June 2026

The 14th National Congress was shaping up to be one of the most eventful Congress’ since 1986, when the party adopted the Doi Moi reforms. Although Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s poor health and unprecedented third term had already excluded him from re-election for much of the party members, his policies in Myanmar had alienated even his own hardliner faction. The 13th Politburo had received plenty of praise for its strong response in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic recovery immediately after, however the decision to fund rebels against the military junta, opposing both the ASEAN consensus Hanoi had helped author and Beijing as a now active supporter of the regime, drew sharp criticism both from within the Politburo and the wider Communist Party. Rumor had it that Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh had been furious over the decision, leading to a rift in the central government leadership that was only stopped from becoming a disaster because of Chinh’s belief that he was tipped to succeed Trong as General Secretary anyway. Even Trong’s supporters, most of which hail from the Army and Department of Public Security, began to openly oppose him, very concerned at being kicked out of ASEAN and what that would do to public perception of the party.

Once the new National Assembly and Central Committee had been elected, the decisions over top leadership made the new faction lines all the more clear. Nguyễn Phú Trọng had quickly gone from being one of the most influential men in the party to being a political hand grenade. Most of his supporters had coalesced around Pham Minh Chinh, giving him a broad base among both reformist technocrats and conservative hardliners and giving him the essential waiver to run while being over 65. As such, it was predicted very early that he would secure the General Secretary nomination. Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, State President during the 13th Congress, had miscalculated by throwing his weight behind Trong early on, hoping to weather what he thought would be minor discontent following the Myanmar decision. As such, the Central Committee did not give him an age waiver, forcing him to retire from politics. Instead Vương Đình Huệ, leader of the National Assembly, was tipped to take over the position. The last two major positions were given to newcomers to the Politburo, chosen by the technocrats. Though their influence had been greatly diminished by Trong’s anti-corruption drives, the shortcomings of the conservative-led Politburo had been capitalised on to bring their influence surging back. Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam has been promoted to Prime Minister, while Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan has been made National Assembly Chairwoman, the second woman ever to serve in the top four positions.

The new leadership, in order of importance:

Vương Đình Huệ, in his new position as State President, made a short speech to the press about the new priorities of his government and the direction they wish to take. In it he expressed a desire to return to the ASEAN Consensus and the ‘ASEAN Way’, stressing the importance of multilateralism in Southeast Asia and diplomatic solutions to crises. Although it was not directly stated, analysts suspect the implicit meaning of this is that VIetnam will end its arming of rebel groups in Myanmar and opposition to the peace process as a whole. He also discussed at length the desire to build strong domestic industries, moving away from being a manufacturing hub for other countries and becoming more like South Korea or Japan, though he acknowledged that this will take time.