July 1966

Nestled at the crossroads of Asia, with China to its north, India to its west, and the rest of Southeast Asia to its east, Burmese security policy has long been preoccupied with solving the question of how to satisfactorily protect itself from much its much larger neighbors. The obsession with this security issue is understandable: not two years after the country gained its independence, the defeat of the Kuomintang in the Chinese Civil War saw some 15,000 Kuomintang soldiers cross the border into Burma and occupy parts of its territory, only departing following negotiations with Taipei in 1960. This occupation--and the Tatmadaw's inability to dislodge it by force--highlighted the need for changes in Burma's defense policy. A myriad of factors, most notably opposition from the civilian government, who balked at the level of spending that this policy would require, meant that no changes were ever made.

Recent developments in the region--most notably the Kuomintang's invasion of Mainland China (and, concerningly, the strangely familiar violations of Burma's borders it has caused) and Pakistan's bellicose behavior towards its neighbors and calls for a pan-Islamic state--have caused the Union Revolutionary Council to revisit these issues.

The Tatmadaw as of 1966

As of the beginning of 1966, the Burmese Armed Forces, or Tatmadaw, is an all-volunteer force comprised of some 135,000 personnel (130,000 enlisted, 5,000 officers), further divided into the Army, or Tatmadaw-Kyi (120,000 enlisted, 4,400 officers), the Navy, or Tatmadaw-Yay (5,800 enlisted, 300 officers), and the Air Force, or Tatmadaw-Lay (5,900 enlisted, 300 officers). The size and quality of the force are an achievement in and of themselves--not fifteen years back, the Tatmadaw was a ragtag force of some 5,000 former guerillas and British-trained ethnic minorities--but are still well below the levels previous drafts of Burmese defense policy have called for. While these drafts are certainly outdated (one draft from the 1950s called for the expansion of the Tatmadaw's regular force to 5 percent of the country's population and of its reserves and militias to 25 percent of the population--a staggering 1.2 million and 6 million souls, respectively), the consensus among the General Staff is that the Tatmadaw's current size is insufficient to complete its current strategic and political objectives.

National Service

Implementing a national service policy has been on the Tatmadaw's agenda since at least 1952, when Burmese military attaches in Yugoslavia and Israel prepared reports for the War Office on the systems of national service present in those countries. Though the recommendation of those attaches to adopt a system of compulsive military service was well-received by both the General Staff and the civilian government, it was never adopted due to concerns that such a rapid expansion of the Tatmadaw (then barely a division in size) would dilute the ability of the force to achieve its objectives. Now that the Tatmadaw is more established, the Revolutionary Council has elected to revisit the idea of introducing compulsory military service.

For the Union Revolutionary Council and the ruling Burma National Revolutionary Party, compulsory national service serves three purposes. First, it provides the Tatmadaw, and by extension, the BNRP, with a captive audience for party messaging. For the better part of a decade, the Tatmadaw's attitude towards the Burmese population has been that they need a strong, modernizing force to shape them into productive citizens of the new Burmese society. National service gives the government eighteen months to introduce even the country's most remote citizens to the New Burma, including the BNRP and its party structures, and to inculcate a sense of national pride. Second, military training provides an opportunity for the government to serve as a "skills incubator" of sorts for skills that are in demand in the national economy. Mechanics, truck drivers, builders, and so on can easily transfer their skills gained in service to the civilian economy. Moreover, compulsory military service allows the government to more easily identify recruits for other government jobs, like policing and psychological warfare. The third and final point is simple: compulsory service allows the Tatmadaw to be larger than its present size, while also costing less than a volunteer force of equal size (since wages are lower across the board).

