July 1961

Diem’s Death Through Election Day

Two weeks is not a lot of time to organise an election. For a country with an almost nonexistent democratic tradition, inadequate is describing that timeframe generously. In two weeks the headless leviathan of the Republic of Vietnam proved not only incapable of producing an effective election committee, but of providing polling booths and candidate lists to areas beyond city limits. There was no time to conduct official hiring processes for poll workers. Those that applied were hired on the spot but even then, come election day the shortfall was enormous, with those being hired lacking any significant training. In the end, government bureaucrats and security forces were pulled from their offices and stationed at booths in major population centers, while outside these areas polling was left almost entirely in the hands of local army commanders. With no functioning central election committee or established rules, the conduct of polling was entirely up to the skeleton crew of each individual station. For most electorates, this meant that victory was based on your patronage network and the age old principle of ‘might makes right’. Those candidates with the ear of a unit commander found their local polling booths run like a tightly oiled machine, albeit with the actual booths being replaced with the bed of an army truck and armed soldiers handing out very handy ‘how to vote’ cards, or hastily painting the information on a wooden board. For their opposition it was a much less pleasant experience. Many of them spent election day in the back of a truck or at an army outpost, under intense scrutiny for charges ranging from unfiled taxes to collusion with the Vietcong. Some particularly vocal opponents spent the day in hospital due to bad falls, while in Quang Nam province two democratic independents went missing entirely. In Binh Duong almost every candidate claimed to be harassed by Viet Cong guerillas, with varying degrees of believability. Regardless, outside of the major cities some 11 candidates were either found dead due to accidents or still remain missing. Unsurprisingly, with no time to campaign and almost no legitimacy to speak of, turnout sat at a snug 27.3%, perfect for a democratic government.

The urban experience was hardly better. Protests for democracy which had been ongoing since the announcement of Diem’s death quickly turned into protests against it as it slowly became clear how much of a sham the whole process had become. The democratic opposition, which had floundered in the army-run countryside, found their credentials with the various anti-Diem groups very useful, their pent-up energy and organisational structures now being directed at the poor civil servants drafted into the polling trenches. Members of the Democratic Opposition Bloc mustered their supporters to overwhelm and seize polling booths they deemed as participating in vote manipulation (not hard to find to be fair). As such, many poorly guarded booths ended up run by the citizens themselves. However, upon hearing panicked reports of these events, city officials began mobilizing whatever forces they could to quell the swelling protests. Tran Kim Tuyen, in charge of the secretive Room 4 and a major player in the Can Lao, fearing a popular uprising instigated by communists, called upon the leaders of the Presidential Guard who were still reeling from the loss of Diem. After a frantic closed door conversation, the 3,000 man unit agreed to deploy alongside Tuyen’s secret police to restore order on the streets of Saigon. However, the sight of APCs rolling downtown only enraged protestors, resulting in a number of violent clashes as the Presidential Guard fought to regain control of polling stations. By this point communication had started to breakdown between the various agencies involved in maintaining the election.

The Visayan Guard, also listless at the loss of their primary purpose and remaining ever suspicious of their rival guard unit, were incensed by the sight of Presidential Guard units and the sound of gunshots. Assuming they were making a power play, their commanders hurried to counter them. Here began a classic sitcom misunderstanding as both sides wrongly assumed the other was trying to snatch the throne. Well into the night, Saigon was filled with the irregular din of gunfire, exchanged between the Presidential and Visayan guards, as well as directed at remaining protestors. By the next morning cooler heads had prevailed as Air Marshal Thi personally intervened to restore inter-agency communication. By the time both sides emerged from their hastily erected barricades, 38 civilians and 2 Visayan Guards had been killed. Another successful democratic election for the Republic of Vietnam had concluded.

Talk Softly and Carry a Big Minh

Within the next week following a vote ‘count’, the new members of the RoV cabinet and parliament were sworn in. Immediately, the patronage networks of the election reared their collective heads. In some form or another, more than half the elected representatives were suspected of swearing loyalty to some wing of the military or government. The 5th Division is believed to be the worst offender, controlling 15 National Revolutionary Movement politicians and 6 members of the Democratic Opposition Bloc, while the VQNDD has more or less become the political wing of the 23rd Division according to an underground newspaper. Though concrete evidence is scarce, these divisions perpetuated much of the ‘poll watching’ in districts these parties excelled in, leading to the accusations. The Visayan Guard, fearing deportation should they become obsolete, have declared unwavering loyalty to the new President Dan.

Big Minh, who had acquiesced to the holding of elections, has now become one of President Dan’s biggest critics. In a radio interview, he declared the elections a complete and utter clownshow, brandishing Dan’s incompetence for the whole international community to see. Furthermore, he decried the problems of such a poorly constructed and rushed government while waging war on the communist menace. Privately, he has regularly met with members of the cabinet to demand more autonomous control over the policy involving counter-insurgency and the war, lest tactics be traded for bureaucracy. It is clear that the new democratic government is beset by crises from day one, chief among them a legitimacy problem and lack of influence over major government organs.