January 2023

Local Connections

With Pakistan's stunning victory in the 2022 Indo-Pakistan War, Pakistan's territories in the disputed Kashmir region have grown considerably. Unfortunately, due to the almost almost seven decade long conflict over the region, much of Pakistan's newly acquired territory is poorly connected to Pakistan and the rest of Azad Kashmir--if it's connected at all! Building roads to connect Pakistani and Indian Kashmir has hardly been a priority for either side over the course of the conflict, as any trade across them would be miniscule at best, while also affording a significant strategic advantage to the enemy in the event of future conflict. In practice, this means that much of Pakistan's newly acquired territory is far better connected to Indian-administered Kashmir than it is to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, making it difficult for Pakistan to adequately defend these possessions in the event of future conflict.

Moreover, now that these towns find themselves on the opposite side of the Line of Control, the existing local economies have been all but snuffed out: if you lived in Uri but sold your produce in Srinagar, you're now shit out of luck. And with such poor connections to the rest of Pakistan, you aren't likely to find a replacement market there, either. Better infrastructure connectivity to the Pakistan's newly acquired territories, then, is absolutely critical from a security perspective: both because it will make it easier for the Pakistani Army to move men and materiel to the front during a conflict, and because it will ensure the livelihood of the people living in those new territories, ensuring that they do not turn to radicalism.

To this end, the Pakistani government has announced that it will be constructing several new road connections throughout the newly liberated districts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, with the ultimate goal of improving the connectivity of those regions to the rest of the province and Pakistan proper. The largest of these roads span mountain passes, such as the Haji Pir Pass, which previously were divided between India and Pakistan, greatly improving the north-south connectivity of the region. In the event of another conflict, this will make it considerably easier for the Pakistani army to rotate along the north-south axis, improving their supply situation and, hopefully, allowing them to deal another crushing defeat to India. In peacetime, this will just ensure that there's actual road connectivity to some of these new towns.

Of course, these highways won't be enough to fulfill all of Pakistan's security needs in the region. While they'll connect most of the newly-acquired cities, they won't cover all of the small footpaths and mountain peaks that define Kashmir. To ensure these are adequately defended, Pakistan will also be constructing a new series of observation posts and fortifications, serviced by military-only roads up into the mountains.

In addition to building new roads, the federal government has included funds to fully "Pakistanize" the province. Road signs, previously written in Hindi and English, are to be converted to Urdu and English. The Indian school curricula will be quickly transitioned to the curriculum in use in the rest of Azad Kashmir. In all instances where government entities use local languages which can be written in either the Devanagari or Nastaliq scripts, such as Kashmiri, Dogri and Gujari, the Nastaliq script will be used. And while the government will fall short of mandating the use of Nastaliq script by private entities (mostly because it cannot realistically enforce this rule), it will still heavily encourage and incentivize its use, setting up Nastaliq literacy courses for both youths and adults, while setting up numerous restrictions, but not outright banning, Devanagari literacy courses.

Companies registered in India proper--mostly banks, mining consortiums, and a handful of private utility providers--have been quickly nationalized by the government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (or, if they were located in Ladakh, by the Balawaristan), while those few internationally owned businesses in the region have been allowed to maintain their property, on the condition that they otherwise abide by Pakistani laws and regulations. And while Indian-issued ID cards will be accepted for local use by Pakistani authorities for a few short months, Pakistan has determined that it will stop accepting them by June of this year, meaning all locals will have to get a Pakistani identification card. In the newly liberated districts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, they will also have the right to vote in Pakistani elections and to hold a Pakistani passport, making them Pakistani citizens in all but name (though, like all residents of the province, they will not technically be full Pakistani citizens, awaiting a final determination of the region's status under the relevant UNSC Resolutions). For those people liberated to Balawaristan from Ladakh, they will become full Pakistani citizens, with all the rights and privileges that entails. Those who do not wish to do so are welcome to leave to India, no questions asked, where we're sure their Indian ID cards will be readily accepted.

Bit by bit, these policies are meant to gradually erase the legacy of the Indian occupation in the region. Their implementation has been met with warm support by the Muslim people of Ladakh and the northern districts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and with bitter resistance in the majority-Hindu towns like Poonch and Nowshera. The projects are expected to be fully implemented, and in the case of the roadways, fully completed, by the end of the year.