Under the newly-adopted national service law, the Tatmadaw will set a designated force strength for a given year. Best efforts will be made to meet this force strength through volunteer units. However, in the event that volunteers are insufficient, the government shall draft a number of able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 25 equal to the difference between the designated force strength and the number of volunteers. The term of service for these individuals will be based on their level of education: non-high school graduates must serve two years, high school graduates must serve 18 months, and college graduates must serve one year. Conscripts will be given the option to re-enlist at the end of their term of service (or, for college graduates, to attend one of the Tatmadaw's officer training programs). Furthermore, university students, if drafted, may defer the beginning of their service until the completion of their degree. Draft exemptions will be provided for:

1) Citizens who have served in the Tatmadaw (including the National Guard), or who are currently in the reserves of the Tatmadaw;

2) Citizens who are actively serving in the Union Police Force, or who have previously served for at least 18 months;

3) Citizens who are actively serving in a Pyithusit (see below), or have previously served for at least 36 consecutive months;

4) Citizens who are currently serving in the civil service;

5) Citizens with a university degree who have completed a reserve officer training course;

6) Male citizens with no male siblings

Reserve Service

In addition to expanding the size of the active duty Tatmadaw, the new policies promulgated by the Union Revolutionary Council seek to form a functional reserve system to rapidly expand the Tatmadaw in the event that the country is invaded by one of its neighbors. These reserves will draw from three sources: volunteer soldiers exiting active duty service; civilians volunteering for reserve service; and conscripts exiting active duty service. The first two groups will serve in the active reserves for four years (with the option to sign on for successive four year terms thereafter), while conscripts will only be obligated to serve 12 months in the active reserves and a further 24 months in the inactive reserves. For exiting volunteers and conscripts, mandatory reserve service will be waived if the individual is entering into the Union Police Force or a Village Defense Force on a 1:1 basis (so if they serve four years in the UPF after exiting the army, it will count as four years of “reserve service”).

While serving in the active reserves, soldiers are required to report for a weekend of training at their local barracks every other month, as well as one two-week training period per year, for a total of 22 days of training per year. Reservists may also be called to active duty for up to sixty days per year during peacetime (though training days count as “active duty” service)--though exemptions will usually be granted for farmers during harvest season, university students, and so on. While serving in the inactive reserves, soldiers are exempted from all mandatory training requirements, but can still be called up for active duty in the event of foreign invasion.

New Officer Rank Structure

As the Tatmadaw continues to grow and the competency of the officer corps expands, there is a need for a greater number of ranks at the upper end of the ranking system. Prior to the 1966 reforms, officers had only eight non-cadet ranks. The 1966 reforms included the introduction of two new ranks between Brigadier and General, the Major General/Rear Admiral (OF-7) and the Lieutenant General/Admiral (OF-8). Effective immediately, the three Vice Chiefs of Staff have been promoted to Lieutenant General (Maung Maung of the Army, Thaung Tin of the Navy, and Tommy Clift of the Air Force), while the commanders of each regional military command (previously of Brigadier rank) have been promoted to Major General.

Burma Rangers

Six years ago, the Tatmadaw opened the Jungle Warfare and Counterinsurgency Training Center, or JWCTC. In that time, some 40,000 soldiers have completed the program’s three week training program. The skills acquired by these soldiers have proven critical in their fight against the insurgents throughout Burma.

However, the introduction of conscripts into the Army has changed the calculus regarding how JWCTC should be used. The short terms of service of conscripts--between six months and two years--means that JWCTC’s training course would be largely wasted on them, as they would leave the military within a year or two of completing the course. Thus, going forward, the General Staff has elected to transform the basic JOTC away from a company level training course (where all members of the company completed the course at the same time) to an individual level training course (where individuals from many different units are given orders to attend at one time, and then sent back to their units after completing the training). This will ensure that JOTC training will not be “wasted” by conscripts.

One disadvantage of this change is that the Tatmadaw-Kyi will no longer have a prebuilt roster of “jungle-ready” battalions that have completed JOTC. Given the value these units have demonstrated in counterinsurgency operations throughout the country, the General Staff is loath to lose these valuable offensive units. To rectify this, the General Staff has authorized the creation of a new “special forces” designation within the Tatmadaw-Kyi to operate as a Tier One unit in the new counterinsurgency doctrine: the Burma Rangers.

The Burma Rangers consists of individuals who have completed JOTC course with high grades, and elected to join the Rangers rather than return to their original unit. Less a designated formation than a designation for formations, the Burma Rangers lack any real organizational structures above the battalion level. “Ranger groups”--collections of individual Ranger battalions--exist, but are mostly an administrative division. In practice, Ranger battalions exist to attach to existing Tatmadaw formations in the field, where they serve as an elite “offensive” unit, taking the leading role in search-and-destroy operations against insurgent forces. Ranger battalions can be organized into larger formations like brigades, but this structure is ad hoc and mission-based.

