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STEP 1

At the start of the program Iran possessed roughly 121.6 kg of up to 60% U-235 and 535.8 kg of up to 20% U-235. This would be the predominant break-out material that Iranian nuclear scientists will be seeking to utilize. Through diversion of cascades of more advanced IR-6 and IR-2mm centrifuges from production facilities which the IAEA no longer has the capability to surveil for the past 2 years into secret underground nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow outside of the publically available surveilled areas that the IAEA has access to, burried deep in the Zagros, this enables the Iranian nuclear program to be supplied with weapons-grade nuclear material with utter secrecy, a process which has been undergoing since October, 2023. By May, 2024, an approximate total of 456 SWU of enrichment capacity has been generated at these sites, generating a total of roughly 78.1kg of weapons-grade HEU.

STEP 2

Obtaining the design of the Hwason-31 nuclear warhead from North Korea, a simple 650-kg warhead designed with an estimated yield of anywhere between 12-30kt according to various different methods of calculation (though the likely yield will be somewhere in the middle with variance typical for nuclear devices unaccounted for, likely around 20kt±5), already designed for the Hwasong-10 which share remarkable similarities to the Khorramshahr family of IRBM that Iran currently possesses dramatically shortens the integration period, with most of the design work so far being done on conventional decoy warheads for the Khorramshahr-4’s MIRV payload (a capability that already exist), recently being tested on the salt flats of Dasht-e-Lut. This warhead design utilise around 7kg of HEU, which enables the current theoretical maximum upper bound for the number of devices Iran could’ve constructed to be around 11, however limitations with regards to the needs for secrecy in transport of the materials as well as storage means that the process has been slow so far, and the likely number of warhead prepared likely lies between 2-3 launch ready warhead and 2-4 warheads in various stages of readiness. Given the nature of these devices being very simple, highly fail-proof decades old gun-type warheads with small tactical yields, in addition to testing data being acquired from the North Korean program and mechanism tests without the weapon-core by Iran indicates a very high confidence for the reliability of these weapons even in absence of a full systems test.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

MILITARY

In the long run within the timescale of around a year and a half from now, having exhausted the available stockpile of 60% enriched Uranium, Iran will have to tap into the 20% enriched Uranium stockpile with a theoretical WGU yield of 94.74kg, enabling up to an additional 13 devices to be constructed in addition to the existing theoretical limit of 11. Given the desire for secrecy, it is likely that a sustained rate of around 2-3 warheads per month can be done.

The first unit of currently unnamed, Shahab-6 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile design, itself a copy of the Hwasong-18 missile, itself highly likely a copy of the Russian modern advanced Topol-M, is currently still being assembled with a test date currently ostensibly pencilled for September of this year, while manufacturing for mass production for the missile unlikely to complete within the next 24 month. That being said however, this program is currently on very low priority, and would only be deemed necessary should Iran acquire complete pariah status (even more so that it currently is, with even more sanctions placed on it than North Korea). Currently, Iran's nuclear deterrent will rest upon the Khorramshahr-4 with its 3 MIRVs, with a total of 20 to be deployed actively, with only 3 missiles carrying actual warheads. Doctrine will require a coordinated launch against Israel and potentially European targets, in conjunction with proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and hundreds of other MRBMs down to SRBMs to overwhelm and saturate Israel's highly potent missile defence systems in staggered waves. A 3rd warhead is currently being stored underground near Kerman Air Base, pending decisions regarding whether to go ahead with an active test, while the other 3 warheads is to be made deployable as soon as possible. An active state of 10/11 warheads always online is to be reached by the end of the Article X.1 notice period and could be maintained for 2 months maximum until readiness will be forced to reduce to 80% for regeneration (however this still means a nominal increase in active deployed warheads given newly produced units). Decoy production is also expected to ramp up with the aim of maintaining 30 deployable missiles at all time by the end of the notice period.

POLITICAL

From the Iranian perspective, nuclear devices are highly necessary in order to secure the regime's safety in the event of the death of the Supreme Leader, which leaders of the security apparatus knows, is imminent and has a high probability of occurring within the next 12 months. However, this is a commodity that could be traded away, and similarly, the threat of Iran getting nukes is always a much better leverage than the act of getting nukes itself. As such, despite the obvious value that such a deterrence would give should it be announced that "yes, Iran has been working on a nuclear device for the past 2 years and possesses 30 warheads with a 200kt yield capable of obliterating Israel and most of Europe", it's likely that this program and its progress is to remain in secret as a last resort red line of defence in cases of what the top security brass in Iran would call "irrational reactions" from the "Great Satan" and the "Jewish Menace", and the provocation of "announcing a withdrawal from the NPT" done as an invitation for guarantees that would ensure the regime's successful power transition.

THE OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVE

In conclusion, given existing Iranian breakout capability in combination with technical assistance in the form of much needed data and proven design given by the independently matured North Korean program, it is likely to be the case that Iran already possesses a small stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons. Western Analysts working on publically available information upon the impending 3-month notice triggering of Article X.1 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty likely will assume that Iran has just begun this process, in which case policy recommendations will be roughly 12 months out of date as that is likely to be when the "predicted breakout" of Iran is likely to be completed given publically available information. Western intelligence likely however would be able to pick up clues that suggest that Iran is either extremely close to acquiring nuclear deterrence the extreme end, and likely around 6 months or more away on the lower estimates.