Russia (Entrenched Sanctions) Motion

This House recognises that:

(1) Russian authorities, seeing Alexei Navalny as a threat tried repeatedly to silence him, with FSB operatives poisoning him with Novichok in 2020, then imprisoned him for peaceful political activities, and finally sent him to an Arctic penal colony, held from June 2022 where he died under their authority on the 16th February 2024.

(2) The penal colonies are known for exerting physical and psychological pressure, full isolation, torture and violence on prisoners. In both places Mr. Navalny suffered abuses, including through repeated solitary confinement in a punishment cell and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, leading to the severe deterioration of his health.

(3) The multilateral curtailing of Russian oil revenue —

(a) the G7 - an organisation of the world's seven largest "advanced" economies - has imposed a maximum price of $60 (£47) a barrel on Russian crude oil, to try to reduce its earnings;

(b) the United States has banned Russian oil and natural gas imports; and

(c) the European Union has banned Russian seaborne crude imports.

(4) Third party actors across businesses and states have continued to be vital suppliers of alternative products, acting as shell companies, smuggling and money laundering, and evading current sanction regimes.

This House further notes:

(1) The importance of a new wave of the necessary sanctions which will —

(a) target businesses sustaining Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine to crack down on those supplying his depleted armoury with munitions such as rocket launch systems, missiles and explosives;

(b) target key sources of Russian revenue, clamping down on metals, diamonds, and energy trade, and cutting off funding for Putin’s illegal war from every angle; and

(c) bolster our powers to target malign Russian shipping activity and individual ‘shadow fleet’ vessels used by Russia to soften the blow of oil-related sanctions imposed by our G7 partners.

(2) The importance of asset freezes and travel ban sanctions on named individuals.

Therefore this House urges the Government to:

Sanctions Regime

(1) Introduce a new wave of manufacturing, arms and technology related sanctions, including but not limited to, the following —

(a) companies linked to manufacturing munitions such as rocket launch systems, missiles, explosives and other critical goods used in military equipment, which includes; Sverdlov State Owned Enterprise, the largest enterprise in the Russian ammunition industry;

(b) key Russian importers and manufacturers of machine tools, which are instrumental in manufacturing vital defence systems and components ranging from missiles and engines to tanks and fighter jets;

(f) Cozum Yazilim Donanim Elektronik, a Turkish company involved in the supply of electronics essential to Putin’s war machine to sanctioned Russian company Fastimpex;

(g) the following Chinese based companies: Finder Technology LTD and JUHANG Aviation Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Limited which have been supplying sanctioned electronics to Russia; and Beijing Micropilot Flight Control Systems Co., LTD, a UAV company producing engines which have been found in UAVs used by Russian forces in Ukraine;

(h) the following Belarussian entities, which are operating in sectors of strategic significance for the Government of Belarus- Precise Electro-Mechanics Plant, which produces various defence products and JSC Planar, which produces semiconductors and other electronics;

(i) the following targets relating to Russian proxy Private Military Security Companies and the networks that support them including PMC Redut, a Russian private military company reportedly involved in the recruitment and deployment of fighters to serve alongside Russian forces in Ukraine;

(j) importers and manufacturers of machine tools, which are widely used in the Russian defence sector and critical for the production of military equipment ranging from missiles and engines to tanks and fighter jets. This includes: JSC Sasta, JSC Baltic, Baltic Industrial, LLC Bitvan, Chelyabinsk Forge and Press Plant, and LLC Stan;

(k) Anna Yurevna Luzhanskaya, the owner of a sanctioned Russian electronics company, LLC Fly Bridge. Fly Bridge, alongside other sanctioned persons Maxim Ermakov and NPP Istok, are part of a covert procurement network used by Russia to acquire critical western technology. And Inkotekh, a Russian importer of microcircuits, connectors, computing modules, and microwave technology components that have been found in the Kalibr missile system being used by Russia in Ukraine;

(l) the 224th Flight Unit State Airlines and its director, Vladimir Vladimirovich Mikheychik, for operating in Russia’s transport sector. The company has reportedly also been involved in the transfer of weapons from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Russia and supporting Wagner troop movements;

(m) the Azia Shipping Company and Ibex Shipping INC, which are involved in the transfer of weapons from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Russia. And Azia Shipping Holdings LTD, which is involved in the Russian transport sector;

(2) Introduce a new wave of oil related sanctions, including but not limited to, the following —

(a) oil trader Niels Troost and his company Paramount Energy & Commodities SA as Troost facilitates the unfettered trade of Russian oil outside the reach of UK and G7 sanctions, including through UAE-based Paramount Energy & Commodities DMCC;

(b) shipping companies Fractal Marine DMCC, Beks Ship Management, and Active Shipping, which operate in the Russian energy sector as part of Putin’s shadow fleet;

(c) Sovcomflot shipping company for operating in Russia's marine sector and for being owned or controlled by, or having acted for or on behalf of, the Russian Government, identifying 14 crude oil tankers as property in which Sovcomflot has an interest.