Once the reforms are completed, there will be 19 sanctioned ranger battalions, for a total force size of about 14,000. Ranger battalions are slightly smaller than their regular infantry counterparts due to the omission of battalion-level anti-tank units. Burma Rangers can be identified by their tigerstripe camouflage, JOTC badges, and Ranger badge (a hissing viper coiled around a dagger).

Tatmadaw-Kyi Airborne Division

Part of the reason Burma’s various insurgencies have survived for so long is the rough terrain and poor infrastructure that defines Burma’s border regions. Moving troops from one part of Burma to another can be an ordeal--especially during the monsoon season, when many of the country’s rural dirt roads are completely washed out by heavy rains. This can make it exceedingly difficult for Tatmadaw units to move from one area of operations to another, or to reinforce or relieve army units that are under assault. Many insurgent attacks have seen success simply because nearby units were unable to reach an isolated platoon or company due to rough terrain and poor weather.

The ability to deliver a skilled fighting force anywhere in the country on short notice is extremely appealing to the General Staff. The Chinthe Commandos generated by the Jungle Commando Course have proven that the value of this concept for the Tatmadaw--though their numbers are too few and their skills too specialized for them to be used in the rapid response role the General Staff envisions. Thus, the Union Revolutionary Council has authorized the creation of a new all-volunteer unit, Burma’s first Airborne Division.

Headquartered in Meiktila (the site of the Air Force’s central headquarters), but with brigade headquarters in Meiktila and Hmwabi (near Rangoon), the Airborne Division consists of two brigades of three individual airborne battalions. These premier light infantry units are designed to be airlifted anywhere in the country within 48 hours (though the first units can be in situ within as few as 24 hours). Serving as a specialized rapid response force, these battalions will be airlifted to supplement regular Tatmadaw units as needed, serving as reinforcements for defense and offensive operations alike.

In addition to more traditional airlift/airdrop capabilities, the Airborne Brigade will also serve as an experimental unit for testing the introduction of helicopters and aerial assault into the Tatmadaw’s repertoire. The Tatmadaw has plans to form two helicopter squadrons using American UH-1 Iroquois helicopters. Given the heavy use of American equipment in the Division, the Airborne Division is the Burman military formation with the largest number of American advisors per capita, and makes the heaviest use of the MAAG Burma program. Airborne personnel can be identified by their tigerstripe camo pattern, inspired by the pattern worn by Vietnam’s own Airborne troops, and their airborne patch, depicting an eagle grasping a dagger.

Applicants for the Airborne Division must successfully complete a three week airborne training course taking place at Meiktila, where a regimen of heavy physical exercise and numerous parajumps will weed out soldiers who are too weak or lack the courage to serve in the Airborne. While completing the JOTC course is not required prior to joining the Airborne, current Airborne troops are prioritized for JOTC courses after joining the unit, meaning that most Airborne have their JOTC patch within their first six months of joining the unit.

Riverine Strike Force

Since time immemorial, the Irrawaddy has been Burma’s economic backbone. It connects all of Burma’s major population centers--which is more than can be said of Burma’s road or rail network. For many villages throughout the Irrawaddy delta (the primary source of Burma’s rice crop and the country’s primary economic engine), the river and its canals and tributaries are the only reliable form of transportation, as roads are either nonexistent or wholly flooded for much of the year. This difficult terrain has made the delta one of the few areas of lowland Burma where the control of the government is still spotty, with insurgents eking out a living in remote stretches of marshland that the Tatmadaw cannot penetrate.

In order to fully root out these insurgent strongholds, the Tatmadaw needed to adopt a new form of mobility suited to the unique constraints of the Irrawaddy and the delta region. Their solution came at the advice of American military advisors in Burma: the creation of a new riverine combat force under the control of the Navy. This idea had already had some traction in Burma--the Navy’s two primary objectives since it was founded have been coastal security and river patrol, and the Navy’s single naval infantry brigade, founded in 1964, has assisted in counterinsurgency efforts in the delta--making it an easy sell in the General Staff.

As part of this plan, the General Staff has authorized the expansion of the Navy’s 800-man Naval Infantry Battalion into a new Naval Infantry Brigade. As part of basic training, members of this all-volunteer force will undergo specialized training in naval operations, including swimming, watercraft operation, and so forth. Unique among Burma’s military formations, the Naval Infantry wears a frog skin patterned uniform, though the colors are darker than the original American design.

