As 2031 comes to a close, Taiwan once again goes to the polls to participate in referenda on several key domestic and foreign policy issues. Those issues, and the results of the referenda, are reported below.

[Local Referendum: Lienchiang County] Renaming Lienchiang County to Matsu County

This referendum is restricted to ballots issued in Lienchiang County (better known as the Matsu Islands). It seeks to rename the county from "Lienchiang County" to "Matsu County"--both to distance itself from the similarly-named Lianjiang County in China, and as a final separation from the Mainland. This issue has been floated previously, but was largely dismissed by the largely-KMT supporting population of Lienchiang County, who believed the issue reflected the pro-independence viewpoint of the DPP. Now that the war has all but evaporated support for the KMT in the outlying islands, this referendum is expected to pass easily. It will also have the dubious distinction of having the lowest total vote count out of any election in Taiwanese history: following the Massacre on Matsu, only a few hundred voters remain on the islands.

The New Constitution

After months of heated debate in the Constituent Assembly, the body finally approved a final draft for the new Constitution of the Republic of Taiwan. The draft is largely based on the old Constitution of the Republic of China, though with some key changes.

First, as a direct result of the power enjoyed by third parties such as the New Power Party and the Taiwan People's Party in the current Legislative Yuan, the new Constitution mandates the use of more representative election techniques throughout the country: first-past-the-post elections have been replaced with a mixture of instant-runoff and single transferable vote elections.

Second, the Executive Yuan has been greatly reduced in power, in essence becoming a Cabinet of Ministers for the President of the Republic. Under this new Constitution, the Republic of Taiwan would become a fully Presidential system--in essence formalizing the division of power between the President of the Republic and the President of the Executive Yuan that had existed since the 2000s.

Finally, the Legislative Yuan has been expanded from 113 seats to 165 seats, with additional seats allotted to the lowland and highland aboriginal communities, and with designated seats apportioned to represent the overseas Taiwanese community.

Ratification of the new Constitution has been added to the 2031 Referenda ballot.

ASEAN Membership

Now that Taiwan is newly-independent, the country is in desperate need of more friends. Taiwan is especially in need of trade partners--both to rebuild its devastated economy, and to reduce its reliance on Chinese trade (China is far and away Taiwan's largest trade partner). With the people of Taiwan voting to leave the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, finding new markets is even more important.

Fortunately, Taiwan has already been working on this for a while under the auspices of its New Southbound Policy. Under the NSP, the governments of President Tsai and President Lai envisioned Taiwan reducing its economic dependence on China by building increased trade ties with the Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Australasia. However, this program was hampered by the One China Policy. The cold hard truth was that most of the countries in these regions were also heavily reliant on Chinese trade, and didn't want to upset Beijing by playing nice with Taipei.

With the One China Policy dead and dusted and Taiwan finally recognized as a free and independent nation, President Hsiao is hoping to revive the New Southbound Policy with one of its biggest pushes yet: membership in ASEAN. In addition to gaining access to ASEAN's existing network of free trade agreements (including trade agreements with India, China, Australia, and New Zealand), this move would gain Taiwan substantial diplomatic support in the near abroad--ASEAN may have its differences, but they do generally cooperate to stand up to foreign pressure.

The proposal to join ASEAN comes with some controversy. Since its democratization in the 1990s and 2000s, Taiwan has prided itself as one of the few Asian democracies, and has taken great strides to promote democratization and respect for human rights throughout the region. ASEAN... has not. Numerous ASEAN members are involved in various levels of crimes against humanity, from minor violations like the suppression of dissent and freedom of speech in Singapore, to gross violations like ongoing genocide in Myanmar. For many people in Taiwan, the thought of associating with an organization that has long provided cover for its members is unpalatable.

But that's why we have referenda. Expert opinion is split on whether voters will vote in favor of pursuing ASEAN membership or against it.

Accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

Next up on the trade docket is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, better known as CPTPP. An eleven-member (twelve? I think the UoK has joined by now) trade agreement of countries along the Pacific Rim, including Japan, Mexico, Canada, Peru (now Bolivaria? Unless they left the agreement?), Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam, the CPTPP is the remnants of United States' attempts to broker the Trans-Pacific Partnership. While significantly smaller in both scope and economic size than similar agreements in the region, most notably RCEP, joining the CPTPP would still help expand Taiwanese trade across the Pacific into South America and Europe--making it invaluable for a country trying to diversify its trade partners. Better still, the nations in the CPTPP are generally non-controversial. This one is expected by analysts to pass fairly easily; after all, Taiwan has been trying to join the CPTPP since 2016.

Accession to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

The largest free trade agreement in the world in terms of the GDP of participating members, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP, is the premier free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region, comprising ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and China. During the negotiation process, Taiwan attempted to join RCEP, but was blocked by Beijing on the grounds that Taiwan should be represented in the agreement through the PRC as part of the One China Agreement. With the death of the One China Policy and full recognition of Taiwan as an independent nation, Taiwan is again considering joining RCEP.

Official analysis on how joining RCEP would affect Taiwan’s economy is inconclusive. Trade with RCEP members was equivalent to 60 percent of Taiwan’s total trade in 2020. However, just over 70 percent of Taiwan’s exports to RCEP members are information and communication technology products, which are tariff free under the WTO’s Information Technology Agreement. The big winners, if Taiwan does join RCEP, would be more traditional industries like petrochemicals, plastics, metals, and textiles, as well as individual companies that do business with China.

Public opinion on RCEP is mixed. Unlike the CPTPP, which has specific provisions against intellectual property theft (and dispute resolution mechanisms if said theft does occur), RCEP has none. RCEP is also mute on labor rights, environmental issues, and human rights, which has led to some pause in Taiwan, where the populace generally views itself as one of the most progressive actors in the region on those issues.

Accession to the Comprehensive and Strategic Economic Partnership

The three agreements above are just free trade agreements. Sure, acceding to them would require some tinkering of Taiwanese regulations, but that’s just the nature of the beast when it comes to free trade agreements. The last agreement on the ballot, the Union of Kingdom brokered Comprehensive and Strategic Economic Partnership, is a whole different animal. Under CSEP, participating nations are united in a single-market. Seems simple enough. The problem comes with all of the extra baggage included in the agreement, most particularly the compatibility clause, which allows firms to effectively pick and choose which country’s regulations they want to follow. Since CSEP includes several poorer countries, like Vietnam and India, Taiwanese voters are worried that joining CSEP, while it would greatly benefit Taiwanese businesses through improved market access to South Korea, Japan, and the United States, would have too great a cost on Taiwanese society through the dramatic weakening of the regulatory powers of the state. Analysts expect CSEP to be met with a resounding no by the voting public.

Republic of Taiwan Referenda 2031 Results

• Turnout: 72.4%