January 2nd, 1936 to January 31st, 1936

Villages around southern China all have a number of visitors suddenly arriving. Most of whom used to live there, however have left for better opportunities. Now they have returned, only now entrenched with Syndicalist ideologies, and with the only role of riling up the people back home, the people who were oppressed by the LEP governance and with the recent “Wuhu Massacre” as the KMT frames it, unsurprisingly they were easily convinced to join the KMT cause. KMT agents can’t compile exact numbers, but around 200,000 to 500,000 abled bodied persons in the provinces south of Nanjing are sympathetic to their cause, but to supply them and turn them into even just a mere guerilla force would be an uphill struggle, especially as League authorities also happen to discover these information, and have tightened control over the region, however their control is now tenuous at best. Nevertheless, popular support in this region, especially in Jiangxi and Fujian, is decidedly in the KMT’s favour. This is obvious to everyone.

French speaking German agents stand in the gates of Moscow. Their goal is to contact the opposition in Russia and try to secure a line of communications for support. Unfortunately for them however, with the recent coup, access to the political opposition in Russia is particularly difficult. While this in of itself might not be a problem for the finest of Abteilung III b’s agents, as they’ve acquired the addresses of many politicians who are currently hiding in or outside of the capital, immediately upon arrival in Moscow all foreigners, especially those from Syndicalist countries, are searched thoroughly at checkpoints, and the presence of small arms and suspecting highly detailed, military grade documents on the Russian transport network on these undercover agents immediately earned them a ticket to be deported back home….to Paris. The local authorities immediately notified the Military Government of a potential case for Communard spies.

Having this infiltration mission now turned into a desperate escape before they arrive at Petrograd to be deported to the Commune of France, agent Berndt Preis managed to successfully get the German crew off the train that was carrying them off at Tver, before embarking on a journey that deserves a book to be written about it to get out of Russia, arriving at Orsha in White Ruthenia 2 weeks later.

While German involvement was not explicitly revealed, the incident does have the potential to ignite a diplomatic row between the new Russian government and the Commune, as the Russian government now suspect that those were Communard spies trying to infiltrate the fledgling Russian regime. The French government of course vehemently denies this accusation however, noting that they have no possible interests in infiltrating the Russian Republic, and that they have been framed.

On the other side of the continent, 2 German spies, including Berndt Preis’s brother Albert Preis were leading an infiltration effort into the Commune of France, chosen as they were remarkably similar to 2 major union representatives on the Parisian Commune Local Work Exchange. Quickly disposing of 2 prominent representative on the Parisian Local Work Exchange who had been marked by Abteilung III b prior, the 2 spies successfully infiltrate the Local Work Exchange, however their trails weren’t covered well, and the Commune government have been notified of “traitors” who are working with the Germans in the Parisian Commune’s government. While their identities aren’t discovered just yet, the French knows that the Germans are behind this, and that the spies are somewhere in the Parisian local government.

SIS agents attempt to wiretap the Michigan and Illinois SPA party apparatus, however this attempt fails spectacularly as they discover that the SPA have managed to encrypt their communications better than they had expected. The Socialist Party of America of course is unaware of this attempt

SIS agents manage to contact some of their relatives who are Exiles currently living in Ulster. Over the course of a week SIS with the help of these personal connections in Ulster manages to recruit a network of collaborators with the Canadian government, mostly consisting of British Exiles fleeing to Ulster after the revolution. While most of these members have no significant role to play in politics, they do provide a stable ground to further any intelligence efforts in Ulster in the future. The Irish government does not suspect a thing.

SIS agents in South Africa, working for a font mining company, manage to secure contacts with about half a dozen pro British politicians, holding posts in local governments and recruit them to work for the SIS. The South African government is unaware of this development.