Concurrently, the various naval craft currently operating in the delta region will be reorganized into dedicated “assault groups”--each capable of transporting a reinforced battalion of naval infantry. These assault groups will consist of three main elements:

• A “patrol group” consisting of small, fast patrol craft such as (from largest to smallest) the Yugoslav Michao-class, the American PBR-class, and the American Hurricane Aircat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Aircat). This force will be responsible for patrolling the smaller waterways of the delta to identify insurgent forces and to protect the flanks of the assault group. These vessels have light armament--mostly .50 and .30 caliber machine guns, though the Michao-class does have two 20mm Bofors cannons, and the Swift Boat comes equipped with an 81mm mortar.

• A “strike group” consisting of armored transport craft (mostly up-armored and up-gunned WW2-era landing craft). These craft are responsible for ferrying the naval infantry units around the delta to attack insurgent positions. Since they are based off of modified landing craft, the vessels have extremely shallow drafts, making them perfect for navigating the delta and its varying depths. Vessels in this category are typically equipped with a 40mm cannon (for direct fire support) and other, smaller weapons, such as 20mm autocannons, .50 and .30 caliber machine guns, and automatic grenade launchers.

• A “fire support group” consisting of heavily-armed vessels. Inspired in part by the British gunboats that used to roam the Irrawaddy, this group has the largest and heaviest vessels of the assault group, intended to operate as indirect fire support for the strike group. Vessels in this group are equipped with at least a 40mm cannon and an 81mm mortar, though many feature a repurposed 25-pounder gun or, in the most extreme examples, a 105mm gun.

Combined with the naval infantry, these assault groups, collectively referred to as the Riverine Strike Force, take advantage of the mobility provided by the navy’s riverine craft to deliver competent offensive forces and organic fire support to the furthest reaches of the delta, even during the height of flood season.

Reorganizing Non-Military Security Forces

The Tatmadaw has been the primary force--perhaps the only force--in combating Burma’s various insurgencies. This is, speaking colloquially, a classic case of the hammer viewing every problem as a nail. While the Tatmadaw-Kyi has enjoyed some success in counterinsurgency operations, launching effective offensive operations that have reduced insurgent control to a meager 10 percent of the country’s land area, the force is spread thin. With no other counterinsurgency forces to speak of, the Tatmadaw-Kyi is responsible for everything from offensive operations, to border security, to rear area security, to village patrols. This mission creep has distracted the Tatmadaw from its two primary purposes: defending the country’s territorial integrity from external invasion; and neutralizing insurgent strongpoints. To help relieve the Tatmadaw of some of its other duties, the Union Revolutionary Council has elected to create a new counterinsurgency strategy, as well as a collection of new non-military security forces to assume some of the Tatmadaw’s workload.

The new counterinsurgency adopts a “three-tier” approach to counterinsurgency. The first tier involves all-volunteer Tatmadaw units, who are responsible for carrying out search-and-destroy missions against insurgents in areas of medium-to-heavy enemy presence. In other words, Tier One performs the actual warfighting part of counterinsurgency.

The second tier, made up of paramilitary forces and a mix of volunteer and conscript Tatmadaw units, is responsible for securing territory that was recently reclaimed through the offensives of Tier One units, or that is adjacent to areas with medium-to-heavy insurgent presence. By providing rear-area security in these areas, these units ensure the security of Tatmadaw supply lines (a disproportionate amount of casualties against the Tatmadaw comes from insurgent ambushes against supply convoys) and operate as a “blocking” force that prevents insurgents from escaping the killzone. These units are also capable of undertaking search-and-destroy missions against weaker enemy forces.

The third tier, made up of paramilitary forces and fully civilian security services, is responsible for providing security and enforcing the law in areas that are removed from the insurgency. These forces exist to combat insurgent infiltration attempts in the rear area, combating insurgent attempts to secure funds or materiel from major civilian areas outside of the combat zone. These forces are not designed to engage in combat against a determined enemy force--rather, they blanket the rear area to ensure that the insurgents cannot move materiel like food, weapons, or drugs through civilian areas.

