August - December 1950

Along the border of Pakistan and Burma lies a small collection of townships that are populated by a Muslim-majority. Variously called the Rohingya (a newer name favored by those supporting integration into Pakistan), Burmese Muslims or Muslim Arakanese (names favored by the Burmese government), or even Chittagongians or Bengalis (names favored by those stressing their ties to Bengal rather than Burma), this population is a messy appellation combining indigenous peoples who have existed in the region for centuries and more recent migrants from Bengal and Chittagong who were given financial incentives by the British to cultivate the underutilized valleys of northern Arakan during the late 1800s.

In late 1947, just two short months before Burma’s final independence, the future of these people was called into question when the British gave into demands from a local political organization, the North Arakan Muslim League, to hold a referendum to determine whether the region would be assigned to Pakistan or Burma. This decision was met with outrage by Burma’s political elite, who promptly withdrew all security forces from Arakan Region, then used the ensuing violence as a justification to cancel the referendum. While this cancellation was of dubious legality (Burma was at the time still a colony of the United Kingdom), the United Kingdom, already a foot and a half out the door, was not about to force the issue. Thus, on 4 January 1948, North Arakan gained independence alongside the rest of Burma.

This did not settle the issue. Over the next two years, a low-level insurgency raged against the Burmese government as different groups of Mujahideen--many of them led by experienced British-trained guerillas--fought against the Tatmadaw. This insurgency grew progressively stronger as the government grew weaker and more insurgencies broke out throughout the country, splitting the government’s attention between multiple crises.

The crisis escalated in 1949, when the entrance of the People’s Liberation Army into northeastern Burma set off a chain of events that led to the overthrow of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) parliamentary government and the creation of a new National United Front (NUF) led by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). To neighboring Pakistan, this presented an opportunity to finally make good on the referendums that the Burmese had canceled, expanding her borders while gaining anti-communist bona fides in the West at the same time. With Burmese forces distracted fighting insurgencies in the north and east of the country, there was little chance of them successfully resisting an invasion of their westernmost territories by the larger and better-organized Pakistani Armed Forces.

The NUF was aware of this threat, too. Shortly after seizing control of the government, Chairman Thakin Than Tun dispatched diplomats to Karachi to discuss a potential settlement of the issue. Pakistan, however, had limited interest in participating in these talks. When the Burmese diplomats flatly refused Pakistan’s opening demand to give the region over to Pakistan, the Pakistanis left the talks.

On 12 August 1950, Pakistan launched an invasion of Northern Arakan. The fate of Burma’s Muslims would be settled by force.

The Arakan War

The Pakistani Offensive - August/September

At the outbreak of hostilities, the Tatmadaw presence in Northern Arakan was extremely small. With most of the Tatmadaw’s forces focused on fighting the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) and working to reassert government control of the country’s north, the Tatmadaw forces in Northern Arakan were limited to two battalions (the Third Burma Rifles, made up of ethnic Bamar, and the Burma Regiment, made up of Burmese Gurkhas) running a counterinsurgency campaign against the Mujahideen.

First contact between the Tamadaw and the Pakistani Armed Forces occurred at approximately 10:09 AM local time, when a company of the Burma Regiment engaged in routine patrols along the Naf River (which formed the border between East Pakistan and Burma) near Maungdaw (the river’s main port on the Burmese side) spotted a Pakistani battalion from the 14th Infantry Division mustering on the opposite side of the river, swollen with monsoon rains. Having been made aware of a potential Pakistani invasion after talks broke down between the two sides some months before, the company called for reinforcements (receiving an additional company an hour or so later), and prepared for battle, opening fire on the Pakistanis as they approached the shoreline.

The fighting lasted the better part of the day. While the Gurkhas were outnumbered and outgunned by their Pakistani opponents, they enjoyed the defensive advantage of the river, and by nightfall, the Pakistanis were forced to retreat back across the river without having seized the port of Maungdaw. The Burmese victory was short lived, though. Having taken heavy casualties from their battle, and with more Pakistani units mustering on the opposite side of the river, local Tatmadaw commanders decided that discretion was the better part of valor and beat a hasty retreat from the region, falling back south of the Kaladan river. They were joined by many thousands of non-Muslim Arakanese, who, with the memories of the 1942 Arakan Massacres still fresh in their minds, decided that they were better off taking their chances to the south.

