يَـٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوٓا۟ إِذَا ضَرَبْتُمْ فِى سَبِيلِ ٱللَّهِ فَتَبَيَّنُوا۟ وَلَا تَقُولُوا۟ لِمَنْ أَلْقَىٰٓ إِلَيْكُمُ ٱلسَّلَـٰمَ لَسْتَ مُؤْمِنًۭا تَبْتَغُونَ عَرَضَ ٱلْحَيَوٰةِ ٱلدُّنْيَا فَعِندَ ٱللَّهِ مَغَانِمُ كَثِيرَةٌۭ ۚ كَذَٰلِكَ كُنتُم مِّن قَبْلُ فَمَنَّ ٱللَّهُ عَلَيْكُمْ فَتَبَيَّنُوٓا۟ ۚ إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ كَانَ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرًۭا

O you who believe, if you strike in the cause of GOD, you shall be absolutely sure. Do not say to one who offers you peace, "You are not a believer," seeking the spoils of this world. For GOD possesses infinite spoils. Remember that you used to be like them, and GOD blessed you. Therefore, you shall be absolutely sure. GOD is fully Cognizant of everything you do.

Constantine Region, Algeria, August 20th, 1955

The affronts to Algeria were severe. They had always been severe, since the French had first come in 1830 to sweep the old Algiers Regency from the map, and take what they wanted for themselves. This was an absolute belief amongst the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA), which had begun the war to free Algeria in earnest in 1954, and had since morphed into the National Liberation Front (جبهة التحرير الوطني), known to the French as the FLN. Unity was a paramount concern amongst the organization, but achieving that unity was still a matter of some debate amongst the leaders of the FLN.

In some ways, the French had helped matters along themselves. The recent overtures by Jacques Soustelle to ingratiate the French government with the Algerian Muslim population had backfired badly. The devastation it wrought within the government aside, the reaction by the Algerian Muslims was a mix between apathy and anger at what was perceived as overly cajolistic policy by the French administration. Some, especially those aligned with the FLN, viewed it in more overtly suspicious terms - establishing schools, enforcing Arabic education - were these matters that could be trusted to the French? Would they be speaking a French version of Arabic in a generation? If there was one thing Algerian Muslims agreed upon, it was the basic intolerability of a French-run madrasa.

The Pied-Noirs themselves, of course, were absolutely outraged at this gesture towards the Muslim population. What would later be termed “Hot July” ensued across the country, as the Pied-Noirs population made their feelings known. Oran, an area with a highly European population already, saw regular beatings and attacks on Muslim inhabitants. A mosque in Blida was sprayed with paint and anti-Muslim slogans on July 13th, and a series of mysterious fires in Muslim-owned businesses ravaged Tangiers throughout the month that the gendarmerie refused to investigate.

Yet, it was not enough to galvanize support for the FLN. While the Algerian Muslim community had again been reminded of the brutality of their occupation, unity behind the national liberation front was still lacking. The Wilayahs (administrative divisions of the FLN) were in disarray, with only a handful able to conduct offensive operations. Wilayah II, overseeing the Constantine Region in northeastern Algeria, decided the time was now to undertake drastic action. The audacious plan, developed by the leader of Wilayah II, Youcef Zighoud, was to brazenly attack Pied-Noirs civilians in the hopes of drawing a response so drastic that the Algerian Muslim community could unite behind the FLN. The events of Hot July justified this in the eyes of many in the FLN, and it would take only leadership to accomplish their goal.

Years later, French and Algerian journalists would discover one of the shocking truths about the war in Algeria - the French knew that the attacks were coming, yet they did little to prepare or counteract them. Informants loyal to General Paul Aussaresses had notified him of the massing of FLN troops outside Philippeville, one of the major settlements in the Constantine Region.

The massacre of 20 August, 1955, was horrific for the Europeans living in the area. Several thousand civilians, led by a small number of armed FLN soldiers, assaulted the town with the intent of seizing the armoury there. With the crowd chanting pro-independence slogans, Europeans in the city were massacred on sight. Some were beaten, some were stoned, others were beheaded or shot. Bodies were left burning in pits and alleyways. The French Army’s response was delayed but effective, driving the crowd away and killing several dozen FLN members - not before some of the police station’s heavy weaponry was carried away, and over a hundred Europeans and a similar number of moderate Muslim personalities in Philippeville were dead.

Massacres erupted across the rest of the region. Four dozen Europeans were killed at the El-Halia pyrite mine, and dozens more in Collo, Ain Abid, and Ramdane Djadel. The exact nature of the atrocities committed was soon mired in the propaganda of this dirty war, but the overall brutality was impossible to escape. Men were castrated and choked on their own genitals, pregnant women’s stomachs were ripped open - across the regions, hundreds of Europeans witnessed horror that would stay with them for the rest of their life. Youcef Zighoud’s plan to horrify and disgust the French into intense overreaction came swiftly to fruition.

The immediate responses by the French Army were swift, and brutal. The French Air Force razed a dozen shepherding villages, suspected to be harbouring FLN operatives, to the ground, killing several dozen Algerians and hundreds of livestock. French paratroopers, arriving at the El-Halia mine, rounded up and shot 100 Algerian men without trial. This pattern would repeat across the region - in what would become a scandal in Metropolitan France, the mayor of Philippeville, Paul-Dominique Benquet-Crevaux authorized the local stadium to be turned into an interrogation center, where suspected FLN operatives were brought, tortured, forced to sign fake confessions in many instances, and summarily executed. Their bodies would remain on the pitch for days or even weeks at a time, stinking in the sunshine, depriving their families of the quick burial necessary in Islam. So, too, did Mayor Benquet-Crevaux begin arming vigilante groups, the most prominent of which, the Torchbearers, grew to 1200 members by the end of September. These groups took it upon themselves to round up and shoot any person they suspected of being an FLN member, and even got into a few firefights with the French Army as a result of mistaken identity.

Whatever vague hopes for detente that existed before this point were gone. In any conflict two sides are necessary, and the actions of the FLN served to set these two sides in blood and gore.

Summary

• August Offensive results in 194 European deaths, and around 3-5,000 Algerian deaths

• Reprisals by French Army are swift and brutal

• Pied-Noir vigilante groups are formed across Algeria for protection of Europeans, who are armed and dangerous