Leibniz holds that we live in the best of all possible worlds. We know this because God is perfect and disposed towards the best. This, then, often acts for Leibniz as a justification of the world's evil. It must be the case, no matter how strange it seems to us, that every instantiation of evil was required to bring about the best possible world. So, we'll just take him at his word and say all of this is true. Leibniz says that this means that nobody has a legitimate grievance against God ("The Common Concept of Justice"). I wonder if this is true even given his premises. Specifically, couldn't one levy a Kantian complaint against God? I'm thinking of one who has suffered serious evil saying something like this "I know that all of this evil was required to bring about the best possible world, but you were not permitted to use me as a means to that end." This seems perfectly coherent to me. But what might this mean for God? Would this mean God required not to bring about the best possible world? Or that the best possible world is actually one significantly different than Leibniz thought? I am aware that this question is unfocused, but sometimes such "shotgun" style questioning has yielded very interesting avenues in learning for me when taken up by someone knowledgeable in the relevant topics. So, even if you just have something orthogonal to say regarding this question, that would be completely welcomed.