Six years since the last Presidential elections, and it was that time in Russia again. Much had changed in the intervening six years — most obviously the ongoing “special military operation” in Ukraine, which hung over the entire election cycle. Of special note for this election were the recent Constitutional amendments passed in 2020, many of which concerning eligibility for the Presidential election. Most notably was the “nullification” of the previous Presidential terms of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev — allowing them both to serve the “first” of their two terms if elected in 2024.

The Federation Council officially announced the election in December 2023 — allowing individuals to submit documents to the Central Election Commission for candidacy.

Candidates

Vladimir Putin (Independent)

Despite his previous proclamations in 2018 that he would not run for President in 2024, it surprised no one when incumbent President Vladimir Putin submitted his candidacy to run for President once more. Previously, he’d publicly demurred from running again due to constitutional restraints — but now, thanks to a miraculous coincidence, with the passage of the recent amendments he was eligible once again to run.

Putin retained his Independent label that he’d run under in 2018, supposedly to appeal to a broader segment of the population — and to hold his head above partisan politics, so to speak. Nevertheless, he was quickly endorsed by United Russia, A Just Russia, the Party of Pensioners, The Greens, Rodina, and a number of small parties.

Pavel Grudinin (Communist Party of the Russian Federation)

The candidacy of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) was lightly contested by a host of CPRF of lesser known CPRF members — most of them deputies in the State Duma — but Grudinin’s candidacy was never really in doubt. Much like 2018, Grudinin had the support of Gennady Zyuganov, the General Secretary of the CPRF and four-time presidential candidate. Despite opposition from some within the CPRF which followed familiar lines from 2018 — accusing Grudinin of representing “bourgeois interests” due to his business credentials and ownership of offshore companies — he was nevertheless confirmed as the CPRF’s candidate in the Party Congress.

Notably, Grudinin is a previous member of United Russia, and has echoed Zyuganov’s support for the invasion of Ukraine.

Leonid Slutsky (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia)

Following the death of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the long-time leader of the LDPR and perennial presidential candidate, it was not certain who the LDPR would nominate. Competition was fierce between Mikhail Degtyarev, incumbent Governor of Khabarovsk Krai and former two-time candidate for Mayor of Moscow, and Leonid Slutsky, the new Leader of the LDPR following Zhirinovsky’s death. Degtyarev was viewed as somewhat of rising star in the party, especially given Slutsky’s numerous controversies — the most prominent of them being allegations of sexual harassment levied against him in 2018 — but in the end Slutsky won out.

Slutsky shares the late Zhirinovsky’s very militaristic view on operations in Ukraine — having previously advocated for the execution of all captured members of the Azov Regiment.

Andrey Nechayev (Civic Initiative)

Nechayev’s candidacy is unique in being the sole anti-war opposition candidate allowed to run, with the disqualification of Rybakov. An economist, businessman, and former Minister of Economy, Nechayev is the only founding member of Civic Initiative still permitted to run — with the 2018 presidential candidate Ksenia Sobchak being disqualified for holding Israeli citizenship, and Dmitry Gudkov having left the party and having fled Russia for Bulgaria. Nechayev remains opposed to the conflict in Ukraine, but was approved by the CEC to run for elections — widely considered to be “symbolic opposition,” chosen for his relatively low profile and technocratic background, in comparison to the more activist figure of Rybakov.

Following Rybakov’s disqualification, Yabloko announced that they would endorse Nechayev’s candidacy for President.

Viktor Alksnis (Independent)

Alksnis, a radical ultra-nationalist member of the Club of Angry Patriots, announced his candidacy following the formal disqualification of Igor Girkin. A former member of the Soviet Air Force and a former member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Alksnis is perhaps best known for his strong opposition to the dissolution of the USSR and especially in his opposition to the independence of the Baltic States, notable given his Latvian descent. For the 2024 election, however, he serves as the primary political representation of the ultra-nationalists upset with how the conflict in Ukraine has played out.

Alksnis calls for full mobilization of the Russian populace and in the “ultimate defeat of the NATO bloc in Ukraine.” He enjoys endorsements from the Club of Angry Patriots, and from the Russian All-People’s Union.

Disqualified Candidates

Nikolay Rybakov, running as the candidate for Yabloko and the incumbent Chairman of Yabloko, was disqualified from running. Yabloko, as one of the primary non-systemic opposition parties within Russia, has been vocal in its disapproval and opposition to the war — a fact that came back to bite them, as just a few weeks before elections were announced a number of high ranking Yabloko members were taken into custody for “discrediting” the Russian armed forces, Rybakov among them. As Rybakov was in custody at the time, his candidacy was rejected by the CEC. His arrest spurred widespread condemnation from international organizations and Russian dissidents abroad, but the fact of the matter remained — Yabloko, with not enough time to convene to nominate another candidate, would not run a candidate in the 2024 presidential elections. Analysts believe that Rybakov is likely to be released without severe charges, and that the prevention of Yabloko from running in the elections served more as a “warning shot” to Russian civil society about what will not be tolerated in the elections.

Alexei Navalny, a prominent member of the opposition, is prevented from running due to his ongoing imprisonment and his previous criminal convictions.

