious elements. D 5-5:37 follows Plut C Gracch 17 exact (Septimuleius hollows CSG's head and fills it with lead for more gold, CSG's wife Licinia is deprived of her dowry, etc). Beness & Hillard CQ 51 (2001) pp 135–40 argue that many of these details derive actually from ancient playwrights' imaginations; even if not literally a drama – per Keaveney Klio 85 (2003) – the ancient accounts are all contradictory in the details. Similarly, Licinia's dowry being confiscated is a detail "to amplify the dramatic effect of his story" and is likely ahistorical. Tellegen-Couperus J Leg Hist 22 (2001) pp 6–8.

Plutarch (or his sources per Benness & Hillard) plays up drama with dubious details that D repeats uncritically. It paints the Gracchi too tragically and in a great light (probably CSG's own). Plutarch misleads D; D (and J) then repaint this narrative with a modern coat, wilfully blind to its problems.

Land reform and armies

The Gracchi require discussing land reform. But I can add very little to the topics of land reform and armies beyond the wonderful post by /u/Zaldarie on the topic some months ago. We use similar sources to critique similar narratives based on similar sources; similarity is no surprise.

A short précis. The traditional narrative in Plutarch and Appian – ie soldiers in foreign wars have their farms fail; the rich displace them with slaves won by the soldiers' own conquests – is incompatible with archaeology and grain accounting. Instead, under Malthusian-esque conditions, it is more likely that rural poverty was caused by population pressures. Roselaar Public land (2010) pp 191–220. TiSG thought there was a fall in the Roman population too, compelling land distributions to sustain levies, but this likely did not happen; and he failed to uncover the real cause: people dodging the census (and therefore conscription into the Spanish wars). Ibid ch 5; Rosenstein Rome at war (2004).

In the Roman land "crisis", EC (D and J) and M(ike Duncan) all place a drama of the common man betrayed – see D 1-0:08 for lament of the citizen soldier – before what we now know about second century Italy.

So too destroyed in recent years have been the old stories of moral decline in the soldiery caused by their rootless urban pleb pedigree. Profit was nothing new in Roman soldiering. Rosenstein Rome at war (2004) pp 81 et seq; see also Baker Spare no one (2021). The composition of the soldiery was largely did not change, before or after CSG or the "Marian reforms". Rich Historia 32 (1983) pp 287–331. It is ironic, though, that D 4-5:21 connects CSG's state-provided clothing to the old narrative of professional soldiers bringing down the republic when the actually professional soldiers of the emperors still get pay deducted for clothing. Tac Ann 1.17.6.

Political institutions

Hagiography

D and J do not understand Roman legislative process. D 4-5:06 also misunderstands how Roman voting was set up and paints CSG as trying to dismantle "voting blocks that, under Roman law, came with having vast landed estates"; these are fictitious too but I'll handle this in the section on CSG's reforms. J 12:37 also confuses the comitia tributa with the comitia centuriata. Fortunately, because they so slavishly copy Plutarch without attribution, the impact is minimal, except for the errors in service to TiSG's hagiography.

D 2-3:32 misunderstands veto procedure. It was not something done like the US president's, where a law passes Congress before being vetoed. Tribunes' vetoes were issued when the bills were being read to stop their passage ab initio. Mackay Breakdown (2009) p 41; eg Plut Cat min 27–28. J notes this in "Lies", but only because M noted it.

D 2-5:12 mischaracterises the veto, calling it "used sparingly" and "an extreme measure". Williams Latomus 63 (2004) pp 281–94 dispels myth of a quiescent middle republic. Beard SPQR (2015) pp 226–27 similarly calls this quiescence a "nostalgic fiction". Tribunes exercised their vetoes regularly in the decades before 133: they vetoed triumphs in the 190s, vetoed replacement of Gaius Flaminius as commander of the Second Macedonian war in 197 and 196, and vetoed levies by magistrates (even imprisoning the consuls in 138); similarly, Marcus Antius Briso vetoed the lex Cassia (expanding secret ballot) in 137, but lifted it under pressure. D is glorifying TiSG and to do this he blackens Octavius by having him veto bills already passed and absolve TiSG by casting Octavius' veto as unprecedented. Similarly D 2-6:37 follows Plut Ti Gracch 12.5 above App BCiv 1.12.51–54 because it has heroic TiSG save Octavius from the crowd instead of an ordered dispersal.

