Ramat David Air Base, Jezreel Valley, June, 1954

It had not been a good week for Israeli defense, intelligence, or planning. The push into the swamps of the Hula Valley had been singularly disastrous and humiliating for Israel, the former recipient of international acclaim as the finest armed forces in the near East. The Air Force had felt this humiliation acutely, itself. While the Syrian Air Force had been swept aside with ease, combat against Iraqi jets had been inconclusive the first week. Only in the second week had the clear superiority of Israeli jets become more clear.

One of the most vital components of the Israeli war plan was extensive air strikes by Israeli F-84G Thunderjets, acquired from the United States. These fighter-bombers were capable, modern, and superior to anything the Arab armies had - yet the difficulty of bombing an enemy in a swamp out was clearly evident after a week of fighting. Bombs falling in the swamp failed to explode shockingly often - some were outright duds and some failed to have their impact fuse detonated by the soft and squishy swamp mud. Those that did explode often failed to do significant damage unless they landed directly on their target - the swampmud tended to absorb and deaden the blast, localizing it to a small area. Fragmentation performance was incredibly poor.

Thus when a Mossad report to the head of the Air Force, Aluf Dan Tolkowsky, came through on the morning of May 30th reporting an offer from Turkish intelligence officials to locate key targets in Syria and Egypt, it had been received with enthusiasm. The chance to strike the key infrastructure of these enemies, particularly training camps for the Syrian army and Syrian energy infrastructure, promised to turn the tide of this and any future war.

Yet, with time the apparent fantastic nature of the Turkish plan started to unravel. David Ben-Gurion personally encouraged, then ordered the Israeli Air Force to go ahead with the plan - placing complete trust within Turkish intelligence-sharing. Tolkowsky refused. How could they know that it wasn’t a trap, or a fake? How could they know what targets they were striking? Heated telephone conversations between the civilian government and the IAF raged all through the night of May 31st - June 1st. Tolkowsky, with his headquarters at Ramat David Air Base, would not order it. This breakdown in the chain of command intensified the dysfunction and nonparticipation of the IAF in the crucial operations against the Hula Valley - 140 and 147 squadron failed to launch even a single mission from May 28th to June 10th, paralyzed by indecision at the top.

The phone call that would break the stalemate came in the wee hours of June 3rd, 1954. The identity of the caller was kept a well-guarded secret. Some said it was an unnamed Lieutenant on Tolkowsky’s staff; others blamed Tolkowsky’s secretary and even Tolkowsky himself. Nevertheless, the call to the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper’s managing editor, Noah Mozes, would result in international scandal.

The frontpage of June 3rd would be hastily modified and reworked through the night until the morning paper read the shocking truth:

TURKS ATTEMPT TO COLLUDE STRIKES ON SYRIA

Turks Favour Israel over Arab states?

Ben-Gurion in favour of strikes - Air Force refuses

The details were shocking, with many direct quotes from Turkish communiques being quoted. “We will pass the targets along and allow you to hit them as you see fit,” one read. “Most of them are training centers, which might not be of interest to you now.” Other communiques detailed an apparently elaborate plot to “Make Syria energy dependent on Turkey,” with Turkey musing on creating a “coastal Alawite state which would naturally be small and easy to handle.” The paper was also quick to blame Ben-Gurion and the head of the Mossad, Isser Hassel, for “plotting with a Muslim state at the expense of Israeli security.”

With the newspaper citing an unnamed high-ranking official in the IAF as their source for this information, it was clear that the aftermath of the war would be more devastating for Israel’s internal stability than simply its humiliation on the battlefield. The consequences for Syria’s pro-Turkish al-Shishakli would be immediately destructive, as well, and Turkey’s reputation as friend to both the Israelis and Arabs was called into question.