There is usually given a distinction between two separate claims that can be made, namely that some object X in itself has a fundamental explication, or more weakly the best explanation as a mental or conscious state rather than a real existence, or either that all that can be known, alternatively what constitutes any useful knowledge about X must be composed of a mental or conscious state. The implicit assumption here is that these are two independent claims, specifically that you can hold one without holding the other. But when examining the case of reality taken as a whole, is there really a pragmatic distinction between the two? In my napkin-math basic argument, I don't see why it should be so, which has perplexed me, but perhaps I am missing something here.

1. Knowledge about X is possible.

2. Our knowledge regarding X is constituted by mental constructs.

3. Our epistemic access to X is necessarily mediated by these mental constructs, precluding the possibility of direct experience of X independently of our cognitive frameworks.

4. Therefore, our understanding of X is necessarily conditioned by our mental constructs, and the two are ontologically inseparable.

5. If our understanding of X is thus conditioned, then any assertions we make regarding the nature of X are necessarily assertions regarding our mental constructs of X.

6. Given that our mental constructs of X are mental in nature, any assertions we make regarding the nature of X are ultimately assertions regarding mental entities.

7. Any attempt to distinguish between the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of X would require a non-mental, objective vantage point from which to assess X.

8. However, such a vantage point is impossible, since our epistemic access to X is necessarily mediated by mental constructs (premise 3).

9. Therefore, we have no grounds to posit a distinction between the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of X.

10. Conclusion: The metaphysical nature of X itself is also mental, and our knowledge regarding X constitutes a reflection of this mental nature.

In essence, I'm arguing that our understanding of X, which encompasses the entirety of our knowledge and experience of X, is fundamentally identical to the intrinsic nature of X itself, in the sense that the two are indistinguishable and interchangeable, provided that our knowledge of X is the only conception of X we have, and there is no residual aspect of X that exists independently of our understanding of it, such that our understanding of X constitutes the complete and total reality of X as we know it. Is it reasonable to hold it to be so?