From 13 August forward, the Pakistani advance into North Arakan was more or less unopposed. Even so, it was slow going. The August invasion fell directly in the middle of monsoon season, leaving the region’s rivers swollen and the land muddy. Losing trucks and Universal Carriers into the mud was a daily occurrence. It wasn’t until the beginning of September that Pakistani forces had asserted full control over the operational area, occupying the towns of Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Rathedaung, Akyab/Sittwe and Kyauktaw and forming a defensive line along the Kaladan river and Arakan mountains. The North Arakan Muslim League government-in-waiting, formed in Dacca at the beginning of the invasion, relocated to Maungdaw, declaring its intention to hold the suspended referendum under Pakistani supervision as soon as possible.

Almost immediately, tensions emerged between the local Mujahideen units and the Pakistani forces. Driven by a desire to ensure a maximalist border for North Arakan (stretching from the Naf to the Kaladan) and to exact revenge for the communal violence that had occurred on-and-off since 1942, the Mujahideen adopted a policy of systemic and brutal violence through the occupied (liberated?) territories. This policy was, much to their surprise, actively opposed by local Pakistani commanders, leading to sporadic clashes between the more militant Mujahideen commanders and Pakistani army units. Even with Pakistani opposition, thousands of non-Muslims were massacred throughout the region, with many more driven south into the rest of Arakan.

Burma Calls for Aid, the East Answers - September/October/November

Burma quickly became a cause célèbre in communist nations around the world. A newborn communist nation being illegally invaded by its neighbor--and discussion of said illegal invasion being stonewalled in the Security Council by the United States--was an easy propaganda victory for the Eastern Bloc. Materiel aid started to pour in for the embattled Tatmadaw. The first Soviet weapons shipments arrived in Rangoon in mid-September, followed soon after by volunteer pilots from Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania.

The true victory, though, came on 18 September 1950, when the People’s Republic of China declared that it would be sending PLA troops to defend Burma against “Commonwealth imperialism”. The 4th and 5th Armies of the Second Field Army poured across the border under the command of Marshal Liu Bocheng and [Deng Xiaoping]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deng_Xiaoping) and started their long march to the front, while Chinese aircraft redeployed to existing paved runway air bases in Rangoon and Meiktila.

The PLA quickly became painfully aware of the operational constraints facing them. Monsoon season meant that their initial plans, which involved a few hundred tanks and hundreds of planes, were logistically impossible. Even in better weather, the terrain and the lack of road infrastructure connecting Arakan to the rest of the country made such a proposal untenable. After conferring with their counterparts in the Tatmadaw, the PLA decided on a new supply route, using the Irrawaddy to travel by ship from Myitkyina to Minbu, where they would then cross the Arakan mountains through the An Pass before proceeding north along the coast. The 4th Army would lead combat operations, while the 5th Army remained entirely dedicated to providing logistics support along this route.

The first units of the 4th Army, supported by the 3rd Burma Rifles and the Burma Regiment, arrived at the front in late October, assuming positions southeast of the Kaladan. On the opposite side of the river, the Pakistanis had spent the last two months digging in, creating an intimidating network of interlinked trenches and bunkers. The next few weeks were marked by a series of raids, skirmishes, and probing offensives as the PLA attempted to identify weak points in the Pakistani defense, while the Pakistanis tried to frustrate PLA efforts to build up a force large enough to force a river crossing.

The PLA began major offensive operations on 2 November, right at the tail end of monsoon season. While one division, supported by the Tatmadaw elements present in the sector, feinted a crossing upriver close to Kyauktaw, two forced the issue further downriver near Ponnagyun, launching a series of ambitious nighttime infiltration attacks to neutralize key fortifications before forcing a broader crossing. After a few days of heavy fighting, in which the Pakistanis inflicted heavy casualties against the numerically superior PLA, the Pakistani defenders were nevertheless forced to retreat. Unfortunately, this retreat coincided with a late monsoon season rainstorm that frustrated their efforts to flee across the Mayu river, and allowed the PLA to inflict devastating casualties on the defenders while they tried to cross the river.

After a few days of reorganizing and reorienting, the PLA launched another offensive--this one to secure a crossing of the Mayu river. This crossing was successful as well after another period of pitched fighting, with the 14th Infantry Division and elements of the East Bengal Rifles unable to hold back the superior numbers of the PLA despite their superior equipment, training, organization, and defensive terrain.