Burma National Guard

The Burma National Guard is a new Tier Two unit designed to assume border control, border area, and rear area security duties from the Tatmadaw-Kyi. It is under the command of Director-General Maung Shwe, a Tatmadaw Brigadier on secondment after his promotion from the 6 Infantry Brigade, which has been engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Shan State since 1959. A paramilitary gendarmerie unit operating as a new fourth branch of the Tatmadaw, the National Guard is an all-volunteer force with a sanctioned strength of 50,000. It consists of two distinct mission sets: a “peacetime” mission set and a “wartime” mission set.

During peacetime, the National Guard is responsible for providing border security throughout Burma, including operating points of entry like border crossings, ports, and airports. They are also the primary law enforcement agency responsible for combatting transboundary crime such as smuggling.

During wartime, the National Guard is responsible for maintaining law and order in areas near the front (insurgent areas of operation are regarded as “fronts” for this purpose), securing supply lines, controlling the flow of refugees, and engaging in limited offensive operations against enemy irregulars.

In terms of structure, the National Guard is led by a Vice Chief of Staff occupying the rank of Director-General (equivalent to Major General) who is entitled to a seat on the Union Revolutionary Council. It is divided into 13 regional commands (one for each of Burma’s top-level administrative divisions), each of which is commanded by an Inspector-General (typically a Brigadier or Colonel seconded from the Tatmadaw-Kyi, though the goal is to eventually have these positions filled by purely National Guard personnel). These regional commands are responsible both for the security of the external borders in their region; combating drug, arms, and human trafficking; and supporting army-led counterinsurgency efforts within their territory.

Naturally, this results in regional commands of varying sizes. Rangoon’s command, which is primarily responsible for operating security at the capital’s ports and airports, is several times smaller than that of Shan State, which has over a thousand miles of border, a growing local insurgency, and a significant drug smuggling problem. To address this problem, the regional commands are staffed by a number of battalions, which are themselves composed of companies. Both units are roughly analogous to their army counterparts, but with lighter equipment (platoons don’t come with attached machine gun squads; mortars are concentrated at the battalion level; and anti-tank equipment is virtually non-existent). Battalions can be rotated between regional commands as the need arises.

Commissioned Ranks

Enlisted Ranks

People’s Defense Force (Pyusawhti)

Unlike the other forces discussed here, which only came into existence as part of the 1966 reforms, the People’s Defense Forces have existed in some form or another since 1952, and in their current form since 1961. Known collectively as the Pyusawhti and individually as Pyithusit (after Pyusawthi, a semi-legendary member of the Pagan dynasty), the Pyusawhti are the government’s latest attempt to involve the rural communities of Burma in counterinsurgency efforts. As part of the 1966 security reforms, the Union Revolutionary Council has authorized a significant expansion of its efforts to create, train, and field Pyusawhti units, who will serve as a Tier Three unit in Burma’s insurgency-prone regions.

A Pyithusit is a part-time, static militia force recruited from villages within or near insurgent zones of operation. Recruited from volunteers from the villages and armed with small arms by the Tatmadaw (usually retired WW2 era submachine guns and rifles--the “official” structure of a ten man squad includes six submachine guns and three rifles, but this is a very rough guideline), militiamen are provided with four weeks of basic training in military discipline, shooting, and rudimentary small unit tactics before being returned to their village, where they serve as a part-time auxiliary for local Tatmadaw operations. Pyithusit are expected to run small patrols in vicinity of their villages in order to identify evidence of insurgent activity and, should other forces not be nearby, protect their villages from insurgents and banditry (much of the livelihood of insurgents comes from requisitioning food from nearby villages). That said, a Pyithusit is far from a frontline combat force: standing orders for the Pyusawhti is to avoid long engagements with insurgent forces, engaging only long enough to retreat (when attacked on patrol) or when ambushing or when they numerically overwhelm the enemy (when defending the village).

The primary purpose of the Pyusawhti is to supplement the Tatmadaw in garrison duties by denying insurgents safe harbor in villages near the area of operations. By ensuring that there is some armed force in even the most remote villages inside of the combat zone, insurgents are forced to expend at least some effort when attempting to requisition supplies or otherwise engage with the civilian population. The militias serve as a critical source of local intelligence for Tatmadaw counterinsurgency operations, reporting insurgent activity in the vicinity of their villages, serving as guides for Tatmadaw units (the militiamen are far more familiar with the local terrain than the soldiers), and even identifying insurgent sympathizers among the village residents.

