Compared to the considerable chaos in years previous in Libya, the first half of 2024 was relatively peaceful. Minor scuffles between militias broke out — but for the first time in a long time, the government was unified. There was no rival government in Tobruk to contest authority, or to hold the threat of renewed civil war over the country’s head.

Of course, Ddeibeh’s people and the National Forces Alliance were most displeased with the results of the election and the subsequent coalition building; despite the NFA having the most representatives, they were out flanked by a diverse coalition headed by Saddam Haftar’s National Restoration Alliance. Rumors of Ddeibeh and the NFA attempting to reconstitute a rival government of sorts in Tripoli, backed by their own Army, were plentiful — and there was significant substance to the rumors. The Tripoli Protection Force remained active in and around the capital, but abstained from any true action.

The reasons for the lack of a substantive offensive by Ddeibeh, the NFA, and the previous Tripoli government were numerous, but came down to two primary factors. The first was legitimacy. The 2023 elections had given the resulting coalition a great deal of legitimacy in their action — they could convincingly state to be acting on behalf of the people, while Ddeibeh and the NFA had lost, in the eyes of most, fair and square. Public support for the NRA-led coalition was high, especially with their endorsement of the return of the popular Prince Mohammed. Second was military supremacy. When Saddam Haftar traveled from Tobruk to Tripoli to take up the office of Prime Minister, he brought his Tariq Ben Zeyad Brigade with him. While the TBZ Brigade has been previously accused of committing war crimes (not entirely uncommon, given the brutal nature of the civil war), the TBZ Brigade is undeniably well-trained and well-disciplined. Stationing themselves throughout Tripoli, their presence — and the threat of further Libyan National Army units integrating themselves in the capital — meant that the leaders of the Tripoli Protection Force preferred to keep their force in reserve.

The result? Prime Minister Saddam Haftar was allowed to undergo his constitution-crafting relatively unopposed, enjoying a) large public support from the elections and the invitation of Prince Mohammed back, b) military supremacy in Tripoli and previous grounds uncontrolled by the Haftar coalition, and c) support from Tobruk, where his father remained in charge. Therefore, alongside the various reform parties and the eight JCP members who’d agreed to support the Constitution, the NRA-MRCLL coalition began their efforts to amend the 1951 Constitution.

On June 1st, 2024, the amended Constitution was approved by the House of Representatives by a vote of 101-99. Following the text of the 1951 Constitution closely, various amendments were proposed — providing for a unicameral legislature, regional autonomy, independence of the Supreme Judicial Council, recognition of the Berber language as an official language of Libya, and a restatement of the protection of civil rights. Thus, Prime Minister Haftar held a press conference that afternoon — formally announcing the dissolution of the State of Libya, which had existed since 2011, and the proclamation of the Kingdom of Libya.

Prince Mohammed El Senussi was thus, in a separate vote in the House of Representative, confirmed as King Mohammed I. His father, Hasan as-Senussi, was recognized posthumously in a separate vote as King Hasan I — thus, providing a clear line of inheritance for the throne of Libya, from King Idris to King Hasan to the new King Mohammed.

The new King, who’d been expecting this announcement for months now after his invitation back to the country, gave his own speech on June 2nd in Independence Square before a cheering crowd — proclaiming his gratitude to the people of Libya for putting their faith in him, and committing himself to the “betterment of the situation for all Libyans, no matter political orientation.” King Mohammed will take up residence in the old Royal Palace, with the past few months dedicated to clearing out the library built in the palace during the Gaddafi regime, and restoring it to the center of the Royal Court. A new library would be built nearby, funded by the King’s personal wealth.

The King remains exceptionally personally popular, as a figure for Libya to rally around. He has restored the royal household — placing Prince Idris bin Abdullah al-Senussi, previous rival claimant to the throne, as the head of the royal household. Despite Prince Idris’s rival claim to the throne, he is in fact a quite distant relation to the main royal line — but he has been rewarded with a high spot in the new Royal Court as a reflection of the King’s gratitude for the Prince’s hard work in restoring the Libyan monarchy during the Gaddafi years.

Nevertheless, as celebrations continued through Libya at the ascension of King Mohammed, hailing his ascension as the end of the tumultuous period of post-revolutionary civil war, there is still substantial work to do. The coalition government which Haftar heads is extraordinarily diverse — and without the support of the eight JCP members, they are a minority government. Haftar will have to choose his issues carefully to avoid being ousted, as the NFA and Ddeibeh continue to wait in the wings.

But that is for later; for now, Haftar will indulge in the celebratory mood of the nation. Long live King Mohammed!