PLA successes during this phase of the war were in part attributable to their control of the skies, which allowed PLAAF Tu-2s and Il-10s to strike the battlespace with relative impunity when the weather permitted (which, as the monsoon season started to abate in late October/early November, was more and more frequent). In addition to piston-engine fighters piloted by Romanian, Yugoslav, and Polish volunteers (including fighter aces Witold Łokuciewski and Ian Dobran), the PLA counteroffensives saw some of the first combat deployments of MiG-15s, which were operated by the PLAAF out of the air base at Meiktila (which, critically, had paved runways and a relatively dry climate). Though Pakistani pilots flying the Hawker Sea Fury and Iraqi pilots flying Spitfires were considerably more skilled than the poorly-educated and poorly-trained pilots of the PLAAF, their piston-engined fighters were wildly outclassed by the modern, swept-swing MiG-15s. The sole air-to-air kill against the MiG-15 was achieved on 19 November, when Flying Officer Mukhtar Ahmad Dogar managed to shoot down a MiG-15 in his Hawker Sea Fury. His victory was short-lived, though, as another MiG-15 shot him down less than a week later. He was last seen by Pakistani forces as his plane dipped below the treeline in the Arakan mountains.

Bad Turns to Worse - November/December

The PLA breakthroughs across the Kaladan and Mayu rivers put the Pakistani forces in Burma in a precarious position. This was especially true for the 14th Infantry Division’s 3rd Brigade, which had been tasked with depending the upriver sector of Kaladan near Kyauktaw and Paik Thei from a PLA crossing. The rapid crossing of the PLA meant that they were now trapped between the Kaladan river (and a PLA division across it) to their east, the Indian-controlled Chittagong Hill Tracts to the north, numerous PLA divisions to the south, and the Arakan mountains to their west (which separated them from the remaining Pakistani forces).

The local Pakistani commander was left with an unenviable decision. He could hold his position, which would keep one PLA division stuck on the far side of the Kaladan river, but would almost certainly lead to his unit being encircled and destroyed. He could force a breakthrough south to attempt to encircle the PLA as they moved towards Maungdaw, but he was skeptical of his ability to beat the force arrayed against him. Finally, he could abandon his heavy equipment (artillery, trucks, anti-tank guns, and troop carriers) and lead his men in a retreat across the Arakan mountains on foot, looking to move north around the PLA and regroup with friendly defensive lines near Maungdaw.

Ultimately, he chose the third option. On 20 November, the 3rd Brigade abandoned their equipment in Kyauktaw (destroying what they could) and fled into the mountains. To the commander’s credit, the retreat was extremely well-organized, and the vast majority of his unit successfully arrived in Maungdaw before the end of the month.

The situation there was not much better. After sustaining heavy casualties during the defenses of the Kaladan and Mayu rivers, the 14th Infantry Division, East Bengal Rifles, and local Mujahideen auxiliaries were exhausted. They were aware that the 10th Infantry Division had been sealifted to Chittagong in November, and was rapidly approaching the front, but local commanders were of two minds on how to handle this. The first camp wanted to establish a defensive frontier through the Mayu mountains and hold Maungdaw until the 10th Infantry Division arrived, then launch a crushing counteroffensive to rescue the Mayu and Kaladan rivers. The second, more risk averse group wanted to defend the Mayu mountains only long enough to evacuate their forces.

The first group won out. The remnants of the Pakistani forces dug into the mountains and made a valiant stand, even holding Maungdaw long enough for the 10th to arrive in full force. Bolstered by fresh troops, Pakistani commanders thought that they might be able to turn the war, but the fighting in the mountains was the sort of close-in infantry fighting that the PLA excelled in. December saw push-and-pull fighting throughout the Mayu mountains and the Mayu and Naf river valleys. By the end of the month, after sustaining heavy casualties and with Maungdaw itself coming in range of PLA artillery fire, the local commander made the call to retreat back across the international border.

The retreat was chaotic, with small fishing boats and military landing craft working day and night to ferry wounded Pakistani soldiers, heavy equipment, and the (tens of?) thousands of Rohingya refugees trying to flee across the Naf river into East Pakistan. In many cases, Pakistani artillery would fire a barrage, load onto a boat to ship across the river, unload on the Pakistani side, and go right back to firing.