Igor Girkin, a veteran of the Army and the FSB, a former Minister of Defense in Donetsk, prominent milblogger in Ukraine, and co-founder of the ultra-nationalist and ultra-militaristic Club of Angry Patriots, was disqualified due to his ongoing arrest and pending charges of extremism. Girkin is perhaps best known for his scathing criticisms of the incompetence of ongoing military operations in Ukraine, and calls for an even more radical and even more militaristic approach to the war. Analysts believe his disqualification was an attempt by the Kremlin to, in the wake of the late Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed march on Moscow, quiet the political influence of ultra-nationalist milbloggers as a feasible opposition force to Putin.

Campaign

The campaign itself was largely uninteresting. President Putin remained personally distant from the campaign, claiming that the “ongoing special military operation” required his full attention — regarded by analysts as an attempt to portray himself as “above the political fray,” so to speak. The main “controversy” in the campaign came from Nechayev, who claimed that Russian police were actively disrupting his attempts to campaign and that he’d received “stern warnings” from Russian intelligence and police regarding his anti-war messaging.

Results

To the surprise of no one, Vladimir Putin won reelection handily, with the largest share of votes recorded in recent Russian history. Allegations of ballot stuffing and voter fraud, backed up by video evidence from a number of voting centers across the country, were widely spread by international organizations — though Ella Pamfilova, Chair of the Central Election Commission, declared it “the cleanest election in Russian history so far,” and attributed Putin’s wide margin of victory to “the unification of society behind the special military operation and the success of Russia under [President Putin].”

Notable as well was the shift in the opposition, with Alksnis (and his ultra-nationalist backers of the Club of Angry Patriots) finishing second in overall results — overcoming both of the more established parties, in the CPRF and the LDPR. Analysts have attributed this to the rising prominence of milbloggers, and the increasing dissatisfaction of Russian ultranationalists with what they view as the Kremlin’s hesitant approach to the conflict — a dissatisfaction that spread to systematic opposition parties like the CPRF and the LDPR.

Nechayev, the only anti-war candidate, finished a distant fifth — though this is widely speculated to be because of systemic voting irregularities and voting fraud. A number of credible reports came out, accusing Russian police units and crowds of ultra-nationalists of intimidating Nechayev voters — with a number of instances of Nechayev voters being attacked outside of polling centers. Pamfilova disregarded these allegations, instead chastising Nechayev for “not being a graceful loser.”

Cabinet and Security Council

More eagerly anticipated by Kremlin-watchers was not the election itself, but the appointment of the new Cabinet. Specifically, speculation about Cabinet shuffling was rampant — with many viewing the movement of appointments as a sign of who Putin is grooming to be his eventual successor; by the 2030 election, he will already be 78 years old. As is customary, the entire government resigned following Putin’s inauguration in May — with the new one appointed just two weeks later, confirmed without a single vote against in the State Duma.

Notable names are bolded.

GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Permanent Members

Note: Sergei Ivanov, Special Representative of the President on Issues of Environmental Activities, Ecology and Transport, was demoted to a Temporary Member of the Security Council.

Notable Changes

For the most part, the Cabinet and Security Council remain unchanged — a reflection of Putin’s desire for continuity as struggles in Ukraine continued. However, the few changes that were made were significant.

Aleksei Dyumin and Dmitry Patrushev were the biggest beneficiaries of the reshuffle — the former being moved from Governor of Tula Oblast to become Deputy Prime Minister for Defense Affairs, and the latter being moved from Minister of Agriculture to become Deputy Prime Minister for internal affairs. The elevation of Dyumin, Putin’s former bodyguard and staunch loyalist, reflects a light punishment to Shoigu for his handling of the “special military operation,” given Dyumin’s shared mandate over “Defense Affairs.” Dyumin and Shoigu will inevitably have to spar for authority and influence within Putin’s orbit, as is by design. The elevation of Dmitry Patrushev, son of Nikolai Patrushev, reflects the elder Patrushev’s growing influence within Putin’s orbit.

Nikolai Patrushev also benefited directly from the reshuffling beyond the elevation of his son, being promoted to Deputy Chairman of the Security Council — second-in-command behind only Putin. This reflects not only his rising star, but also the falling fortunes of Dmitry Medvedev, who was demoted from Deputy Chairman to Patrushev’s former position as Secretary of the Security Council. Though Medvedev is far from falling out of influence entirely, his attempts to shed the designation of a political moderate have evidently not gone too swimmingly.

Kremlin watchers hoping for a clear sign as to a successor have been left disappointed by the reshuffle. Nikolai Patrushev is undisputedly the greatest beneficiary of the shuffle, but his advanced age prevents him from being a serious successor candidate in the long run. Dmitry Patrushev, Nikolai’s son, also benefited greatly from the reshuffle and from his family ties — but his relative inexperience in government means he cannot be considered an ultimate contender for the time being. Aleksey Dyumin, a longtime Putin loyalist, also saw his fortunes rise. Other candidates such as Dmitry Medvedev, Mikhail Mishustin, and various personalities within the intelligence and military community remain possibilities — but there is little certainty, as intended.