International Connections

Another consequence of the 2022 War is that the Sino-Pakistani border has almost doubled in length. The seizure of Siachen Glacier has extended the Sino-Pakistani border all the way to Chinese-administered Aksai Chin, including the historic Karakoram Pass. This is critical for Pakistan from both a security and an economic perspective. From a security perspective, this longer border, if sufficient transit connections are developed, means that China has an increased ability to intervene in any future conflict between India and Pakistan, improving the effectiveness of its security guarantees. From an economic prospective, developing more road connections along this expanded border would provide alternatives to the Karakoram Highway, meaning that if terror attacks or extreme weather events knock out the connection, there are alternative routes for Sino-Pakistani trade.

Even with China removed from the picture, there are major incentives for Pakistan to develop a more robust road network in Balawaristan and Siachen, as it will improve the Pakistani Army's ability to supply units in some of the world's most remote regions. In 2017, Pakistan started construction on the long-awaited Gilgit-Skardu Expressway Project, a 250m USD improvement plan to convert Strategic Highway 1, which links Gilgit to Skardu, into a four-lane highway. Pakistan is hoping to build upon this initiative by creating a new highway network, dubbed the Trans-Balawaristan Highway Network, a combination of road improvements and new road construction that will improve north-south transportation in Azad Kashmir and east-west connectivity in Balawaristan--particularly those regions recently liberated from India--as well as improve road connectivity to China. The project is the final realization of a plan first proposed in 2021.

Starting in Muzaffarabad, the project will build full highways through the Neelum and Astore Valleys, traveling north towards Gorikot. Once there, it will cut through the Deosai Plateau, the second highest plateau in the world, connecting to Skardu and the existing Gilgit-Skardu Expressway.

From there, the highway network will branch in two. The first branch, known as Mustagh Highway, will travel north, cutting into the Trans-Karakoram Tract (a part of historic Kashmir ceded to China by Pakistan in the 1963 Sino-Pakistan Agreement through the Mustagh Pass, a 19,700 meter high mountain pass recently reopened by the receding of several glaciers in the region due to climate change. After passing into China, this spur will follow the Yarkand River until it connects to China National Highway 219. When finished, the Mustagh Highway will be the highest paved international border crossing in the world--a record prevcurrently held by the Khunjerab Pass border crossing between Pakistan and China.

Given its extreme altitude--the Mustagh Highway will be the highest paved international border crossing in the world, beating out the record currently held by the Khunjerab Pass border crossing between Pakistan and China--the Mustagh Highway will only be passable for part of the year. However, this does not make the highway any less important: during the part of the year that it is open, it will provide a critical secondary route to the Karakoram Highway, filling the need for a backup route that was discovered when a 2010 earthquake and landslide forced the route to close for five years.

The second branch, known as Siachen Highway, will travel through the Shyok Valley towards Siachen Glacier, crossing the Saltoro Ridge through Gyong La Pass, at which point it will follow the Nubra River towards Sasoma, taking advantage of the road infrastructure previously built up by India's Border Roads Organization. From Sasoma, it will cross east through the Sasser Pass, then cut north through the barren Depsang Plains to cross into China at the 18,000 foot high Karakoram Pass, where further construction on the Chinese side will travel north to China National Highway 219.

Unlike the Karakoram Highway, which is closed to heavy traffic from November 30 to May 1 (and to all traffic from December 30 to April 1) due to heavy winter snows, the Karakoram Pass is snow-free through most of the year due to its high winds (though it remains extremely cold, and is often subjected to blizzards), meaning that, except for temporary interruptions due to extreme weather events, the route will remain open through most of the year. This route is also easier to access for China's southern and south-western provinces than the existing crossing at Khunjerab Pass, as it can be accessed directly through the highway network in Tibet--presently, Pakistan-bound traffic from these provinces has to travel through Xinjiang.

In total, these new highways are expected to cost a combined 2b USD. Pakistan is requesting Chinese financing and engineering support for these projects, given their importance to both nations.