End-to-End Encryption (Protection) Bill

A01

Amend Section Two to read:

(1) Attempts and the weakening or compromising of end-to-end encryption for the purpose of facilitating government surveillance or interception of communications by any person(s) or entity providing messaging services within the United Kingdom shall be prohibited, pursuant to the conditions of Section Five (3) of this Act.

(2) Requirements set that undermine or weaken end-to-end encryption via laws, statutory instruments, or any other executive action shall be prohibited, pursuant to the conditions of Section Five (3) of this Act.

Amend Section Four; (2), (3) to read:

(2) Messaging services shall be required to ensure users of such services shall have the right to have, but not be limited to, communications via messages, multimedia, and audio, remaining confidential and protected from unauthorised access, pursuant to the conditions of Section Five (3) of this Act.

(3) Messaging services shall be prohibited from the sharing and disclosing of user communications, metadata, and any other information to any third party without the explicit and informed consent of the user, with the exception of —

(a) the conditions set in Section Five (3) where the informed consent of the user may not be deemed viable in matters of national security.

Amend Section Five (4) to read:

(4) Messaging services shall be prohibited from the installation of backdoors or any measure to the similar extent to weaken encryption, ensuring communications remain confidential and secure, pursuant to the conditions of Section Five (3) of this Act.

EN: The provisions of this bill are contradictory due to lacking an acknowledgment of its overriding clauses, and the vague wording, this amendment fixes that.

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A02

Amend Section 5(3) to read and renumber accordingly:

(3) Requests from the Government or any other authority acting in the capacity as law enforcement within the United Kingdom to access encryption keys shall be required approval by a competent court.

(4) Pursuant to subsection 3, approval of encryption key access shall only be granted where deemed necessary and proportionate to serving law enforcement and national security measures by the competent court.

(5) Pursuant to subsections 3 and 4, the review of access requests shall be subject to rigorous scrutiny and strict conditions devised by the competent court.

EN: Not sure why the competencies of law enforcement is excluded from the override clause but national security efforts are not, when both can be subject to the same stringent and rigorous review processes. Especially as it only applied to things like terrorism or human trafficking that are deemed national security but prevents action on crimes such as murder, child sexual exploitation and distribution, blackmail and more.

These amendments were submitted by /u/Waffel-lol

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This division will end at 10pm on the 16th August.

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