The Chiefs of Staff are all in agreement, Guinea Bissau was an insurmountable failure for the Portuguese military, one which should not be repeated again. With the aftermath that was Operation Float, Julio Botehlo Moriz claimed responsibility for his failure and resigned from the Ministry of Defence and as Commander of West Africa Terrestrial Forces (while it was disbanded and reorganized into the Cape Verde Defense Command). While the lessons made were paid for by portuguese blood and treasure in a war of attrition that was not necessary, several key advancements were made during the conflict:

-Combined arms warfare against an opponent who uses unconventional tactics and asymetric warfare is not an effective or advisable strategy. -Use of Helicopters, MEDEVAC, fast response units were very useful and effective in the evacuation of Bafata and special operations in Bissau. -Artillery and fire support always remain an effective and reliable tool for both sides -Superior Intelligence wins wars -Utilizing expensive equipment like planes and tanks will hurt far more when destroyed especially against a foe equipped to counter them. -Naval Blockades are ineffective at stopping shipments to the rebels. -A strong grassroots and legitimate movement is required against an opposing guerilla movement with its role to draw support away. -Mobilizing Portuguese settlers to act as militias are crucial. -Equipment procurement must prioritize cost effectiveness and medical equipment as well as a small level of mechanization to minimize casualties.

The military approach best suited for the Colonial war seems to be Spignola’s grand strategy of africanization and containment, It is in Mozambique where Portugal has the most success in curbing the influence of the FRELIMO. Costa Gomes’ campaign in Angola is also going well however much of Eastern Angola is under control of the rebellion due to poor infrastructure and the vast distances involved. However West Angola and the coastline is in firm Portuguese control as Cabinda agreed to a settlement with Portugal to cease hostilities in exchange for considerable autonomy and the cities of Luanda and Novo Lisboa remain secure.

Combat reports from both fronts are much much lower in casualty ratings than the Portuguese Guinea campaign mostly due to several factors:

-Vast distances which allow for insulation of the garrisons -Guerilla infighting in Angola between UNITA and the MPLA made Eastern Angola a battlefield between each other rather than Portugal -Greater use of Africanized volunteer and conscripted counterinsurgency forces and less troops from the mainland relegating much of Core Portuguese soldiers to the Air Force and Special forces. -Unrestricted access of MEDEVAC helicopters and air support and a great number of field hospitals prevented unnecessary casualties of disease and rapid deployment. -Common troop rotations out of the front to reduce war weariness and increase morale.

Key Objectives and improvements necessary going fowards.

-The Grand War Plan of the Portuguese military in Angola and Mozambique has changed from a war to keep the territories as colonies at all costs, and into an operation tasked to buy time for nation building into strong and friendly independent nations and to prevent the spread of communism in Africa as well as to provide legitimacy to the sucesor governments -At this stage reducing war weariness in the Portuguese population is key towards continuing the conflict and containing it to low intensity. This can be done by: reducing or abolishing the draft, prioritizing portuguese advisors to the air force and indirect fire support batallions, rapid deployment forces such as the Tropas Paracaidistes and Mechanized battalions. -Utilize Portuguese mass media to drum up support of the war from a war of colonialism to war for democracy against authoritarian communism, exposing war crimes committed by guerrillas, interviewing victims by land mines and other armaments the guerrillas use, and loyal Mozambique troops. -Scale back deployments to reduce reliance of the Home Guard and the local militaries on the Portuguese armed forces for support, this will help them develop true tactical and military independence necessary to defeat the rebels on their own once Portugal withdraws. -Use veterans of the Guinea Bissau war as advisors to the Home Guards specialized in counterinsurgency. -Develop a local support and logistical network the home guards can rely on with the Portuguese departure.

With this plan moving fowards alongside the Commonwealth plan, the war is expected to reach an end in 1970-1974 with a Portuguese strategic victory.