To a casual audience, Malaya is, today, a veritable model of what a newly independent state should be. It is democratic, pluralistic, and wealthy, assertive of its newfound freedom but not hostile towards its former colonial power. A nation where ethnic minorities can live in harmony–Chinese, Indian, Aboriginal, and Malay. Everything would change when the Malay Nation attacked. Yet, when Malaya needed the stern hand of British governance most, they vanished.

For, beyond the constitutional documents and organizations established in newly independent Malaya with the overwhelming support of the Chinese, Indians, and Aborigines, and even the support of the pragmatic UMNO under the Tunku, the median Malay is not happy about the current state of affairs. Not at all. Malays are a minority in “their own country”, as Mahathir Mohamed says–and he’s right, according to census data. With the incorporation of Singapore and the separate independence of the British possessions on Borneo, Malaya is, in fact, Chinese-majority. So despite the fervent and sincere belief by many, if not most, Malays that they are innately superior to their Chinese neighbors, their government has stated that all born in Malaya are of equal status under the law. Not only this, Malays continue to be economically marginalized and, in their view, are not receiving the respect and status they deserve, especially within the government. The Chinese, for their part, have become increasingly concerned that the Malay minority may seek to utilize their monopoly on the nation’s security forces to take matters into their own hands. The voices of Malay ultras who happily are willing to talk about “solutions to the Chinese Question” certainly didn’t help. Nor did a series of increasingly violent police abuses by the Malayan security forces–increasingly Malay rather than White or Chinese–against Chinese residents, ranging from intermittent beatings to arrests under the accusation of communism.

It was in this racialized atmosphere that a pair of Malay police officers, Special Constable Intan and Corporal Ratnasari, approached Tan Li Min, a small-time dealer in scrap copper. Their conversation is printed here, as described in the Straits Times, crudely translated from Malay vernacular:

“We’ve had some reports that you’re selling copper of inferior quality.”

“No, not at all, we only produce copper of fine quality here.”

“The last man to buy from you, he says you dumped that”--Ratnasari gesticulated towards some of the copper rubbish in the store–”and said, if you want to take them, take them, if you don’t want them, sod off”.

“Bastard deserved it though.” Tan smirked.

“What do you take yourself for, you filthy kaffir, treating a Malay with such contempt?”

Intan knocked around some of the stuff in the shop, a bit halfheartedly, since it was already all broken.

“Who the fuck do you think you are! Nobody else here treats their superiors with such disrespect! Just because you’re lending your sinful money to Malays, you think you have the right to push us around!”

Tan was thrown to the ground. A woman screamed in the back.

“This is the last time you ever sell copper of inferior quality to a Malay, scumbag!”

The sounds of heavy metal objects being used to beat a man to death may not have attracted much attention in the din of daily life in Penang, but they would echo throughout Malaya. The news of Tan Li Min’s demise–unknown to Ratnasari and Intan, a prominent member in his local Chinese community–and in several secret societies–would travel fast.

At first, it was peaceful enough. Chinese demonstrators marched, chanting, waving huge signs in a mix of Malay and Chinese, carrying pictures of Tan, or someone who they figured looked roughly like Tan, or of other relatives, friends, and neighbors who had been on the receiving end of Malay violence. That phase, however, didn’t last long. Malayan ultranationalists, egged on by elements of the security forces, seized the opportunity to gain revenge on the Chinese oppressor. Rioting broke out in urban centres throughout Malaya, with Malay gangs attacking Chinese homes and businesses and beating any Chinese they could get their hands on. While Chinese groups have attempted to resist, they have been overmatched by both the escalation of violence by Malay ultras and the fact that the security forces–in particular the almost entirely Malay Army–have cracked down hard on any organized Chinese efforts to fight back against their Malay attackers.

While in other circumstances, the government may have been able to solve this crisis, it is clear that for many in the UMNO this was precisely the moment they had been waiting for. The Tunku may have been a popular figure among Malaya as a whole, but within his own party, doubts had been simmering for some time as to his fitness to rule, given his steadfast refusal to accept the reality of Malay supremacy and unwillingness to take action to remove the “squatters” from power, despite their demographic majority.

Under influence from these UMNO leaders, particularly Tun Abdul Razak, the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong Abdul Rahman of Negeri has suspended the parliament, declared a state of emergency, and forced Tunku against his will to hand over de facto power to the National Operations Council, which is headed by Tun Razak, without consulting UMNO's alliance partners or Parliament at large. In this he has the full support of the Malay Armed Forces. Aside from Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin, the entire NOC consists of Malays. In addition, Claude Fenner has been replaced as Police Commissioner by a Malay.

In the short term, the ascension of the UMNO has quieted the streets somewhat, but this will likely not last for long. UMNO’s partners have been completely excluded from the NOC with parliament shuttered, most notably the Kuomintang. Tun Razak has promised a “restoration of the proper order of things”, with this starting with a campaign to Malayanize the government and security forces, sacking Chinese, Indian and White civil servants and police officers and replacing them with Malays in order to “account for historical wrongs”. Tun Razak has accused the Chinese of “destroying racial harmony” and has stated that “without proper acknowledgement of the place of the native bumiputras, we will be overwhelmed by immigrants”. Other firebrand ultras have gone further, with Mahathir Mohamed calling for the confinement of Chinese to ghettos and the restriction of the entry of Chinese into certain professions that should be “entirely reserved for Malays”, while Syed Jaafar Albar is loudly proclaiming that “it has been long since time to remove our unwanted houseguests”. Meanwhile, in darker corners, Malays are whispering about taking more active measures to ensure that Malays are not a minority in their own country, with random attacks and scattered violence recurring for the past several months targeting Chinese, Indians, and, in a worrying development, even some Malays viewed as being too sympathetic to the Malaysian ideal.

Quietly, both sides are organizing for what they fear may be a much more violent conflict. Malay gangs and paramilitaries have obtained weapons and in some cases are being allowed to train publicly and intimidate local Chinese communities under the nominal label of the “Regional Forces”, with their official mission being to suppress communist elements still active in Burma who have been blamed for inciting the recent violence. While the Chinese have been prevented from forming their own organizations openly, there has been a surge in arms smuggling recently–largely conducted by Thai pirates buying guns in Cambodia–and many Malay Chinese are believed to be stockpiling arms. Just to add onto this fun, levels of crime are rising across Malaya, with it largely being Malay-on-Chinese robberies, rackets, and other larcenies, and Chinese groups, licit and illicit, are often taking justice into their own hands, not trusting the now Malayanized police. The Indians for their part have been caught in the crossfire and have had trouble organizing any defense, although the minority of Malayan Sikhs have proven their ability to intimidate Malays foolish enough to challenge them.

It is unclear how long the NOC will persist, as in any fair election the UMNO leaders are perfectly aware the Chinese majority would annihilate them in the polls, but while the situation in Malaya is not terminal–at least not yet–it is not good in the slightest. To throw an added spanner into the works, Tun Razak has signaled his openness towards Indonesia and has expressed displeasure with the aggressive prosecution of confrontation with Indonesia that Britain is pursuing, viewing Indonesia as a vital friend of the Malay race in the real conflict with the Chinese. While Tun has maintained a vocally anti-communist line, he has attracted the condemnation of the Republic of China, which has expressed its grave concerns that the Malayan KMT has been illegally forced out of power, and has called for the restoration of regular parliamentary order as soon as possible. While rumors circulate in the more conspiratorial circles that the ROC has been arming Chinese KMT members, there is currently no evidence of this occurring. Yet. Tamil politicians in India have also expressed their concern for their ethnic brethren in Malaysia, and have similarly called for parliament to be restored.