Needless to say, things did not get any better for the citizenry of Myanmar in late 2023/early 2024.

In the Dry Zone, combat continues in its usually brutal fashion — primarily between guerillas and the Pyusawhti militias of the Tatmadaw. Combat has, however, continued to move away from the widespread use of arson by Tatmadaw units — common earlier in the war, with the Tatmadaw having set villages alight — in favor of more precise raids against local resistance leaders. Specifically Local Defense Forces (LDFs), largely independent and organized on the ultra-local level by village, not formally affiliated to the NUG but nevertheless opposed to the SAC, have been hit particularly hard by these raids — with many local leaders being killed or otherwise abducted. This has primarily been attributed to the poor supply of these groups, many of whom rely largely on homemade weapons, and poor operational secrecy. By contrast, PDFs in the region — more formal structures, aligned with the NUG — have done fairly well. Evidence has grown showing cooperation between PDFs and EAOs in other regions, permitting PDFs in the Dry Zone greater access to factory-manufactured fire-arms. Additionally, fighting has intensified greatly along the banks of the Chindwin River and the Irrawaddy River — key supply routes for the Tatmadaw in funneling supplies to Monywa (headquarters for the fight in Chin State) and to Kachin State. Perhaps a symptom of greater coordination with EAOs, makeshift rockets and small arms managed to stop a number of supply flotillas traveling these rivers — though the PDFs paid a heavy price for this victory, given the strong and violent Tatmadaw response in villages along the river.

In Rakhine State, the standoff between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw continues, with the tense ceasefire remaining in place for the time being. Rumors are aplenty, alleging that either the AA or the Tatmadaw intends to violate the ceasefire, but thus far nothing has come of these rumors. Nevertheless, they may hold a kernel of truth in them — the rapidly increasing state capacity and state administration of the United League of Arakan (ULA), the AA’s political wing, is of increasing concern to the Tatmadaw, especially in that the longer they wait the harder time they may have reasserting control. Additionally, the funneling of new Chinese arms from the AA’s ally in the UWSA has increased the AA’s confidence in any potential conflict. For now though, things remain peaceful.

In Northeast Myanmar, the situation remains as messy as ever. There are a truly impressive number of groups operating in Kachin State and Shan State. The Tatmadaw and their Pyusawhti militias are without allies in the region, essentially fighting everybody else. The NUG and their PDFs have clear allies in the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and the Kachin People’s Defence Forces (KPDF), and tentative allies in the newly reformed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and their People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Then, there is the vague alliance centering around the Chinese-backed United Wa State Army (UWSA), including the KIO (in a weird overlap with the NUG-alliance), the Shan-dominated National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Kokang-dominated Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP). And then separate from them all, primarily feuding with the SSPP, is the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).

Action in the Northeast picked up substantially in the later months of 2023, thanks in large part to a fresh flow of new Chinese arms from the UWSA, especially to the KIO and SSPP. The RCSS suffered major losses in the field against the SSPP, losing many of their remaining strongholds and forcing them back into a position of further weakness — with the RCSS beginning to seriously think about allying with the SAC for support. However, the SAC faced immense difficulty in the Northeast over the last few months of 2023, with heavy casualties as a result of better reconnaissance from the EAOs allowing them to prepare for assaults beforehand, and generally better arms in the hands of the EAOs. Hpakant and Momauk Townships were especially difficult — being the scene of fierce fighting throughout the war between the SAC and the KIO — as well as in Muse Township, where the SAC has been fighting the TNLA and the MNDAA for months. The Tatmadaw withdrew their forces from these regions for the time being. It is no coincidence that the groups the Tatmadaw struggled against in the Northeast (the KIO, TNLA, and MNDAA) are all UWSA allies.

In Southeast Myanmar, things are much the same as they’ve been in recent months. Tatmadaw forces, demoralized and inexperienced, have been steadily pushed back as Karenni and Karen groups seize back territory in Kayin and Kayah State respectively. The SAC has continued their vicious scorched earth tactics in this region, burning and razing villages to the ground where possible, and have continued to rely on their airpower and artillery might to bomb the entirety of the Southeast. Nevertheless, state building efforts by the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC) in Kayah State and the Karen National Union (KNU) in Kayin State have continued to progress — serving to further legitimize their rule in the region. PDFs in the Southeast continue to be some of the most competent in the country, being well-trained, well-equipped, and working in close concert with their EAO allies. Rumor has it that a number of NUG observers, primarily from the Shan State, have traveled to the Southeast to gain lessons that they can apply to the EAO-filled landscape of the Northeast.

In Northwest Myanmar, the fighting between Chin forces and the SAC continues to be vicious — with SAC scorched earth tactics a hallmark of the combat. The Yaw Valley, especially up north near Kale, continues to be the centerpiece of the fighting, specifically surrounding the two roads that lead from Monywa to Kale. The logistical value of these roads cannot be overstated — being the main supply routes between the Tatmadaw’s Northwest Command in Monywa, and a key airport/stronghold in Kale that the Tatmadaw wishes to use as their base in subduing the entirety of the Northwest. Chin forces have managed to make Kale too dangerous to be effectively used as a Tatmadaw forward operating base, constantly ambushing convoys along the Monywa-Kale highways — inviting reprisal attacks, arson, and bombings in return. Nevertheless, similar to the Southeast, in the Northwest, Chin state building continues unabated — the Chin National Front (CNF) leading a surprisingly sophisticated administration in the rural hills of the Northwest.

In Lower Myanmar, the last few months of 2023 have been a mixed bag for both sides. On one hand, the SAC continued to be extremely effective in uprooting urban resistance in Yangon and Naypyidaw. This is the continuance of the trend from the past year or so, where military intelligence has been extremely successful in sniffing out urban cells of local, independent, anti-junta guerilla groups — infiltrating these groups, and leading precise raids to capture or kill leaders of these groups. As this has happened, and with little help or coordination possible for the moment from the NUG due to logistical concerns, fighting and attacks in Yangon and Naypyidaw have died down slightly as these guerilla groups retreat to the countryside to form their bases. Additionally, Pyusawhti militias have been loosed on these cities — essentially leading to pro-junta mobs rampaging any anti-junta militias in the area. Nevertheless, Naypyidaw and Yangon remain heavily militarized with constant police/military checkpoints and patrols.

SAC success in the urban areas is contrasted sharply with the non-urban fighting along the Sittaung River in Bago Region. Fighting along the river centers around four key logistical chokepoints — two highways, one railroad, and the river itself, all of which connect the economic hub of Yangon to the SAC’s political capital in Naypyidaw. Local PDFs, as well as the KNU, have been fighting over this area for months now — contesting the “old” highway, the railroad, and the river; but the “new” highway, located further west of the river and closer to the regime-controlled Karen Hills, remained uncontested. This has changed slightly. Along the old highway, the railroad, and the river, fighting is constant and heavier than before; any convoys seeking to travel between Yangon and Naypyidaw are forced to be accompanied by heavy military escort and a constant air presence above. Constant ambushes have done a number on the Tatmadaw’s logistics — hurting not only Naypyidaw, but also the war effort in the Northeast and Northwest. In recent months, the new highway has been the subject of a number of prominent raids and ambushes so far from PDFs, causing the Tatmadaw to slightly panic — although the efficacy of these raids has been mitigated by the overwhelming air power the Tatmadaw wields in the region. PDFs have begun to build rudimentary operating bases in the Karen Hills, with the goal of seriously threatening the new highway, and have secretly opened talks with the UWSA regarding the transfer of MANPADS equipment to dampen the Tatmadaw’s ironclad control over the transport corridor from the air.