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With Russia liberated, the victory parades done, and 'peace' restored to Russia, one of the tasks given to the new, unified government is the merger of the Provisional Army with the Armed Forces of Southern Russia. While both fought for liberty and freedom of Mother Russia from tyranny, two different and diverging doctrines regarding combat developed as a result of geographical and political considerations. While Denikin's force was composed primarily of mobile units and those enlisted from the Cossack heavy populations of the Don and Kuban territories, the Provisional Government in Siberia had only reliable access to the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks, with the more populous Trans-Baikal Cossacks pacifying their sectors or joining Semyonov in their... successful invasion of Mongolia. When the Provisional Army was able to break through because of superior firepower and concentrated strikes, it lacked the mobility needed to follow through and exploit breakthroughs, leading to a cycle of successful and devastating breakthroughs followed by organized withdrawals due to over-extension. While Denikin's front was more lucid and forces exhibited a similar behavior to the Eastern Front in the Great War, it was centered primarily on its utilization of limited armor breakthroughs and mobility to exploit those breakthroughs, leading to situations where entire armies collapsed to the AFSR, but it suffered greatly when exploitation of terrain and positioning could not be achieved. For the Russian Army - deemed too big to fail to succeed not only in localized conflicts, but global warfare, it has to learn from not only these lessons, but the lessons of the First World War.

With a devastated economy as well as a partially collapsed agricultural sector, the future of the Russian Army is unclear, as the status of a Russian revival both domestically and in geopolitics is currently grim. However, despite all of this, following multiple meetings of the newly formed Provisional War Council - with General Romanovsky acting as the chairman - was able to find common ground. Changes to the Russian Army's current doctrine would revolve around the analysis of the previous wars Russia had fought - and lost - and prediction of future conflicts Russia might find herself engaged in as the world continues to change around her.

The offensives conducted by Russia at the start of the Great War to relieve pressure off of the Western Front saw only limited success against an unprepared and inferior foe in Galicia and almost saw the complete destruction and routing of Russian forces during the First and Second Battles of the Masurian Lakes. While Russian forces were able to conduct several successful offensives during the War - such as Brusilov's Offensive in mid-1916 - these offensives failed to change the course of the war, depleted vital war material and in no way hampered the Central Power except for the occupation and seizure of the Galician harvest in 1914. In Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, Russian forces were beaten back by a superior foe who utilized surprise attacks and better transportation/supply lines to maintain the initiative. It has become clear that the cult of the offensive is unsuitable in this time and age, that logistics and supply have an important role in the conduction of warfare, and that Russia can not win a prolonged war of attrition in its current state.

The Russian Army was sustained through the Russian Civil War by outside powers, something that has not been previously afforded to Russia en masse within the last century. While foreign aid arrived in small amounts during the war, this aid did not meet the threshold needed for Russia to sustain itself against the Germans indefinitely. The situation in the Russian Civil War will most likely never be achieved and therefore the reliance of Russia only foreign military hardware, equipment and supply must eliminated for Russia to win any prolonged conflict. This can be achieved through further industrialization and modernization of Russia's economy to allow for the proper supply of not only the current Russian Army but an enlarged Russian Army should a major war break out and Russia finds herself drawn into conflict.

Another recommendation given by the Council would be the joint-utilization of mobility and concentrated firepower to break enemy positions and advance swiftly through breakthroughs to force either a withdrawal or dissolution of enemy forces along the front. Mobility and concentrated firepower - while having its benefits on its own - needs to be combined in such a blend that the horrors and failures of the Great War is never experienced by the Russian people. Armored warfare is something new to the Russian people, and while the Western Front and the AFSR saw tanks be able to undergo breakthroughs, their relative speed and reliability is something to be desired and if improvements in armored warfare are not achieved to support Russian efforts at the maintenance of mobility, the tank will be relegated to a purely supportive role in assisting Shock Troops in breaking the front-line.

The final recommendation of the Council would regard the merging and integration of both the Provisional Army and the Armed Forces of Southern Russia into a cohesive fighting force destined to fight future wars. The future Russian Army - disregarding the soon to be established Territorial Army - will at first number 250,000 men, drawn from all across Russia and will be expanded at a future date to reflex advancements in Russian industry. These 250,000 will be drawn from both the Provisional Army and the AFSR, retaining volunteers before resorting to limited conscription across Russia with no discrimination with regards to the rural-urban divide. This demobilization of the Russian Armed Forces will take place on an equal basis with regards to the PA and the AFSR, with the amount demobilized from both armies proportional to their size as of the final victory over the RSFSR. Those that ultimately remain in the army and those that either volunteer or are conscripted in the future will have their records examined and cross-referenced whenever possible to avoid the admittance of radical Bolsheviks into the armed Forces. As promised to the AFSR here, Wrangel, May-Mayevky, Shcherbachev, Kutepov and Dragomirov will be given positions either within Stavka or deployed forces in the field. If more generals want to stay than there are positions for them, they will be assigned to military-training schools and will be partly responsible for the development of Russian doctrine as recommended by the Provisional War Council and will be tasked with utilizing their extra time at improving standards and curriculum at not only the best schools, but all military academies in the nation. After all, Denikin himself was able to come from such humble beginnings...