Shortly after General Secretary Khrushchev’s breakout announcement at the Politburo in November over his intentions to audit the Soviet military over irregularities since the West Papua fiasco and intensified by the recent resumption of the Chinese Civil War. He sent his Cabinet into a panic, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky was furious, perhaps the most he has been in a long time, and viewed Khrushchev’s decision as a betrayal of trust and his friendship. Perhaps the two men most concerned with this development besides the Army, however, were Vladimir Semichastny, Chairman of the KGB, and Alexander Shepelin, Chairman of the Office of People’s Control. Both men served in the Soviet Union’s vast security apparatus which not only ensured peace at home but had its primary directive to ensure its own power and stability of the internal government. Khrushchev’s antics were tolerable and in fact beneficial to the Soviet Union at times, but this was taking it a step too far. Now the military is angry and very unwilling to have the civilian government interfere with their affairs too much. Both Semichastny and Shepelin requested an urgent secret meeting with Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky and Deputy Chairman Ustinov to discuss the situation.

Semichastny: “Gentlemen please, help yourselves over some drinks.”

Shepelin: Marshals Malinovsky and Ustinov, you are, of course, aware of Khrushchev’s November speech yes?

Malinovsky: Yes Director, let's just say that there is a lot of murmuring and discussion growing within the Red Army over the implications of this new policy. Most of it is negative for us.

Ustinov: I respect the General Secretary’s judgment, but i feel like he probably has gone down the deep end. There is nothing to investigate anymore, he has received the reports and reforms are taking place, We believe that it's an overreach of the General Secretary to request an audit of this scale.

Semichastny: smokes a cigarette Well my department believes that our most esteemed General Secretary is interfering with the unofficial delicate balance between our institutions to advance domestic political goals of his. I would not be the first one to argue that his experiences in the United States and with that bastard Kennedy have made him soft.

Shepelin: The man is old, you can see that he is cracking under the pressure.

Malinovsky: I would want to make it clear that the Red Army is not interested in interfering with the Party’s mechanism or the Security apparatus, I do know that Suslov is probably very unhappy about this development, not so much about the reformists whom I expect to be supportive. That said, something must be done about him before certain men within the Army start taking matters into their own hands and get the situation out of our control.

Semichastny: I agree Marshal, A coup d’etat within the Party would be preferable but Khrushchev has a lot of allies within the party, that said, he has many enemies, We do not want to weaken the Party either as that will encourage them to go after us in the future, destroying the nation’s stability. Our goal is to keep the balance of power.

Shepelin: We may have to strike a deal with some of the reformists within the Politburo to ensure our regime change goes swimmingly, if the KGB and the Army support our guys, the Party will be forced to accept, who do you think is best?

Semichastny: I have met with Suslov recently and he seems receptive to the idea of becoming Central Committee chairman, Leonid Brezhnev is probably unreliable as he was given successorship status by Khrushchev and is too ambitious for our interests which leave us Kosygin and Podgorny. Mikoyan is a Khrushchev ally so he is untrustworthy

Ustinov: I met Podgorny and he seems like our best shot, moderate, economically, and diplomatically oriented, and has no connections to the military, Kosygin might attempt to compete with Podgorny as well which gives them less time to worry on us and the security bureau.

Shepelin: Good eye Marshal.

Semichastny: Then it is settled.

Malinovsky: This plot involves removing several highly powerful individuals gentlemen, I doubt they might go down lightly. Thus we must use a show of force to ensure a resignation, I could call in a favor to my friend Grechko to the Moscow Guard Tank Division to lock down the Kremlin.

Shepelin: Do that Marshal, we pounce by January

Malinovsky: Understood.