This glorification also stops D from painting "the senate" as anything but moustache-twirling plutocrats; to that end, he also omits the legitimate arguments against TiSG's bill: unfairness of removing long-thought-settled property rights and negative effects on the Italian allies. See generally Mouritsen Italian unification (1998). D also entirely omits the natural anxieties that other politicians would have when TiSG stacked his land commission with his own family; D's story has little room for TiSG as a nepotist.

Party politics

Throughout, D 1–2 characterises TiSG as acting without the support of anyone in the senate. Following Plut Ti Gracch 9, he mentions offhandedly at 2-2:00 that TiSG consulted the pontifex maximus and the consul. The first is anachronistic: the man who killed TiSG, Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, was pontifex maximus in 133; TiSG's supporter succeeded him in the post the next year when TiSG had been dead for months. MRR 1.499. In actuality, TiSG did not just consult, but had the support of many important men: princeps senatus Appius Claudius Pulcher (cos 143), the consul of 133 Publius Mucius Scaevola, and – the future pontifex maximus, – Scaevola's brother Mucianus.

Because of this support, contra D 2-3:09, opponents did not view this as some kind of revolution: "clearly any proposal backed by such men could not have been self-evidently revolutionary, and [TiSG] may well have been attempting to implement a plan that had been urged upon him by one of his elders". Mackay Breakdown (2009) p 38. Eg the consul in 140 had brought similar plans but backed down in the face of opposition. Opposition to TiSG was in terms of his tactics, not his aims. Roselaar Public land (2010) pp 221, 240.

D also views the senate as too unified a body. With CSG, "the senators simply gloated" after CSG's riot justified intervention. D 5-4:24. Even Plutarch, who oversimplified the political situation into people-vs-senate, notes how senators were inclined for peace before incited by Opimius. Plut C Gracch 16.1–2. Moreover, to further this people-vs-senate narrative, D 5-6:09 omits Opimius' acquittal in a trial before the people in 120 for illegally killing CSG. Stockton Gracchi (1979) pp 199–200. Adding it would detract from the narrative of the people-vs-senate by placing the people on the "wrong side".

I seem to repeat this a lot, but it we have again the legacy of Mommsen. D uses different words but casts Roman politics in terms of TiSG or CSG and friends against the Politburo of the Roman Senate Party Central Committee™. This is simply not how Roman politics worked. Gruen Last generation (1995) p 50 explains:

Roman politicians did not normally divide on matters of principle. The term optimates identified no political group. Cicero... could stretch the term to encompass not only aristocratic leaders but also Italians, rural dwellers, businessmen, and even freedmen... [The phrase "senatorial party"] originates in older scholarship which misapplied analogies and reduced Roman politics to a contest between a "senatorial party" and "popular party". Such labels obscure rather than enlighten.

Moreover, popularis was not a party. It referred to certain political methods; they involved no revolution and were meant instead to win personal political support. Gruen Last generation (1995) p 79. The many-shaded word "popularis" (meaning being popular, people, comrades, pro-plebeian, and popularity-seeking) creates great confusion and Romans did not use it to refer to a faction. Robb Beyond populares and optimates (2010). If it was used in such a manner, that usage was idiosyncratic to Cicero. Tracy Illinois Class Stud 33 (2009) pp 181–99. Other scholars connect it to an ideology – eg Wiseman Remembering (2009) and Mackie RMfP 135 (1992) pp 49–73 – but this is hotly debated. Eg Mouritsen Politics (2017).

Misc

The Attalid will. D 3-0:45 mishandles the Attalid will. D asserts Attalus III wanted to save his people from Roman conquest and civil war and therefore gave the kingdom to Rome. First, the purpose of these wills, per Steel End of the Roman republic (2013) p 21, was so you, without heirs, could guard against assassination. If you are "poisoned by your enemies", the kingdom suffers state death and courtiers lose their elevated positions; they therefore don't do it. But second, D's facts can only work if you entirely ignore the Roman war against Aristonicus which was a de facto Roman invasion and civil war in the kingdom. By doing so, D whitewashes Roman imperialism and paints Attalus as bowing to the inevitable.

