The American government had expected a response to the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, but taking the people of West Berlin hostage was a completely unexpected step being taken by Soviet leadership. It seemed extreme and incredibly antagonistic, but one that American leadership could not ignore. Retreat was not an option, which General Lucius D. Clay - the man in charge of the US Occupation Zone in Germany - summed up in a cable to Washington soon after the blockade was declared:

"There is no practicability in maintaining our position in Berlin and it must not be evaluated on that basis… We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent."

Through rapid discussion with their counterparts in London, American military planners determined that the most feasible ability for both sides to supply the city was via an airlift. Though they had declared their airspace a "no-fly zone", this itself was a violation of the Potsdam agreement that they claimed to be so upset about, wherein it was guaranteed that Allied nations would be able to resupply their troops in West Berlin. Additionally, unlike a force of tanks and trucks that had been suggested by some military personnel, the Soviets could not claim that cargo aircraft were a military threat. In the face of unarmed aircraft refusing to turn around, the only way to enforce the blockade would have been to shoot them down. An airlift would put the Soviet Union in the position of either shooting down unarmed humanitarian aircraft - thus breaking their own agreements and creating a diplomatic nightmare for the government - or backing down.

The American military government, based on a minimum daily ration of 1,990 kilocalories, set a total of daily supplies needed at 646 tons of flour and wheat, 125 tons of cereal, 64 tons of fat, 109 tons of meat and fish, 180 tons of dehydrated potatoes, 180 tons of sugar, 11 tons of coffee, 19 tons of powdered milk, 5 tons of whole milk for children, 3 tons of fresh yeast for baking, 144 tons of dehydrated vegetables, 38 tons of salt and 10 tons of cheese. In all, 1,534 tons were required each day to sustain the over two million people of Berlin. Additionally, for heat and power, 3,475 tons of coal, diesel and petrol were also required daily.

Of course, carrying all of this cargo in would not be easy. The postwar demobilization left the US forces in Europe with far fewer cargo aircraft than had been there at the peak of the war. USAFE Commander Curtis LeMay believed that "with an all-out effort" of 100 daily round trips these remaining forces would be able to haul about 300 tons of supplies a day. The RAF was somewhat better prepared, since it had already moved some aircraft into the German area, and they expected to be able to supply about 400 tons a day.

Unfortunately, this was not nearly enough to move the 5,000 tons a day that would be needed, but these numbers could be rapidly increased as new aircraft arrived from the United Kingdom and the United States. The RAF would be relied on to increase its numbers quickly. It could fly additional aircraft in from Britain in a single hop, bringing the RAF fleet capacity to just over 750 tons a day in the short term. The USAF and RAF would then, in theory, be able to increase capacity very quickly over the coming weeks, but it would be the initial few weeks that would prove critical to the success of a sustained air resupply mission.

Given the feasibility assessment made by the British, an airlift appeared to be the best course of action, but the one remaining concern was the population of Berlin. Clay called in Ernst Reuter, the mayor-elect of Berlin, accompanied by his aide, Willy Brandt. Clay told Reuter:

"Look, I am ready to try an airlift. I can't guarantee it will work. I am sure that even at its best, people are going to be cold and people are going to be hungry. And if the people of Berlin won't stand that, it will fail. And I don't want to go into this unless I have your assurance that the people will be heavily in approval."

Reuter, although skeptical, assured Clay that Berlin would make all the necessary sacrifices and that the Berliners would support his actions.

Two days later, British and American military leaders gave the go-ahead to their parallel airlift campaigns. The cargo planes were clearly marked as unarmed, humanitarian aircraft, and would make no deviations from a planned course directly from airfields in West Germany and the UK to Berlin and back. As they crossed over the border from West Germany to the Soviet Occupied territory, everyone held their collective breath to see what the Soviet response would be.