Jordan

Now more or less under proper AIRL control, Jordan has proved eminently useful to the AIRL. While the UN presence remains, besieged in their encampments [at least practically speaking], the DMZ has become increasingly farcial as militias are organized in Jordan and sent north to the Syrian front. Jordan has also become increasingly key to the AIRL's supply lines as their routes through the Iraqi-Syrian desert come under attack. The port of Aqaba has proven quite busy, and while most of the equipment moved through it is innocuous--engineering vehicles, trucks, gasoline, rations--there is little doubt that actual weapons are, to one extent or another, flowing through, though nobody's been able to precisely check. The bulk of those, however, continue to flow in from Saudi Arabia rather than the DMZ.

Lebanon

The Amal Movement now has competition: An up-and-coming movement called "Hezbollah", or "The Party of God". Funded by the AIRL and Saudis and more sympathetic to Khomeini than Amal as a whole, Hezbollah has been recruiting fanatics to harass UAR positions across the border; while also working to build support within Lebanon, mostly by engaging in petty fights with local Amal leaders over marijuana farms and patronage networks. They have taken over a good portion of the drugs trafficking business to the UAR, which they view as a jihad against the degenerate godless atheists of the Alawite-Communist-Baathist axis. Conflict with Lebanon's majority Christians has been rather restrained thus far, and it seems they are mindful of their weakness relative to them (and support for reigniting civil conflict remains rather low).

Syria

Syria has proven, once again, the most confusing front of this extremely confusing war, as well as the primary front on which actual fighting happens.

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Initial results looked good, at least for the UAR, with the offensive--now okayed against the Kurds--pushing forwards into the Euphrates line and finally encircling Raqqa and deir Ez-zor. While the Sudanese brigade took massive casualties in doing so, and neither Raqqa nor deir Ez-zor has been reduced, the divisions trapped in Raqqa are increasingly desperate and running low on supplies, though some are still being smuggled through UAR lines due to poor enforcement, chronic corruption, and double-dealing tribes--speaking of which, tribal assaults on UAR forces have almost entirely stopped as the UAR buys their 'allegiance'--most are, however, not exactly proving helpful to UAR forces.

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This all came crumbling down, however, when Damascus folded. With the Jordanian militias joining AIRL forces already there, and contacts being made inside the city--which had long resented Aleppo's dominance--launching a combination of internal insurrection and a massed infiltration attack that overwhelmed Damascus's defenders, which were poorly supplied with resources mostly flowing to the UAR's key offensive forces in the east. However, the AIRL's plans to launch a lightning offensive to topple the whole UAR, aided by internal revolts, has largely stalled out, as sympathetic rebellions by Islamists in Aleppo and Idlib were quickly crushed, while the revolt in Hama ended in a massacre of Islamists in the city by the Third Armored Division. Still, the victory in Damascus, the preoccupation of UAR-aligned forces elsewhere and a moderately successful uprising in Homs has brought the AIRL into core Syrian territory. The campaign also included massacres of UAR communists, as well as the not-quite-last-stand of the French Foreign Legion's presence--the survivors fled into Lebanon, where French roots are deep.

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The only good news is that with the crushing of Islamist uprisings, security concerns in remaining UAR territory are greatly diminished, with attacks on government targets, suicide bombings, and other terror incidents significantly diminishing as a result of the AIRL's sympathizers extinguishing themselves. The need for counter-insurgency within UAR territory is more or less minimal at this point and can be handled by local security forces.

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Iraq

The main UAR offensive into the borderlands between Jordan and Iraq was stunningly successful, and, unfortunately, achieved virtually none of the goals it was meant to, largely because all it meant was supplies were routed through Saudi Arabia (and around the Arab Peninsula by sea) into Jordan instead. By buying off the tribes to protect their supply lines, the UAR has taken At Tanf, Trebil, and Rutba, while landing airborne Assyrian forces along the 1 highway to interdite AIRL traffic, of which there is virtually none [though at least one position has come under heavy attack and the Assyrians are not especially happy being used for such a dangerous position that isn't about fighting the Kurds].

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In addition, trends in Iraq are indicating that the population is radicalizing further, incited by various propaganda, nationalist trends, and further Islamist teachings. In particular, the Sunnis are becoming more vocal in their calls for a caliphate, and the overall population is becoming more anti-Kurd and anti-minority in general, though most AIRL 'official' clerics are doing their best to patch over these divides.

