Hula Valley, May 28th, 1954

The Israeli Defense Force’s long-standing mandate to retake the Hula Valley had not materialized in the way so many in its ranks had hoped. Blame was shooting in all directions: the Defense Force blamed the government for underfunding them; the government blamed the Defense Force for planning the operation poorly. Indeed, the IDF’s reliance on an armoured push through the swampy Hula Valley had cost it dearly in the first week of the war.

Only as May 28th dawned would the second phase of the operation be mobilized. With the folly of using heavy tanks now clear, lighter M4A4 Sherman tanks rolled forward on the single dusty track that traced its way up the west side of the valley. Opposing the Israeli push was a multinational coalition hurriedly assembled from the Syrian and Iraqi Armies. Emplaced along the road and enmeshed into the small amount of villages and settlements within the valley itself, the Arab army was prepared for the second wave of Israeli assault.

Early operations on the 28th were intent on clearing the skies of Iraqi jets. While only limited skirmishes had dominated the first week of the war, concerted efforts by the Israeli Air Force to destroy the remaining Iraqi fighters were quickly felt - Israeli F-86 jets proved immediately superior to Iraqi Vampires sent against them, and the small amount of Iraqi jets failed to make a significant difference to Israeli air superiority over the valley. Yet, the expected air strikes on Syrian and Iraqi positions failed to materialize, except for a few confused runs on the afternoon of the 28th - one of which accidentally targeted an Israeli column. Only after two strafing runs and a dozen injuries was the mistake realized. Israeli unfamiliarity with the F-84 fighter-bomber, which had already been suffering notorious issues in US service, combined with a shocking revelation from inside the IAF that threatened to again collapse trust between the Israeli Defense Force and the government…

With expected heavy airstrikes not forthcoming, it would fall to Israeli ground troops to win the war. Pushing forward dismounted, with tank support, the Israeli advance was again slowed by murderous defensive fire from the Arab forces. With the advantage of prepared defensive lines, and against an enemy suffering from poor planning and poor communication, the Israeli advance was slow, grinding, and difficult. The extensive swamp network was hell on armoured logistics. Thick papyrus overgrew the wet, muddy swamp, requiring Israeli troops to hack away with machetes and hatchets to make progress. Syrian troops had laid booby traps and hidden machine gun nests amid the thick papyrus, and preplanned artillery firing from the Golan Heights had a tendency to create swirling whirlpools of murky, dark mud. One group of twenty Israeli troops from the 146th Ha-Marpatz division became so lost in the swamp they wouldn’t emerge until early July, with half their number lost to malaria.

Nevertheless, the Israeli push made early gains on securing the southern side of Lake Hula and the west bank of the Jordan up to the base of the lake. Counterbattery fire against the Golan Heights at least proved effective, but IDF entreaties to take the heights and outflank the wetlands were denied. Instead, all that could be done was continue to funnel troops north - slowly making progress through the swamps, fighting the conditions as much as the enemy. Ambushes were a frequent occurrence.

Thus was the combat in the Hula Valley from May 28th to June 10th. Only on June 11th, when an advance guard of Israeli troops from the 146th Division destroyed an Iraqi machine gun position and found themselves walking unopposed into Gonen, which had become a crucial Arab logistics center on the north side of the swamp, did the tide slowly begin to turn. With their rear flank exposed, Syrian and Iraqi troops were forced to extricate themselves from the swamp - which proved no easy task. Luck seemed to favour the Israelis again, however, as a huge rainstorm on the night of June 11-12th intensified the misery of the swamp and, again, turned the single track on the western side of the valley into a quagmire. Fresh Syrian artillery strikes on June 13th obliterated an Israeli supply dump at Hulata, with the explosion being visible from everywhere within the valley. Arab troops cheered while Israeli morale, already low, faltered even further.

Even these turns of good fortune were not enough to decide the war, however, and Israeli obstinance finally paid off on June 15th when an armoured push captured the village of Neot Mordechai. With the writing on the wall, Iraqi and Syrian troops pulled back to the cover of the Golan Heights to await an expected Israeli push - but none came. The Israelis had been humiliated in a pyrrhic victory, their prowess and elan from 6 years before apparently drained away. Fresh scandals continued to hit the IDF, and the specter of internal strife again hung over Israel…