In the third Critique, in sections 20-22, Kant talks about a "common sense" that he distinguishes from the sensus communis he discusses later in the work. In section 22, Kant asks if this common sense is a "constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or [if there is] a still higher principle of reason that only makes it a regulative principle for us."

I'm kind of confused on what he means by this higher principle. He further describes it as thus (pg. 240-241):

...or is taste only an idea of an ability yet to be acquired and [therefore] artificial, so that a judgement of taste with its requirement for universal assent is in fact only a demand of reason to produce such agreement in the way we sense? In the latter case the ought, i.e., the objective necessity that everyone's feeling flow along with the particular feeling of each person, would signify only that there is a possibility of reaching such agreement, and the judgement of taste would only offer an example of the application of this principle.

He then declines to investigate the question further. Does he mean that there may be some possible principle upon which we can all commonly agree, and a judgement of taste is a possible example of such a principle, though it may not be an actual one? I'm having trouble imagining what this principle might look like - is it simply a "bigger" judgement of taste, that's not limited to the subject of taste?