January - February 2023

After two years of negotiating and dozens of ceasefire violations, the two rival administrations of Dbeibah and Bashagha had not only reunified and prevented another outbreak of large scale fighting, they had also penned a roadmap for both a constitutional committee and democratic elections. While initially most Libyans had been rather dismissive of the meeting in Ghadames, this almost miraculous pace of progress had given birth to a feeling of cautious optimism bordering on genuine hope. The people were tired of death, violence and destitution, embracing the potential for light at the end of the tunnel. However, the tunnel ahead was still fraught with danger, as the government now had to begin the careful process of demilitarising and healing a nation long torn apart by clans, militias and organised crime.

The first point of order was officiating the agreements made at Ghadames. This involved first passing the Ghadames Accords through the House of Representatives, then swearing in the new Dbeibah cabinet. Within the House of Representatives there existed a number of stern opposition members. These were primarily among the Eastern representatives who felt either that the Bashagha government had given too many concessions to an illegitimate leader, or that both Bashagha and Dbeibah being from Misrata would lead to Western dominance of the interim government. A number of members from Fezzan too were indignant about their lack of representation both in the new government and the negotiations themselves. Among the southern delegates the opposition was stronger, as their relative distance from much of the fighting shielded them from the war fatigue that was setting in up north. Despite this vocal minority, the majority of the HoR supported a concrete roadmap to ending the war and after a short debate, the 2nd Dbeibah Cabinet and the election roadmap were approved by a vote of 153 - 36 - 11 (Yeah, Nay, Absent).

Two weeks later on a brisk February morning, a convoy departed from the ex-LNA stronghold of Tarhoun just south of Tripoli. At its center sat an Emirati-supplied Nimr carrying the new Eastern members of the government, Fathi Bashagha and Hafed Gaddur. Surrounding this VIP transport were four technicals carrying a ragtag group of militiamen from the 7th Brigade, an LNA aligned group running security. After an uneventful journey they arrived at the outskirts of Tripoli, where they were greeted by the first of many checkpoints manned by members of the Tripoli Protection Force. They’re the primary security provider in the city, but these checkpoints had been set up specially along the convoy’s route to prevent any attacks on the new government ministers by rogue militias enroute to the government district in the capital’s center.

In Tripoli this threat is particularly amplified, as militias around this area defended the GNA primarily out of their own self-interest. Keeping Haftar out of Tripoli was necessary to maintain the monopoly these groups had over the lucrative criminal opportunities that spawn from controlling the capital. Their ideology has always been money, and the war economy of the last decade has been far more enticing than the prospects of peace. As such, a number of militias disgruntled by the power shifts caused by the peace accords may be interested in spoiling the process, leading to a heightened threat of attacks on government officials. On the other hand, the senior leadership of the militias making up the Tripoli Protection Force have seen the writing on the wall. Any attempt to prolong the conflict would unite the government and army firmly against the TPF while alienating their grassroots supporters. If they want to maintain their power they will have to swim with the current. For Libya’s largest criminal cartel the switch was obvious: they had to become the police.