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Kurdistan

Kurdistan's life has gotten substantially more complicated as its pivotal role in what some are calling the "Arab Civil War". While payments from Turkey have resulted in attempts to suppress the trade in illegal AIR oil, the fact remains that it is altogether too profitable (and Kurdistan lacks the state capacity) to actually suppress this vigorous trade, which is now being conducted by Kurds of an increasingly less savory character. Shipments have declined but have not stopped. Meanwhile, the Kurds have been pressed back by UAR forces in the east, and also cut supply runs to AIRL forces trapped in the Euphrates, though some smugglers continue to operate in the region. Furthermore, Kirkuk has become significantly more complicated as both the Iraqi Arabs agitate for its return while Iraqi Turkmen argue that it is theirs and should be the centre of a Turkic state stretching from Kirkuk through Mosul to the Turkish border, though they are around half the size of the Kurdish community and presently are less organized and more dispersed.

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Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

Under heavy pressure from Iran, Kuwait has largely stopped active support of the AIRL. However, there is a large gap between "stopping active support" and "stopping support". Observers will note that Kuwait seems largely uninterested in stopping supplies of British and Soviet arms and equipment through their territory, often from Saudi Arabia, or the flow of foreigners to the AIRL, or the flow of equipment and men out of the AIRL.

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Saudi Arabia, however, has gone from covert-but-not-really to overt intervention in the war, supplying the AIRL with all manner of weapons and material, shuttling forces across their territory, and even waging an air campaign against the UAR in the same vein as the Iranian campaign against the AIRL. This is now truly a Pan-Arab Conflict, with only the FAE, Oman, Yemen, and Morocco yet to stake out a position on the war (and for at least the first three, doing so is weighted with peril).

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The Air

The skies above the Levant remain crowded, with Iranian, Saudi, Turkish, AIRL and UAR jets all flying in various sectors, largely on attack missions [though a few dogfights between the Saudis/AIRL and UAR have taken place]. Key military and logistical facilities in Iraq have been hit along with some oil-related infrastructure, causing significant problems, though Iran has not begun an indiscriminate bombing campaign as of yet and Turkey's operations have been even more constrained; while tactical UAR attack aircraft drive off AIRL forces that are bold enough to attack or move during the daylit hours. The Saudis meanwhile have largely devoted their time to dropping cluster bombs on UAR forces near their border, wreaking havoc on mechanized formations and showing that while certainly not the caliber of the Israelis, or even Iranians or Turks, they're still much better at this than the UAR. The UAR Air Force has also run into significant problems due to the advance in Syria overrunning a number of airbases, with the AIRL capturing damaged or abandoned airframes on the ground and logistical capabilities being stressed at remaining facilities, limiting their sortie rate.

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Refugees

The war has seen a steady increase in refugees, with over 1 million people internally displaced within the "UAR territories". A significant number are seeking refuge abroad, however. In particular, the Syrian Druze community has begun fleeing to their enclaves in Lebanon, with 40,000 Druze making the journey, while 20,000 Syrian Turkmen have fled to Turkey with more likely to follow if the advance continues. Almost 30,000 Mandeans have fled the AIRL, along with a similar number of Ba'hai, mostly to Iran. Minority religious groups in Kurdistan still, however, largely enjoy protection and safety, as long as they're ethnically Kurdish or Kurdish-related [ie not Assyrian mostly]. In addition, while smaller in number, large numbers of the UAR's intelligentsia, especially around Aleppo, has been emigrating to Egypt, seen as the new heart of the Arab World, at least if you're not an Islamist.

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Map

Casualties

UAR: 8,000 dead, 25,000 wounded or missing (mostly deserters or prisoners), 30 Su-7s, 12 MiG-19, 19 MiG-21 [mostly lost on the ground to abandoned airbases], ~50 T-55s, 200 AFVs

AIRL: 14,000 dead, 40,000 wounded, 17 Hawker Hunters, 1 division encircled in Raqqa plus auxiliaries, 1 division worth of militia encircled in Deir ez-Zor.

French Foreign Legion: 700 dead or missing, 200 fled into Lebanon

Yugoslavia: 3 MiG-19S, Bosniak Brigade surrendered to AIRL

Sudanese: ~1500 dead

Kurds: ~1200 dead

Libyans: ~70 dead, 155 wounded or missing

Assyrians: ~50 dead

Saudi Arabia: 3 Hawker Hunters, 5 A-4s, 1 Hawker Hydra

Iran: 2 F-4D, 1 RIO

Turkey: 1 F-5 overshot runway, reparable