Union Police Force

Burma’s national civilian police force, the Union Police Force (UPF), has long been viewed with suspicion by the Tatmadaw--and with good reason. In the early days of Burma’s independence, the civilian government attempted to use the police force as a sort of paramilitary to check the Tatmadaw’s political influence. While this ultimately failed (and the most blatantly pro-AFPFL police units were disbanded following both the 1958 and 1962 coups), the police have nevertheless occupied a sort of liminal space under the latest government. Well aware of the importance of a civilian police force in suppressing insurgent activity, Chairman Aung Gyi has tasked the Ministry of the Interior with reorganizing the Union Police Force into a competent law enforcement entity.

In practice, the Union Police Force can be divided into two major branches and several smaller departments. The departments are outlined below, followed by the branches.

• Department of Railway Security (DRS), which is responsible for safeguarding Burma’s railways and rail stations, as well as enforcing rail-related laws and investigating and prosecuting violations of those laws (lack of ticket, incorrect freight receipts and rail smuggling, etc). This force is in part intended to prevent a repeat of the state of affairs in the early 1950s, when communist sabotage rendered much of Burma’s rail network inoperable.

• Department of Highway Security (DHS), which is responsible for law enforcement on Burma’s intercity highways. While this might seem like a particularly dangerous task, Burma’s highways are almost entirely located in Burma Proper (rather than the outlying territories), which are thoroughly under government control.

• Department of Coastal and Riverine Security (DCRS), which is responsible for law enforcement in Burma’s rivers and off of Burma’s coast line.

• Department of Criminal Investigations (DCI), which is responsible for investigating serious crimes throughout Burma.

• Department of Police Education (DPE), which is responsible for operating police training centers. Centers are currently located in Mandalay, Moulmein, and Rangoon (by far the largest, which also trains members of the Metropolitan Police).

• Special Intelligence Branch (Special Branch), which is responsible for keeping tabs on the activities of persons who could “threaten the security of the state” (communists, socialists, ethnic separatists, pro-democracy activists, activist monks, student and labor unionists, etc). Furthermore, it is responsible for issuing passports to Burmese citizens (meaning that it has the authority to deny suspected dissidents the ability to leave the country by refusing to issue them a passport). Special Branch is also responsible for VIP protection.

Provincial Police

The Provincial Police Division is the larger of the two divisions in the Union Police Force, with responsibility for policing every region of the country except for border regions (which are policed by the National Guard) and Rangoon and its environs (which are policed by the other division of the UPF, the Metropolitan Police Division). The Provincial Police are divided into thirteen provincial commands (known as Provincial Police Departments)--one for each province of Burma (though the Rangoon Provincial Police Department is responsible only for the parts of Rangoon Region that are outside the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police Division). The senior most officers of each department, who hold the rank of Police Brigadier, have ultimate authority over all civilian law enforcement within their province, but are overseen by one of Burma’s five Police Lieutenant Generals, each of whom are responsible for overseeing the operations of three provincial departments.

Metropolitan Police Division

In some senses, the Metropolitan Police Division acts as the “provincial police department” of Rangoon and its surrounding cities. However, it is substantially larger than even the largest provincial police department, necessitating a special place in the hierarchy of the UPF. MPD is led by a police chief holding the rank of Police Lieutenant General, who commands three Police Brigadiers, each in charge of a “Police Brigade” that is responsible for policing roughly a third of the city. In addition to standard law enforcement duties within the city, MPD is also responsible for traffic policing in Rangoon (done by a specialized Traffic Police Bureau, known for their white headgear), as well as for riot/protest control within the country’s largest city.

New Security Force Structure

1: The Burma Rangers and Airborne Brigade personnel numbers are already included in the Tatmadaw personnel numbers.

2: Seconded from the Tatmadaw-Kyi, where he previously commanded the 12 Infantry Brigade in the Irrawaddy delta as a colonel.

3: The Naval Infantry Brigade personnel numbers are already included in the Navy personnel numbers.

4: I am very tired but I want to get this post out before I am already way overdue on it–I intend to review these numbers tomorrow and may make some minor force adjustments if needed.