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During the late clash with Paraguay's imperialist-backed forces, our revolutionary comrades in Beijing hastily dispatched some advisors to help us--skilled in the art of fighting a technologically superior foe, and prevailing against them. While it took them some time to smuggle them through Peru under the pretense of them being "mining advisors", their arrival in Bolivia has proven quite educational. Unfortunately, the lessons they taught could not be applied under the unsteady rule of the Grand National Revolutionary Junta, but with the recent elections, their proposed reforms can now be fully realized.
There were two lessons that the junta, now nominally essentially one and the same with the PRBI [Party of the Institutional Bolivarian Revolution] took away from what the Chinese taught them. The first, of course, was that a technologically inferior force could stand up to a much greater one--it merely required the proper application of good, brave small unit leadership and excellent morale--and the clever application of guerilla tactics. The second, far more important, however, was that--as the Soviet advisors under Lister had advised Comrade Fredo--the military, as presently constituted, could not be trusted. Many officers of the old order remained, along with even those of the new order who were too sympathetic to rightist views. The fact that Victor Paz had been welcomed back into the fold even offered them a legitimate, more right-leaning opposition that they could easily latch onto. All that would be required was a quick coup and some "election irregularities" and Bolivia would once again be under the hand of foreign imperialists.
This, obviously, would not do. So, with the election complete and the PRBI firmly ensconced in power, Colonel Fredo, Minister Capparelli [a firm member of the Revolutionary Left Party and head of the Interior Ministry], Director Khalil, head of the Institute for Statistics, and, of course, Defense Minister and Commander in Chief "JJ" Torres, gathered together in La Paz to discuss what should be done about this state of affairs.
It was quickly determined that fiscal responsibility and political security depended on shrinking the armed forces down to their prewar size and redesigning the defenses of Bolivia to function without a massive standing army. So, on the Feast of Epiphany, 1951, orders went out to the grossly inflated armed forces of Bolivia. Virtually the entire army had already been granted generous leave for the holidays, which almost everyone had taken up--aside from a few 'high priority' units, and the revolutionary police, whom of course had to stay on duty for this time of drunken revelries.
The news that came was, for the most part, welcomed. Bolivia's conscript classes and the bulk of the Bolivian Army's enlistedmen were demobilized, with a modest cash bonus, a bottle of beer, and the promise of future veteran's benefits for their fight in the Chaco. While some did resent being expelled in such a way, for the majority of soldiers, who hadn't wanted to be there in the first place, this was happy news--a Christmas Miracle, even.
For the officers, it was somewhat more of a mixed bag, especially those who had things like "political ambitions" and "anti-communist views"--a large portion of those laid off, as anyone viewed as being possibly suspect was sacked. Many had been on leave from professional units or were deep careerists. However, for the more pragmatic officer, it wasn't usually a bad deal. A number of officers were actually maintained--in the army's new corporate ventures, areas ripe for embezzlement self-development. Many more, indeed the majority, got offers for jobs with a number of areas, ranging from the Foreign Ministry--which had indeed sacked a number of ambassadors to make room for new generals--to management positions at Al-bol or Bol-tac, Bolivia's new alcohol and tobacco monopolies. There were even officers offered civil service postings in various administrative roles. Only officers deemed incompetent and harmless were excluded from these listings.
While it wasn't impossible that the soldiers and officers who were less than enthused about this new state of affairs might gather together on the warm summer days of Christmas, the guns they might have otherwise used were secure under lock and key, those deemed most politically dangerous were under the 24/7 monitoring of some rather grumpy Bureau of Statistics employees [carefully tabulating their activities], and the Revolutionary Police remained at the ready to break up any disorganized groups that might avoid the various clever tactics employed.
This only left the question of what the new Bolivarian People's Army would look like. The answer, as it turned out, was something heavily inspired by the PLA, not that it rejected entirely German influence. At its head, was, of course, JJ, but the overall structure mirrors that of the Chinese. The force is overall fairly officer heavy, with well performing enlisted men being promoted to officer positions, while political officers have been introduced both to ensure political reliability but also to ensure that the quality of life for the enlistedmen remaining can improve. The political officers tend to be drawn from the ranks of students and the Revolutionary Left Party, and most are mestizo, not criollo. The organization of the BPA is aimed at forming a small, elite force of regulars who are supposed to be well equipped with armor, artillery and aircraft, formulating a single "Field Army" that in reality is the same four division manpower as prewar.
To this have been augmented the Worker Peasant Red Army, which is formed of all Bolivians, male and female, between the ages of 16 and 60. Military training is to be held in secondary schools [which, it is hoped, will soon enough become largely universal] and for and by the various autodefensas. The Worker Peasant Red Army is wholly decentralized and all units are made up of local residents nominally loyal to their local autodefensas. Leadership is largely built of PRBI cadres and Bolivian Army veterans, while weapons are "whatever we can find". Even sharp pointy sticks. However, the idea is that the Worker Peasant Red Army will form an instant guerilla force and provide mass resistance in event of war.
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