June 2024

In the end, it was inevitable. Niger’s army had done better than many anticipated, but even with Wagner mercenaries stiffening their line, they couldn’t hold up to the superior numbers and firepower fielded by ECOWAS forces–mainly Nigeria. Nigerian air superiority, combined with intelligence support from the United States and France, led to a successful push into Niamey.

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Although initial resistance was tough, the back of the Nigerien forces had been broken at Dasso, and General Tchiani, realizing the gig was up, took what remained of his forces and has fled to Mali, where a fellow AES regime still holds strong–abducting President Bazoum in the process, with fast moving Toyotas and armored cars racing across the desert overnight for the Malian border before American or French intelligence could ascertain their position.

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Wagner Group fighters held out for a little longer than their Nigerien allies, defending the (conveniently remote) and strategic uranium mines, but once they were the only thing standing between Nigeria and “victory” they determined that discretion is the better part of valor and also decided to beat a hasty retreat to Mali–Libya being rather less safe for Wagner fighters than it was a scant little while ago. They have been replaced by a small contingent of Nigerian soldiers which is presently guarding the uranium mines at Arlit, though the overland route to Nigeria is not secure and they are dependent on supplies delivered by air or through Algeria.

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While Nigeria has produced a large quantity of poorly-edited footage [including the first combat usage of the Chinese-made VT-4 main battle tank, which eviscerated several armored cars in the only known armored clash of the war] and the production of several feature films in Nollywood about the operation is already underway, ECOWAS’s victory rings hollow. Not only does President Bazoum remain rotting in a Timbuktu prison, the conflict has resulted in a power vacuum in the Sahel that has only aggravated existing conflicts–not helped by the active fomentation of resistance by the former Nigerien junta, and the fact a number of armed groups have managed to acquire not-insubstantial quantities of Chinese body armor, encrypted radios, and night vision devices, largely stolen, liberated or purchased from the Nigerian Army, which received a substantial shipment before the fall of Niamey.

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Presently, ECOWAS lacks both the will but more importantly the practical capability to further intervene into Mali. Its forces are already unable to control much outside Niamey and the roads leading to it from Nigeria, and the remainder of the country has effectively fallen into anarchy. While ECOWAS is attempting to reform the Nigerien government and has brought around some actors to their side, there is, as always, a shortage of trained personnel and resources, fiscal or otherwise, to complete the task. The outlook in Niger, as usual, is dim, and the status quo of a weak central government with armed groups de facto controlling most of the country is liable to continue indefinitely barring further action by more capable external actors. The only good news is that, at the moment, the Tuaregs are supporting the new provisional government, though this itself may trigger backlash from other Nigeriens who aren’t particularly fond of the Berbers.

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In addition, the power vacuum in Niger has worsened the situation in Nigeria itself as well, though Nigerian leaders argue that it would be even worse had they not deposed Tchiani. With the Nigerien government out of the way, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State affiliates, and Boko Haram have all been able to strengthen their hand, and many have even been boosted by fresh recruits from former Nigerien soldiers. A new Boko Haram offensive has been launched with great success, and the town of Maiduguri in northeast Nigeria has nearly been surrounded, with Nigeria appealing for aid internationally to help repel the terrorist onslaught.

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Notable Armed Groups Operating In Niger:

• Nigerien Government/ECOWAS support forces, about 30,000 men
• National Council for the Safety Of The Homeland (CNSP) and aligned pro-junta rebels, about 7,500 fighters
• Tuareg, mostly Rhissa Ag Boula/Council of Resistance for the Republic aligned, about 3,500 men
• Al-Qaeda and affiliates, around 2,500 men in Niger
• Islamic State, about 1,200 fighters in Niger and many more on the Malian side of the border, presently in opposition to both pro-junta and pro-government forces
• Boko Haram, about 1,100 fighters routinely on the Nigerien side of the border

International Consequences

• Significant strengthening of Islamist groups in the Sahel region
• ECOWAS looks towards the West for further economic and especially military support in combating terror movements and “winning the peace” in Niger
• Uranium supply secured, but fragile and largely dependent on the goodwill of the Tuaregs
• African leaders more suspicious of Russia after active support for junta in Niger, worried Wagner Group will overthrow them too
• Mild decrease in ease of doing business for Chinese entities as some attempt to better enforce customs, worried rebels in their country may be buying Chinese equipment
• President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, has offered to send Rwandan troops to help the Nigerien government but “can’t afford to support them”