With parliamentary elections having concluded, the immediate next step was the furious flurry of negotiations between the various parties, all hoping to join the new governing coalition — and therefore have a voice in creating the new Constitution.

The National Forces Alliance hoped to leverage their position as the largest liberal-oriented party to try and horde the other various, numerous liberal parties into a broad coalition. Ddeibeh’s Libya Future Party proved willing to cooperate — provided the coalition would unify behind Ddeibeh in a presidential election — as did the National Centre Party and Ihya Libya. However, the National Front Party, the Democratic Party, and the Ensaf Movement — all left-leaning parties — refused this call. Similarly, the Union for Homeland and Libu Party demanded more regionalism, and thus did not join. In all, the NFA’s initial attempts to form a coalition failed, with only 57 seats backing their coalition.

Broadly speaking, the pro-Gaddafi Popular Front for the Liberation of Libya remained ostracized, given their pro-Gaddafi stance; more than anything, their surprisingly significant presence in the House served to further emphasize the failure of the “establishment” political figures in Tripoli and Tobruk alike to capitalize on Gaddafi’s fall, with so many yearning again for Gaddafism.

The Haftar-backed National Restoration Alliance and the Movement for the Restoration of Constitutional Legitimacy in Libya were the first to make significant headway, stemming from their shared appreciation for the 1951 Constitution. Common interest was found in the potential elevation of Saddam Haftar, leader of the NRA and Khalifa Haftar’s eldest son, to the position of Prime Minister — and the abolishment of a President in favor of restoring the King. The NRA favored this as it would ensure that the executive remained apolitical and would not oppose Saddam Haftar; the MRCLL favored this as it would restore the King to power. With 70 seats between the two parties, the NRA-MRCLL alliance proved the largest thus far.

The natural issue was finding the last 30 seats in a coalition. On principle opposing Haftar-family rule, the NRA and LFP refused to join in coalition. The JCP and their more hardline Homeland Party allies opposed the 1951 Constitution, preferring a form of sharia as the basis for the Libyan Constitution (something which no other parties favored, settling them outside of the coalition discussions for the most party). The Democratic Party and the Ensaf Movement, both secularist, opposed the 1951 Constitution’s declaration of Islam to be the official state religion.

Ihya Libya, seeing an opportunity, took advantage of the brief stall in negotiations. Ihya Libya gathered the National Front Party — the most liberal of all the parties — the Union for Homeland, the National Centre Party, and the Libu Party together, with 23 seats between them, to potentially join the coalition. They made contingent on their membership in the coalition a series of amendments to the 1951 Constitution, centering around increased regional autonomy, recognition of the Berber language as an official language, and strict independence for the judiciary. The NRA-MRCLL accepted their terms, and the coalition swelled to 93 members.

As the coalition built steam, the Democratic Party and the Ensaf Movement, both secular parties, attempted to negotiate the removal of Islam as the official state religion, but this was timidly looked upon. The coalition seemed to agree that Islam was, in addition to the King, a potential rallying point for the Libyan people. But outright rejection was not given. Instead, the coalition reached out independently to a number of the more moderate members of the JCP — threatening to ally themselves with the secular parties and remove the mention of Islam as a state religion if they did not get a sufficient number of votes.

In the end, 8 moderate representatives from the JCP — after discussing it with leadership — agreed to join the coalition temporarily to vote through a Constitution that would maintain the mention of Islam as a state religion; though they would not join the new government officially afterwards — acting as confidence and supply temporarily throughout the constitutional process. The new government would be a minority government once the Constitution passed.

Thus, on December 20th, by a vote of 101-99, the coalition was approved by the House of Representatives. The coalition consisted of the future-government in the National Restoration Alliance, the MRCLL, Ihya Libya, the Union for Homeland, the National Centre Party, and the Libu Party, with eight members of the Justice and Construction Party voting alongside the coalition to protect their interests as best as they could. Saddam Haftar, son of Khalifa Haftar and Captain in the Libya National Army, is officially the new Prime Minister.

The coalition appears steady for the time being, at least while the agreed upon amendments to the 1951 Constitution are drafted. But in the long-term, there are simply too many competing interests at stake to make this government a long-living one; nevertheless, the brief sense of a functioning government was a welcome reprieve for Libya.

Interim Prime Minister Ddeibeh initially looked poised to refused to step down, threatened by the seemingly inevitable lack of a President, but after protests broke out in Tripoli at the mere rumor that he may once again fracture Libya’s sensitive political state even after the newly-elected House voted a Prime Minister through, he acquiesced. Ddeibeh remains in Tripoli alongside his NFA allies, plotting a response. Saddam Haftar left Tobruk and arrived in Tripoli, accompanied by a number of personal guards, to take charge of the country.

Simultaneously, Prince Mohammed El Senussi, heir to the Crown of Libya, has been invited to Tripoli. Though the former Royal Palace remains a library since Gaddafi’s coup, preparations have been made to restore it to its old state. Prince Mohammed’s arrival in Tripoli was greeted by cheering crowds — a welcome sign for the Prince.

The other claimant to the Libyan throne, Prince Idris bin Abdullah al-Senussi, remains in Libya as well — enthused by the resurgence of the royal family, but nevertheless will more than likely not be tapped for the role of King.