(3) Introduce a new wave of LNG related sanctions, including but not limited to, the following —

(a) Arctic LNG 2 and its director, Oleg Vyacheslavovich Karpushin. This is one of the key links in Putin’s plan to make Russia a major LNG player;

(b) the following directors of PJSC Novatek, which is the majority owner of Arctic LNG 2 and a vital asset to Russia’s future as an energy superpower: Lev Vladimirovich Feodosyev, Valery Anatolyevich Kryukov, Viktor Gennadiyevich Nesterenko, Alexei Vitalyevich Orel, Irina Vernerovna Gaida and Alexander Yegorovich Natalenko;

(4) Introduce a new wave of diamond related sanctions, including but not limited to, the following —

(a) Russian diamond companies, OJSC Almazny Mir and JSC AGD Diamonds, and Pavel Alekseevich Marinychev, the new CEO of Alrosa, the largest state-owned Russian diamond company, estimated to hold a 30% share in the global diamond market; and

(b) members of the Management Board of Alrosa, Russia’s state-owned diamond company, including Evgenii Yuryevich Agureev, Sergei Vladimirovich Barsukov, Aleksei Nikolaevich Filippovskii and Igor Vitalyevich Sobolev.

(5) Introduce a new wave of metal related sanctions, including but not limited to, the following —

(a) owners of Ural Mining and Metallurgical (UMMC), one of Russia’s top producers of copper and zinc, including Eduard Alexandrovich Chukhlebov, Igor Gennadievich Kudryashkin and Aleksandr Vladimirovich Bunin;

(b) Anatoly Mikhailovich Sedykh – Chairman of the Board of Directors of United Metallurgical Company (OMK) – one of Russia’s top producers of steel pipes;

(c) Igor Vladimirovich Zyuzin – Chairman of the Board of Directors for Mechel PAO, Russia’s top producer of speciality steels and alloys; and

(d) aluminium companies: Samara Metallurgical Company – one of Russia’s largest producers of finished aluminium; Kamensk-Uralskiy Metallurgicheskiy Zavod – one of the leading manufacturers of aluminium semi-finished products;

Oil Import Ban

(6) Join our G7 coalition partners in curtailing Russian revenue of oil products through the United Kingdom introducing an import ban on Russian oil products.

Human Rights Sanctions

(7) Introduce a new wave of sanctions, including but not limited to, the following individuals for their responsibility for activity that violates the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the right to life. Namely, they are responsible for the custody and sentencing of Alexei Navalny in their positions to Arctic Penal Colony IK-3: —

(a) Colonel Vadim Konstantinovich Kalinin: Head of IK-3 Arctic Penal Colony ‘Polar Wolf’,

(b) Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Nikolaevich Korzhov: Deputy Head,

(c) Lieutenant Colonel Vasily Alexandrovich Vydrin: Deputy Head,

(d) Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Ivanovich Pilipchik: Deputy Head,

(e) Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Vladimirovich Golyakov: Deputy Head,

(f) Colonel Aleksandr Valerievich Obraztsov: Deputy Head,

(g) Andrey Suvorov, who sentenced Alexei Navalny to 19 years in a special regime colony under inhumane conditions last year,

(h) Kirill Nikiforov, who rejected his lawsuit against IK-6 to appeal his transfer to a punishment cell for 12 days, and

(i) Evgenia Nikolaeva andNatalia Dudar, who have issued a number of rulings against political opponents including Mr. Navalny, thereby contributing to political repression in Russia.

This Motion was submitted by u/Waffel-lol Leader of His Majesty’s Official Opposition, on behalf of the 39th Official Opposition.

Relevant and Inspired Documents

New UK sanctions mark 2 years since Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine

UK sanctions heads of Arctic penal colony where Alexei Navalny was killed

Death of Alexei Navalny: EU sanctions 33 individuals and two entities under its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime

Opening Speech:

Deputy Speaker,

We recognise the current sanctions regime in place, however it focuses greatly on only Russian and Belarussian individuals and broad sanctions on selectively luxury goods and iron and steel products. Meaning it completely neglects an array of critical products and industries, the nuance and evasiveness businesses specifically and third party actors play in continuing to enable and benefit from Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine.

This Motion addresses this by calling for a new wave of more expansive and thorough sanctions, targeting key actors and mechanisms that have evaded the current regime. Whilst also modernising our sanction regime since to call for new actors to be sanctioned for their role in aiding Putin’s war. Furthermore, this Motion calls on the Government to join the G7-led coalition curtailing Russian oil revenue which has proven effective at countering Putin’s war. The United Kingdom not being a part of this global multilateral effort is long overdue as it displays a failing of leadership and cooperation to bolster this united front. This is why the motion in the UK’s case urges the Government to introduce an import ban on all Russian oil products to join our allies and reduce any chance for possible dependence.

Moreover, this Motion calls on the Government to introduce new waves of sanctions upon those responsible and complicit in the murder of political prisoner Alexei Navalny which was a violation of fundamental human rights, and breach of international law.

This debate ends on 24th April 2024 at 10PM BST