Editor's note: This is the first in what I hope will become a regular series of debates on topics important to politics in the UK. Each contributor was given a brief and some hundred words [because this is a pilot, I haven't enforced that too strictly here] to relate their argument in favour or against the proposition.

Should the UK have a nuclear deterrent?

The status of the UK's nuclear deterrent has in the last few years become a point of contention among politicians in Westminster and beyond. While only once has the House come close to abolishing Trident entirely, and with a majority of MPs supporting a nuclear deterrent in any form, the debate still rages periodically in the Commons chamber.

So, we asked two MPs on either side of the debate to give us their views.

In favour of the proposition we have /u/MatthewHinton12345, Conservative MP for South West London.

And against the proposition we have /u/AgentNola, Labour MP for Nottinghamshire.

For the proposition, by /u/MatthewHinton12345

Just this past Friday, a divided nation came together to celebrate Britain’s victory over the odious Nazi war machine 75 years ago. Victory in Europe Day means different things for different people; in the United Kingdom, we rejoice at the triumph our ancestors spent six years fighting for. We remember the sacrifices made not just by those that served, but by the people who were left behind. In Germany, the day takes on a more sombre meaning. While the people of Germany honour their liberation from the subjugation inflicted on them by their own government, there lingers a sense of shame, if not guilt, for the crimes committed by the Nazis. It’s that sense of flickering, intrusive discomfort that has prevented Europe’s largest economy from undertaking the level of global military engagement that the United Kingdom has. Rational or not, we must respect Germany’s sensitive and unique misgivings about involving themselves heavily in matters of defence, for they are founded first and foremost in supreme desire for peace.

Peace is what underscores VE Day festivities; wherever you are, if you’re commemorating that most poignant of days, you’re marking the end of half a decade of toil and anguish, sacrifice and privation. You’re celebrating the end of conflict and the arrival of a peace which we have enjoyed for three-quarters of a century. The harmony we now enjoy, while enduring, is precarious. It has been rocked and knocked, imperilled, and dented over the years, but it has been protected by one ultimate, immovable guardian. Just as Germany has chosen to step back in the name of peace, Britain, and others, have risen to the challenge. The United Kingdom stepped up to the plate and invested in the insurance policy to end all insurance policies, the ultimate guarantor against all-out war - Trident.

At the heart of Trident’s efficacy is a great paradox; at least one Royal Navy submarine, armed to the teeth with missiles capable of delivering untold destruction, is constantly, anonymously on patrol. The whereabouts of the submarine are known only to its crew, and it lies in wait somewhere beneath the sea, ready to fire in response to an attack on the UK. That something so lethal and so destructive could safeguard peace is superficially baffling, but fundamentally common-sense. Britain’s nuclear weapons are officially designated the Continuous-At-Sea-Nuclear-Deterrent because that’s precisely what they do – if we have the means to defend ourselves and to respond decisively and swiftly to any hypothetical attack on our way of life, we cannot be bullied. Enemies will think twice before threatening us; we can protect ourselves and our allies and stand up for what we believe in when faced with aggression. It would be no exaggeration to say that, though one can’t put a price on national security, for something that annually amounts to 0.3% of government expenditure, Trident is a bargain-price guardian of peace.

The United Kingdom cannot afford to be ideological or indulge in academic fantasies. We live in a world with nuclear weapons, and if we want to remain credible, to retain our influence, not to mention being capable of defending ourselves, we must continue to operate a nuclear arsenal. If the United Kingdom were to divest its 1.6% of the global stockpile, the world would be no closer to disarmament. In truth, a trusted, responsible, mature, and democratic nation like the U.K. unilaterally surrendering would spell disaster for global peace. As I said in the House, it would hand nuclear hegemony over to malign powers whom we have witnessed, in recent years, act with increasing disregard for our hard-won peace. To play into their hands and relinquish our means to defend these islands, to voluntarily defang ourselves in pursuit of nothing other than a reckless, quixotic, and ill-considered pipe-dream would be of no tangible benefit whatsoever. It would be akin to giving a vampire the keys to a blood bank and would be met by fear and incredulity by the British people and our allies, all of whom depend on Trident for national security. The only ones who would be smiling, while at the same time comprehending what British disarmament means, would be those who wish to destabilise and overturn our principles of freedom, tolerance, humanity, and peace.

A world free from nuclear weapons is one we must all aspire to, but we will not achieve that by abrogating our responsibilities and leaving ourselves, and our global partners, exposed. The UK has taken noble strides forwards to diminish the nuclear threat, retiring its aerial nuclear capability and reducing its total stockpile. But have other nuclear powers followed suit, as those on the other side of the debate insisted they would? They haven’t – instead, we’ve witnessed existing powers augment their capability and rogue states develop nuclear weapons of their own. With every passing minute, the world becomes a more dangerous place, it begins to resemble what our forebears fought tooth and nail to put an end to 75 years ago. Now is not the time for Britain to shrink from its duty, duck its obligations and pass the buck onto a nation that can be bothered to equip itself with what it needs to defend itself. Now is the time to hold fast and remember that while we, as a generation, may not remember first-hand what total war is like, our grandparents do, and it is never that far away. To ensure the children of tomorrow enjoy lasting peace as we have done, we have no other option but to match those that would seek to do us harm and retain our nuclear deterrent.

Against the proposition, by /u/AgentNola

We are often lectured on what is “necessary” for the defence of the nation. We live at a time when conventional warfare is not the ultimate mediator of conflict; instead, that honour lives with nuclear weaponry. The UKs’ nuclear deterrent, Trident, costs roughly between 5 and 6% of the annual defence budget. To some, the benefit of maintaining the deterrent is worth the ludicrous amount of money that is spent on it. This begs the question, what material gain is there from a nuclear deterrent?

The primary purpose of such an apparatus is to provide a retaliatory strike, the threat of which is the meaning of deterrence. This is not a material benefit; means of revenge does not improve the lives of citizens, nor does it provide means of defence in its use. It is said to provide defence by its mere existence. We exercise a policy of mutually assured destruction, and that will dissuade global nuclear usage. The UK’s percentage of nuclear warhead inventory, roughly 2%, implies that we gain very little from the existence of our deterrent. Certainly we do not hold enough influence over the global probability of nuclear war to warrant spending billions in an attempt to marginally increase that miniscule figure.

What is the “defence” gained from constructing a country’s first nuclear device? What of the defence gained from constructing the second or the 20th? A country that constructs its first nuclear device can expect two major consequences. It will be placed into the higher echelons of global nuclear powers and will acquire some global influence over the potential for global nuclear annihilation. A country also gains the capacity for a retaliatory strike. Consider for a moment the strategy in an armed nuclear conflict, where you seek to minimize the total nuclear capability of your opponents, which means nuclear powers are priority-strike targets. Suppose “defence gained” from a nuclear device is the decrease in probability of sustaining a nuclear attack. A country with no nuclear capability is less likely to be a target than one with any nuclear capability. Having a single nuclear weapon does not imply deterrence. We lose defensive capacity when we build our first nuclear device, and building more does not meaningfully contribute to our protection against nuclear strikes. There is no point of deterrence.

The simple fact is that nuclear deterrence only exists to project the UK’s influence over foreign affairs. To act as the Royal Navy once did, to terrorize and influence those who are less wealthy and not British. The UK is no longer a real leader in global politics, we spend ludicrously on a programme that has no tangible benefits, and we call it deterrence.