On 20 December, Maungdaw fell. Surrounded by PLA forces, the remaining Pakistani forces were forced to surrender. On 21 December, Marshal Liu Bocheng and General Messervy, both looking to stabilize their position and avoid expanding the war into Pakistan proper, agreed to a temporary ceasefire. For now, at least, Burma was rid of the Pakistani invaders.

Aftermath

As 1950 comes to a close, North Arakan is under effective PLA occupation, with the 4th Army digging fortifications along the Naf river (which, since the Chittagong Hill Tracts were returned to India, forms the whole border between Pakistan and Burma) and in the Mayu mountains overlooking them. While the temporary ceasefire has lasted the better part of a week, there are no guarantees that peace will prevail--the first four months of 1951 are part of the dry season, which presents good weather for a Pakistani counteroffensive. Even so, the PLA occupies good, defensible positions, and the Pakistani Army in the region is battered and broken. Fresh units would have to be cycled from West Pakistan for a new offensive to have hope of success.

Outside of the uniformed Pakistani presence, the Mujahideen and the indigenous Rohingya supporters of Pakistani annexation have been significantly weakened by these campaigns. Many of the civilian leaders of the Pakistani-backed North Arakan Muslim League government were captured or killed during the PLA advance on Maungdaw, while the Mujahideen fighters themselves suffered heavy casualties both in guerilla actions against the PLA and in their sporadic clashes with the Pakistani Army. Small groups of Mujahideen continue to operate in the rough terrain of the Arakan mountains, but their power and influence are waning.

As the Tatmadaw moved to reassert control of North Arakan, bringing with them many non-Muslim Arakanese civilians who had fled ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Mujahideen, there were serious concerns among international observers that the Rohingya/Burmese Muslims remaining in North Arakan would be subjected to a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing and displacement. To the Tatmadaw’s credit, these concerns have not materialized. That is not to say that there is no ethnic conflict. However, it is not different in character or severity than the counterinsurgency campaign that preceded the Pakistani invasion. That said, North Arakan has decidedly fewer Muslims in it than it did at the time of the Pakistani invasion, as with many having fled across the border into Pakistan during the Pakistani withdrawal in fear of Tatmadaw-led ethnic cleansing.

Public opinion in Pakistan is split over the war. Among the military elite, conspiratorial thinking is becoming increasingly common, with many (quietly) claiming that the Liberation War was sabotaged by incompetent civilian leadership. Others, while stopping short of accusing civilian leadership of conspiracy, are frustrated by the decision to invade (and suffer a costly military defeat at the hand of the Chinese), and have privately chastised the government for jumping straight to invasion (which galvanized international opinion against Pakistan) rather than covertly supporting local Rohingya actors. Critically, support for continuing the war is very low among the civilian leadership of East Pakistan, who are broadly concerned that the expansionist aims of the government in Karachi will lead to Chinese attacks on East Pakistan proper.

Casualties as of Ceasefire

1: Includes those dead from disease.

2: Includes treatable wounded and disabled wounded, includes double counts of wounded.

3: Includes only those who became seriously ill, but did not die.

Internal Conflicts Elsewhere in Burma - 1950

Karen Insurgency

Before, during, and after the Pakistani invasion of Burma, the Karen Insurgency in eastern Burma continued to rage, and remained the primary concern of the Tatmadaw and government-aligned forces. The dry season at the beginning of 1950 saw considerable Tatmadaw combat operations in the Sittaung river valley (occupied by Karen rebels during 1949), with the goal of securing the Rangoon-Mandalay railway that ran through Pegu, Phyu, and Taungoo. Tatmadaw forces were well-received by the local population (which was majority-Bamar on the west side of the Sittaung river), and enjoyed strong success against KNDO forces in the relatively open and flat terrain west of the Sittaung.

By the start of monsoon season in April/May, the Tatmadaw had successfully pushed the KNDO back across the Sittaung and assumed direct control of the Rangoon-Mandalay railway proper. The railway remains a target of Karen attacks--Tatmadaw control of the Sittaung valley is far from absolute--and large spans of the track are in need of serious repair, but a win is a win.

The KNDO, for their part, have retained total control of the mountainous terrain between the Salween and Sittaung rivers, where the majority of Karen live. With heavy local support and favorable terrain, it is unlikely that the Tatmadaw will be able to root them out any time soon, leading Burmese officials to focus their efforts on other, easier-to-pacify provinces in the coming months..