CSG's re-election. D 4-6:35 utterly mishandles Gaius' re-election. D purports that Gaius was chosen by tribunes already elected. This misinterprets Plut C Gracch 8.2 saying that Gaius was elected by popular clamour. D is probably confusing this with a supposed law in Appian where if there were insufficient candidates anyone could be chosen, but this law is dubious and difficult to believe: surely CSG's opponents would ensure there were enough candidates. Stockton Gracchi (1979) p 169. I found it strange to do this; D's narrative of CSG's re-election implies his second tribunate has no popular legitimacy. But he continues quickly onward as if it did, so the viewer does not dwell.

TiSG's motivations

J 11:36 slanders Gaius Hostilius Mancinus in directly calling him "cowardly". This is deeply disappointing. Rosenstein Cl Ant 5 (1986) pp 230–52 shows clearly how Mancinus was criticised offering shameful terms on his own initiative rather than the treaty's terms itself. Ibid p 234. Moreover, D 1-5:58 fails also to understand the reasons for why Mancinus was sent back to the Numantines. All this matters because it was the repudiation of the treaty that was the core issue; repudiating it, for religious reasons, required Mancinus' political sacrifice. Mancinus was praised for his personal courage in offering himself up to save the state's relationship with the gods. (People in the past believed their own religions.) Even though he was stripped of his citizenship and senate seat on his return, he was voted citizenship anew and elected to a second praetorship, returning him to the chamber; he later put up a statue of himself in chains commemorating the incident.

The issue, however, with omitting the treaty's repudiation entirely – painting the senate merely as condemning defeat – is that it breaks down TiSG's motives to undo the harm done to his reputation by the treaty's repudiation. D wants to paint TiSG solely as motivated by his love of the people. But Roman politicians always looked out for their careers. CSG tells us as much: "All of us who address you are after something and no one appears before you for any purpose except to carry something away... I myself... do not come here for nothing... but I ask for you not money but honour and your good opinion". Gell NA 11.10. TiSG was willing to force through the law at any cost because he wanted to recover his dignity and advance his career. Lintott in CAH² 9 (1994) p 61; Morgan & Walsh CPhil 73 (1978) p 208; Cic Har Resp 43. Plut Ti Gracch 8.6 gives similar non-love-of-the-people reasons (rivalry with a personal enemy) but D omission of both seems mainly to serve TiSG's hagiography.

(Nb CSG tried his hardest to combat this more cynical perspective. To that end, Plut Ti Gracch 8.7 cites CSG saying that TiSG became concerned about the agrarian crisis when travelling to Spain and not on the return. D inverts the timeline, omitting this subtle defence against claims of TiSG's opportunism.)

CSG's reforms

CSG did a number of reforms. They were not, however, meant to "dismantle the power of the senate" in favour of the people. D 4-4:55. He did not (contra App BCiv 1.22) attempt to do such a thing. One of the laws that CSG passed, the lex Sempronia de provinciis consularibus gave the senate veto-proof assignment of consular provinces. Badian sv "Sempronius Gracchus, Gaius" OCD^4, writes:

A proud aristocrat, [CSG] wanted to leave the Senate in charge of directing policy and the magistrates in charge of its execution, subject to constitutional checks and removed from financial temptation, with the people sharing in the profits of empire without excessive exploitation of the subjects.

It's important to recognise also that the people – in their assemblies – have no initiative in the republic. If the people want a grain dole but none of the magistrates act on it, nothing happens. Nor do the people regularly reject any proposals brought before them. Mouritsen Plebs (2001) pp 64–64. Handing the state to the people is in actuality merely handing the state over to the magistrates who purport to speak on the people's behalf; it is executive power run amok. And if the people have initiative, it is only in choosing their magisterial champions.

"Popular power"

The main issue here CSG being cast as trying to destroy the senate and the timocratic Roman state. Its aetiology is actually one of sourcing, Plutarch thinks CSG did that, so D follows blindly. But just because Plutarch said it does not mean it is true: Plutarch's CSG is meant to be extra ambitious so he can stress the moral of moderation. Roskam CPhil 106 (2011) pp 219–23.

Sadly, D misreads Plutarch even when plagiarising him slavishly. D 4-4:19 says CSG passed through a (fictitious) law to legitimise deposition of tribunes. D is probably confused between two proposals: one abortive proposal by CSG to ban anyone who was deposed from holding further office, MRR 1.518, or a failed bill in 130 that would have allowed for consecutive re-election. MRR 1.502.