Disorder in the North

With the arrival of monsoon season and the conclusion of the year’s combat operations against the KNDO, the Tatmadaw turned its attentions north to the dry zone of Central Burma. Shielded from the coastal monsoon rains by large mountain ranges, this large stretch of plains between Mandalay, Magway, and Pyinmana was suitable for combat operations year-round, making it ideal for mid-year operations while heavy rains prevented operations elsewhere.

The 1950 campaign in Central Burma was less one of conquest and more one of coopting. As government authority had become progressively weaker through 1948 and 1949, many “pocket armies” had sprung up throughout Central Burma as local leaders looked to make a quick buck (or, more charitably, to defend their communities from other leaders looking to make a quick buck). Most of these militias were not meaningfully opposed to the National United Front in any ideological sense. Indeed, some of them saw their arrival as a positive development: many of these communities had been subjected to “taxation” (which they less charitably referred to as “banditry”) by Ne Win’s Burma Patriotic Liberation Army (BPLA), and if the Tatmadaw presence would put an end to that, they were all in favor.

The restoration of government control over the countryside was further aided by the government’s control of the country’s major port in Rangoon, the government rice export monopoly, and economic assistance from East Bloc countries like Romania. These factors gave the government access to a reliable import route and a small, but consistent, source of medicine, textiles, food, and other necessities. These goods were deliberately made available at below market price in central Burmese communities to incentivize cooperation with the government. Meanwhile, political spoils available to NUF now that they controlled the government--licenses to operate liquor stores or ferry services, land grants, reconstruction loans, and so on--were deliberately meted out on the basis of loyalty to the NUF government. These “carrots” were enough to buy the cooperation of many local elites, who were quickly integrated into the Tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency operations.

Where the carrot failed, there was also the stick. The BPLA, small that it was, had deep roots in central Burma, and his bandit brave anti-communist army was happy to take whatever dacoits, pocket armies, and deserters were willing to fight. Leading the same sort of guerilla campaign that the Burmese had waged against the British and the Japanese during the War, the BPLA bitterly resisted government efforts to reassert control over central Burma, but were at a distinct disadvantage. With no real foreign backers (their position in central Burma made it difficult to receive shipments from outside the country) and no government largesse to woo local leaders with, the BPLA found themselves progressively beaten back by the increasingly Soviet- and Chinese-equipped Tatmadaw. By the end of the year, the BPLA had been more or less pushed out of central Burma into western Shan State (where they were provided support by anti-communist Shan saophas) and Sagaing (where the more mountainous terrain gave them an edge against the Tatmadaw).

Red Flag Communists

Long before the December Revolution--before Burma was even an independent nation--the Communist Party of Burma had split. During the War, the CPB had been united in its (temporary) support of the British in Burma, forming a “popular front” against fascism as advocated by Comrade Stalin. However, after the war ended in 1946, CPB policy towards the British was split. After significant internal debate, the majority faction in the party elected to pursue an electoral line to power, cooperating with Aung San’s Socialist Party and the AFPFL. The minority faction, led by wartime guerilla leader Thakin Soe, denounced this policy as “Browderism” and split from the main party. This splinter group, which became colloquially known as the Red Flag Communist Party (a name adopted by Thakin Soe to distinguish his communist party from the main Communist Party, which used a white flag), began an armed insurgency against the British in 1946. They continued their insurgency even after the country gained independence in 1948.

Since the December Revolution, the Red Flags had been directionless. They had split with the main party over criticisms that their tactics would prove ineffective, and yet, it was their involvement in the government that had ultimately given them the opportunity to take control of it. Thakin Soe and Chairman Thakin Than Tun engaged in off and on peace talks through the better part of 1950, but both were wary of coming to a peace. For Soe, peace would mean giving up his independent influence, while for Than Tun, it would mean allowing splitters back into the party.

Funnily enough, the Pakistani invasion of Northern Arakan was what finally led the two men to agree to peace. Soe had his disagreements with Than Tun, but the Pakistanis and their Anglo-American masters were a common enemy. The Red Flags merged back into the main CPB in late August. After several self-criticism sessions in September, Thakin Soe was swiftly reintegrated into the government, where his support base in the Arakan mountains and the Irrawaddy delta proved instrumental in government efforts to regain control of those territories.

The Home Front

Communist Popularity Soars

Contrary to what the CPB might say, the CPB and its revolutionary government were not particularly popular with the Burmese people. The party did have supporters--its support among labor unions was second to none, and its popularity among the peasantry was behind only that of the outlawed Socialist Party--but its supporters were distinctly a minority. Even among the Tatmadaw, there remained many officers who were not communists, but who were not entirely loyal to the government, either, and were content to bide their time and wait for the current moment to pass.

That all changed when Pakistan invaded in mid-August. If there was one thing that everyone in (Bamar) Burmese politics agreed on, it was that separatism was part of a broader Anglo-American plot to destroy Burma. The Pakistani invasion, which enjoyed clear American support (going off of American arms sales to Pakistan and their support for the invasion in the UN) and less clear British support (legally speaking, the British were right that there were no British Army officers invading Burma, but that distinction was lost on the Burmese) galvanized public opinion. Tatmadaw officers who might previously have been apathetic or opposed to the Communists were suddenly in lock-step with them, marshaling whatever resources they could manage to resist the foreign invasion.

This propaganda coup expanded outside of elite circles, too. Rangoon, Mandalay, and other major cities throughout Burma were plastered with anti-British and anti-American sloganeering, exhorting the Burmese people to support the government in their struggles to defend their country against the foreigners. Voluntary enlistment in the Tatmadaw and communist civilian groups increased significantly.

Burman Brain Drain

As the government did its best to whip up the people into an anti-British, anti-American, and anti-Pakistani furor, there were some unfortunate domestic side effects. During British rule, upwards of a million Indians had migrated into Burma, mostly settling in major cities like Rangoon, Moulmein, and Mandalay. When the Japanese invaded in 1942, some 16 percent of the country, including half of Rangoon, was of Indian descent--most of them born in India. Over half a million Indians fled Burma during the Japanese invasion. The vast majority never returned.

Despite this mass exodus of Indians from Burma, there is still a sizable Indian community throughout Burma. Indians and Anglo-Burmans make up most of the Burmese upper-middle class--doctors, businessmen, barristers, civil servants, moneylenders, and so on--who are predisposed to opposing the communist government in Burma. Many of these educated professionals, facing persecution at the hands of violent Bamar mobs who accuse them of being “agents of Anglo-American imperialism,” have begun to funnel out of the country through Rangoon, taking much of their wealth with them.

While the government has been unable to stop this “brain drain,” it is nevertheless making an effort to limit capital flight out of the country. Communist cadres have begun seizing Indian and Anglo-Burmese owned businesses throughout Burma, in turn accelerating the brain drain from the country. These seizures have yet to bubble over into broader anti-Indian sentiment (ironically, many working class Indians in urban Burma are sympathetic to the CPB, and ethnic Bengalis occupy positions of power in the Politburo), but this remains a distinct possibility, particularly if the war against Pakistan continues.

Summary - MAP

• After withdrawing from diplomatic talks over the fate of North Arakan, Pakistan, supported by Iraqi pilots and observed by Iraqi officers, invaded Burma on 12 August 1950 during monsoon season. The small Tatmadaw counterinsurgency presence in the region was forced to withdraw in the face of overwhelming Pakistani force. Pakistan occupied North Arakan by September and formed a local puppet government to hold a referendum to join Pakistan.

• The People’s Republic of China declared its support for the Burmese government on 18 September and dispatched the 4th and 5th Armies of the 2nd Field Army to push Pakistan out of Burma.

• After heavy fighting between October and December, Pakistan was forced to withdraw from North Arakan as the PLA began to threaten Maungdaw. The last Pakistani units in Burma surrendered on 21 December, followed by a ceasefire between the PAF and PLA on 22 December.

• The war in Arakan saw the first usage of the MiG-15 by the PLAAF. It also saw the first air-to-air kill of a jet fighter by a piston engine fighter since the end of World War 2, as a Pakistani piloting a Sea Fury shot down a PLAAF MiG-15. The PLAAF/Tatmadaw were assisted by volunteer pilots from Romania, Yugoslavia, and Poland.

• At home, the Burmese government reestablished control of large sections of Central Burma, including the Rangoon-Mandalay railway that had been occupied by the Karen insurgency. The KNDO and BPLA fell back to more defensible terrain in the mountains near the Thai and Indian borders, respectively.

• The Red Flag communists, spurred on by the Pakistani invasion, set aside their differences with the main party and reintegrated into the Communist Party of Burma.

• Communist cadres have started to seize the property of Indians and Anglo-Burmese throughout Burma’s cities, resulting in a brain drain as the educated professionals seek refuge in India or Britain (respectively).