D 4-5:06 makes up, probably from misreading Plut C Gracch 5.1, a proposal to dissolve the "voting blocks that, under Roman law, came with having vast landed estates". If D had consulted MRR 1.518, he would have found that this relates to an alleged plan to have the centuries vote in a random order rather than by richest-first. ("Alleged" because MRR 1.520 n 8 notes how Cic Mur 47 attributes the same plan to a different person.)

D 4-5:33 then claims CSG made the equestrians judges (this wording comes specifically from the 1921 Loeb); CSG really made them jurors, specifically on the permanent jury court overseeing corruption and extortion in the provinces. MRR 1.517–18. J 13:54's assertions about how senators "rather than paying their taxes... they'd all just bribe the tax collectors" and how getting fined was "far less than having actually paid their taxes" are ahistorical. Direct taxes on Roman citizens were abolished in 167. Eg Mersing JRS 100 (2010) p 261.

Moreover, because D (or rather Plutarch) wants to depict CSG fighting the elite, he ignores that the equestrians were just as rich as senators. As Mouritsen Politics (2017) p 115 blithely remarks: "[CSG]'s reform of the repetundae court did not 'democratise' it, but merely handed control to non-senatorial members of the elite". It is obvious the equites are not D 4-5:33's "middle class". The "middle class" in Rome – if there was anything like it; the very idea is an anachronism – was the "first class" in the centuries. Millar Crowd in Rome (1998) p 203. By the late republic there were perhaps between 5 to 10 thousand equites in an Italy of 3.5–4 million non-slaves. The equites are not the middle class: they are the sub-1 pc! See Davenport Roman Equestrian order (2019) p 112 and its cites for prior literature.

Anachronisms

The other issue here is that D wants to trace future events into his narrative for CSG. Those connections are only, however, skin-deep. There are two major anachronisms: army reform and the grain dole.

D 4-5:21 connects CSG's plan to have the state pay for soldiers' clothing to professionalisation of the military. This matter is discussed above on the army – the soldiery largely did not change – and in Zaldarie's post. It is especially funny because CSG's plan evidently did not stick into the imperial period, when the soldiers actually were professional, because their pay was still getting deducted for clothing. (Citations above.)

D 4-5:45 connects CSG's lex frumentaria to imperial bread and circuses. CSG's bill, however, was actually a price stabilisation mechanism: it set grain prices to that of a relatively good harvest, bought grain when it was cheap and sold it when it was expensive. Garnsey & Rathbone JRS 75 (1985) pp 20–25; Steel End of the Roman republic (2013) p 23. This is a dole in the same way the USDA's milk price stabilisation policies are a dole.

Some nitpicks

Rome in Spain. D 1-1:02 claims "all of modern Spain" was conquered in the second century. It was not. Augustus was campaigning there two centuries later to actually complete its conquest. Six triumphators had come from the peninsula just in the decade before Augustus campaigned in 26 BC. Gruen in CAH² 10 (1996) pp 163–165.

TiSG and CSG's laws survived. In discussing both TiSG and CSG, D omits discussion of their legislation after their deaths; this can lead the viewer to think they were all repealed. In both cases, however, their laws were largely left intact. For CSG only the colony at Carthage (technically not passed by CSG but rather his colleague Gaius Rubrius; MRR 1.517) was repealed. Lintott in CAH² 9 (1994) pp 82–83. The riot that led to his death occurred when CSG came to protest repeal of only the colony at Carthage. D 5-3:53 exaggerates, likely due to Plut C Gracch 13, repeal of that single law into all of CSG' reforms.

Rome not a democracy. J 6:13 et seq tries to draw democratic parallels between Rome and the present. Beyond the surface level, these are hugely inapt. J doesn't seem to comprehend how few people participated in Roman elections – mere thousands of the millions in Italy – and how they were done before a notional people rather than its reality. That notional people then acts – almost 100 pc of the time – as a rubber stamp for elite decisions. Mouritsen Plebs (2001). Even if you believe in the "Roman democracy" thesis of Millar and Wiseman, that still does not create a democracy similar to ours.

Cont. I ignored some really minor things, like D 2-2:02 calling the tribune Octavius by Augustus' historian-assigned name "Octavian". They get a number of minor details wrong here and there. This post is long enough already.

Some edits for copy-editing.